

WORLD

Problems of

MARXIST

Peace and Socialism

REVIEW

September 1989

\$2.50

Volume 32, Number 9
ISSN 0043-8642



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of Communist and Workers' Parties

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Problems of Peace and Socialism

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WMR Editorial Office and Publishing House: Thakurova 3, Prague, Czechoslovakia Telephones: 331-5111, 311-1414, 311-1416; Telex: 123542 WMR

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

THE HARD BUT NECESSARY TASK OF RENEWAL

George HEWISON

General Secretary, Communist Party of Canada

Communists have to constantly examine their surroundings, to test against reality, and to check and re-check their political course and to update it in order to cut off everything outmoded and to rectify mistakes. Throughout its history the communist movement has accumulated much experience which is extremely valuable to the struggle of the working class for social progress and justice. But we also have to recognize that we have committed serious errors and miscalculations.

First, our world outlook demands that we examine the question of whether or not we have simplistically overestimated the strength of socialism and underestimated that of imperialism, and its ability to mitigate its contradictions. In the 1970s there was a tendency to consider that capitalism was on its last legs, while socialism, the international working-class and the national liberation movement were marching from victory to victory. That belief found its reflection in the Statement of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties (1969): "Imperialism can neither regain its lost historical initiative nor reverse world development."¹

While this statement was, and is, true in the same general sense that socialism will ultimately replace capitalism, it failed to take account of imperialism's ability to adjust, manoeuvre, and strike significant blows of its own. Communists were lulled for almost

two decades into acting as though nothing that imperialism did or could do would check the triumphal march of the revolutionary forces. In some cases, the tactics based on such an estimation, proved to be adventurous. Life has proven that imperialism had, and continues to have, considerable reserves in their arsenal, despite deepening contradictions. Communists have to adjust many formulations to reflect this more sober estimation.

While making such needed adjustments, we have to be very cautious and guard against going to the other extreme and throwing out the baby with the bathwater: we should not declare that socialism has ultimately failed, or call in question the basic correctness of our theory, goals and ideals. The Western mass media have unleashed a tremendous ideological barrage in their bid to prove that all the achievements of socialism are not worth anything and that imperialism is eternal.

New political thinking has improved the international climate, and humanity has pulled away from the edge of the precipice. But this does not cancel the struggles carried on either on the international scene, or within our societies. In the Western imperialist powers those who militarize the economy and would not recognize new realities or accept nuclear-age thinking remain in government, and the Communists should not reconcile themselves to this.

The leadership of our country is still very much tied to the old thinking, to "nuclear deterrence" and "flexible response". But they are increasingly being put on the defensive, and this opportunity must not be missed. So there is ground for revolutionary optimism, although certainly, there is also a need to look at things in the new way, and to do that also with reference to the *very notion of revolution*.

The Communist Party of Canada was founded amidst a resolute international struggle in the working

The *WMR* Commission on the International Communist Movement and Exchanges of Experience of Party Work continues to give coverage to fraternal parties' efforts at restructuring in order to match the rapidly changing national and world realities (see articles by Dimitris Christofias (Cyprus), K. P. Silva (Sri Lanka), Saifuddin Ahmed Manik (Bangladesh), Rene Urbany (Luxembourg), Ken Douglas (New Zealand), Kaare Andre Nilsen (Norway) and George Hawi (Lebanon) in *WMR*, Nos. 12, 1988, and 1, 6, 7 and 8, 1989.

class to counter social chauvinism and to preserve and extend the *revolutionary* perspective of the working class. Of course our party also contributed substantially to the struggle for reforms benefitting the working class within the existing system. But the area causing us the greatest difficulty over the years has been the tactical and strategical *link* of reform to revolution. Unquestionably, the revolutionary perspective remained the Party's Holy Grail, or "philosopher's stone", the more and essentially so in the difficult period of the post-World War II capitalist expansion. But sometimes, the two sides to the processes linking reform to revolution were, in practice, counter-posed, or seen as a balancing act of how much weight and emphasis should be placed on each "pole". On the one hand, the pursuit of reforms and unity with social democracy held for us the constant danger of liquidation; on the other, the democratic, antimonopoly strategy almost became an end in itself, a guard against leftist adventurism. Both of these tendencies reinforced themselves the more the constant practical and theoretical job of linking reform and revolution lagged in the practice of the Party.

This task takes on a new aspect in the face of the threat of neoconservatism today. On the one hand, neoconservatism attacks the field for reform, but on the other, there is a much bigger need for them, and also for linking reforms to the revolutionary perspective. New linkages are emerging, and the *historical gap between the Communists and the Social Democrats is being narrowed* on whether it is the struggle for survival, or whether it is the *immediate questions of concern to the working people*. Ideological differences remain, but room for cooperation is growing broader, and is a precondition for blocking and rolling back neoconservatism.

The reality of our country demonstrates that dialogue on some issues can extend far beyond the frame of the left movement. Transnational capital has launched an all-out attack, not only on the people's living standards, rights and freedoms, but on the very independence of the country. They are hell-bent on militarizing the economy. Such a strategy flies in the face of, first of all, the working class, and creates new ground for unity. At the same time, the interests of other sections of the population, including even sections of the bourgeoisie, are being affected.

The most recent example of this is the battle over the so-called Free Trade Agreements (the FTA is not fundamentally about trade and certainly not "free" from the Canadian peoples' perspective). The FTA is the centerpiece of the international corporate blueprint for restructuring Canada in their interests. As such it challenges Canadian independence in a qualitatively new way. It lays the basis for re-taking reforms granted to the Canadian people over the past four or five

decades. It is consistent with a strategy of militarizing the economy synchronized to the post-Reagan USA. Such a qualitative shift in bourgeois strategy has evoked concern from spokespersons of some sections of monopoly. Some are moved because their narrow economic interests are adversely affected; others see the carefully crafted system of reformist bourgeois rule of the post-World War II period coming unravelling and fear the long term harm to their system as the base of bourgeois rule is ultimately narrowed.

In such a situation, the Left in general, and the Communist Party in particular, have a special responsibility. They must see beyond the peoples' aspirations for a more just society, for maintaining the living standards, medicare, pensions, and trade union rights. While sharing these aspirations, they must give the people the necessary tools to combat neoconservatism in defense of these aspirations. The Left, including left members of the New Democratic Party, independent socialists, and Communists, with their vision of a Canada free of exploitation, and recognizing that the path to such a vision lies precisely through the struggle against neoconservatism, must help unite all the popular forces against the neoconservative attack. And in so doing, they must also provide a viable alternative program to neoconservatism and militarism for the people.

Such a perspective is realistic. We have already seen the possibility of a broad coalition of forces capable of compelling the Tory government of Brian Mulroney to retreat. We know that the key role here is assigned to the working class, the trade unions in particular. We have seen what is possible in terms of mass mobilization in the last federal election, notwithstanding the outcome which speaks more to the unjust electoral system, the insufficient rallying of the trade unions and the lack of an alternative program to neoconservatism and international big business.

A wide-ranging debate is now taking place in the trade unions, recognizing in part, the shortcomings of the last campaign. This is also taking place within the New Democratic Party. Even the second monopoly party, the Liberals, who are in the process of changing leaders, are debating whether to follow the lead of the Business Council on National Issues² or to respond to the broadly-based people's movement.

The Communist Party has played a role in the peoples' movement. But our public impact is still too small, especially given the magnitude of the task. Problems of our size and growth are very much rooted in objective factors, and in the history of our country. These have been well canvassed in the past. But our difficulties have a subjective basis as well.

As Canada's party of socialism, we need to acknowledge that the vision of socialism that we have

often projected has re-enforced a stereotype, imposed on us by our class adversary, of a party without roots in Canada. While we have long argued theoretically about "no models of socialism", our practice has belied this correct theory. The correction of such a mistake is especially painful in the period of glasnost and perestroika.

But with or without glasnost, it is necessary to explain for Canadian working people that the differences between socialism in countries starting from a relatively backward economic position and socialism in countries such as Canada in which the productive forces are highly developed is the difference between night and day.

The quality of life in a socialist Canada as compared to those of existing (and so far only) socialism will naturally start from a much higher level. Our image of socialism must embrace the *widest extension of democracy and people's power; it must prove superior to capitalism materially, spiritually and culturally, and in every other way.* This vision we can realistically and confidently project because the contradictions of capitalism are deepening. The peoples' desires for peace, independence, environmental protection, more democracy in the workplace and society, and a better quality of life is contradicted by neoconservatism and the attack of big and growing capital. Canadians are increasingly searching for an alternative.

That is why the ideological struggle is sharper today. The processes of socialist renewal, while stimulating a renewed interest in socialism, are covered by the monopoly media in such a way as to prove the historical failure of socialism.

The ideological attack on communism within Canada has also changed. From the sharp frontal assault on our Party, combined with an overall media black-out, the big business-controlled press still grudgingly gives space to our Party, but more often refers to it as an historical anachronism. But during the recent neoconservative period, the media black-out net has been cast far wider. Social democrats, socialists, trade unions, progressive and democratic organizations also face increasing difficulty getting an alternative message out.

Within this reality, we need to struggle to break through. Changing some of the subjective and self-imposed restrictions on our Party is more necessary now than ever. With this in mind, the Central Committee of our Party has initiated a party-wide debate on the "legacy of Stalinism". In particular, our party-wide discussion is designed to examine whether or not there is still some subjective baggage of the past that artificially separates us from the Canadian people. The fact is, people often see a caricature of a Communist rather

than a real Communist, they see some stereotype that bourgeois propaganda has made of us.

The analysis initiated by the CC of the CPC has been occasioned by the need for Marxist-Leninists to overcome theoretical stagnation, to draw the necessary lessons, and to find the path of advance. An examination of the "legacy of Stalinism" can neither be ahistorical, nor defensive. It is not an attempt to rewrite history to make it more palatable. That is why we need to differentiate between those mistakes of working-class practice that may be attributable to Stalinism, and those mistakes fed from specifically Canadian soil. We should also examine the possibility of interconnections between the two. The notes for discussion, released by the Central Committee, define Stalinism as *a ramified body of theories and practices which represent departures from Marxism-Leninism, departures:*

- characterized by a denial or lessening of inner-party democracy, and the substitution of command-style or bureaucratic-centralist leadership, which led to serious distortions in, unnecessary mistakes of, and crimes under socialism. A recognition of these practices is not a denial of the historic and heroic road of socialist construction in one country, the historic achievements of the world's first socialist country, including the defeat of Hitlerite fascism. But the acknowledgement of historical truth is needed to prevent a recurrence (or defense) of erroneous, harmful and criminal practices, and to identify how these vary from Marxism-Leninism. The distortion of the principles of democratic centralism is also fraught with the party becoming isolated from the mass of people, because the party leadership does not promptly receive those grassroots signals which enable it to correct its policy line quickly. Another danger is that the public comes to perceive the words "Communist" and "democracy" as antonyms;

- characterized by the substitution of conceited, manipulative, devious, and paranoid behavior for open, frank, and modest relations between Communists, and relations between Communists and others in the workers' and people's movements;

- characterized by the substitution of the living science of Marxism-Leninism by dogmatic formulations;

- characterized by an uncritical attitude to every practice of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in a misguided application of working-class internationalism. This attitude is rooted in history: Canadian workers launched strikes in support of the young Soviet power which stood up to the intervention of 14 powers. Such sort of reaction is natural to any socialist. But a priori support for anything taking place in a socialist country can hardly be considered as natural. But this is precisely what we did, even when

we ought not to do it. Much harm was caused to socialism in this way, and we ourselves paid dearly for that dogmatism.

Following the 20th CPSU Congress, our party passed a special resolution deploring many phenomena involved in the cult of the individual. But the question today is if that resolution has been fully translated into practice. There are many problems, such as over-centralization in the party, the weakening of its links with the population, the declining ideological standards, the need to overcome suspicion and hostility towards other public forces, underestimation of the democratic movements, and an uncritical approach to anything coming from socialist countries. Answers need to be produced to all these and many other difficult question in order to avoid the traps which thwarted our earlier attempts to examine Stalinism. *And unless its legacy is left behind, we can hardly plan the road ahead.*

Our idea of the social base of the Communist Party has to be revised considerably as well. The working class is changing, and we need to examine its new structure, and the relationship between the industrial core and the other sections of the working class. Of course, the goal here is not to blur the differences, but to unite the whole of the working class on the basis of common interests. We should avoid either of the two mistakes: absolutizing the industrial core, and absolutizing the new tendencies, the new sections of the working people that are coming into existence.

Of course, there are subjective perceptions of the changing structure of the working class, including by those new sections joining it. In Canada we have 13 million people who basically have nothing to sell except their labour power. Objectively, they are proletarians in every sense of the word, but you can hardly say that they have nothing to lose. Many have large homes, cars, powerboats, stocks and bonds—and a lot of illusions about the system under which they live and to which they feel they belong. Neoconservatism, however, is eroding many of those illusions, as each of the numerous strikes demonstrates.

The fact that there is an influential New Democratic Party in Canada, and that the trade union movement has taken more or less class-struggle positions shows that Canadian workers do not feel they have an eternal vested interest in the capitalist system. And the Communists' task is to help shape the class consciousness of the working people. Of course, that consciousness is not what it was a century ago, when the proletariat had nothing to lose but its chains. Today's workers would like to keep all their gains and to consolidate and improve their positions. These aspirations can be met only at the expense of the capitalist class, so primarily the Communists should show to the work-

ing people that they have a vested interest in *changing the system.*

In the past, our program envisioned that at some point the struggle for a democratic, antimonopoly system would be over and a quantum leap would be made to socialism à la the Soviet Union, which the Canadian worker found very difficult. Now that Soviet perestroika is presenting a different image of socialism to people in the capitalist countries, Communists have to quickly adjust. They need to seize on the positive interest rising from renewal within existing socialism. But positive possibilities cannot materialize automatically in Canada or any other capitalist country if we cannot show that socialism is a better idea than what working people have today, that socialism will give them something much superior morally, spiritually and economically. People are not going to opt for change on the basis just of what is going on in the Soviet Union. Nor will they join the Communist Party until they see that it has a blueprint for a *better society.* We should take all these things seriously.

In other words, what we need is the *renovation of our ideological work.* Only then will we prove that there is an alternative to the rule of Big Capital, militarism and injustice, an alternative appealing to the working people.

One is hard put to define the phase which the communist movement in the industrialized capitalist countries has now entered. Clearly, there are some very troublesome aspects, but it could hardly be otherwise at such a complex juncture of world history. When you search for new alternatives, there is bound to be confusion at the beginning. But there is enough grounds for optimism in terms of the changing attitudes to socialism. Although it is living through a difficult period, Gorbachov is very popular because people see that the CPSU is honestly trying, is struggling for world peace and social renewal.

Now that the communist parties are giving added priority to the struggle for peace, environmental protection and solutions to other global problems, it is logical to ask what makes the *Communists different* from the pacifists, ecologists and other progressive movements they are consistently supporting. Primarily it is the goal of ending the exploitation of one human being by another.

Communists place that goal in the context of the real world as they find it, i.e., lingering under the shadow of nuclear war, ecological suicide, the debt crisis and problems of the Third World, and so on. While striving to ensure that these contradictions are resolved peacefully, Communists are a force that also draws out the interconnections between these contradictions.

By their views and principles Communists are different from other political forces. But continuous over-

emphasis on their being different will create a self-imposed isolation and, perhaps, a certain arrogance that has found its reflection in rejecting the people. But Communists have a very special responsibility because they do have a scientific method of looking at the world, which they need to share with other people. And they should also learn from others, opponents and allies alike. We have learned the correct formula that "the trade unions are a school of communism". But the reverse is also true: *Communists can learn a great deal from the trade unions, the mass organizations and the people.* Communists are, first of all, students. Any party dies politically the minute it stops learning from people, from the forces around it. And in order to do this, it is necessary to make contact with them and analyze their practice. Of course, our class adversary does not stop learning, is studying Marxism, glasnost and perestroika!

The experience of the world working-class movement is very important. For example, the concept of "quality circles" started in Japan, then came to Western Europe, the US and Canada. They are called "work brigades" under socialism, but under capitalism they are used to intensify the exploitation of workers. We must not be caught unawares by such developments.

Communists also need to study international experience from one another. In our party, we have tended to concentrate very heavily on international phenomena at the expense of studying national specifics sufficiently. We were fairly critical of other parties for talking about socialism in their particular colors. We thought they were perverting Marxism by elevating specifics above the general. Now we need to make some corrections. We see that *there is richness, and a greater unity in our diversity in this new period of socialist renewal, a period fraught with difficulties, but a period necessary to the forward march of humanity.*

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow, 1969, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague, 1969, p. 13.*

² The BCNI is an organization linking the chief executive officers of the largest transnational corporations in Canada. The neoconservative program, including the Free Trade Agreement, is their creation.

* * *

REASON vs. VIOLENCE

Ruben Dario SOUZA

General Secretary, People's Party of Panama (PPP)

The WMR Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean asked the leader of the Panamanian Communists for his views on how to avoid a nuclear catastrophe and lay the foundations of a non-violent and secure world; on the relation between global human problems and the proletariat's class interests, and the struggle for national liberation and social emancipation; on the prospect of Latin America pulling out of the external debt crisis; and on the present state of affairs in the Central American subregion and the underlying causes of the conflict between the United States and Panama. Here are his replies.

The salient feature of the present international situation is a general disaffection with ceaseless violence and prejudice. All they do is exacerbate the basic contradictions of our age and delay interminably any possible solutions.

The store of knowledge and technological potential today disallows countries from turning their own problems into absolutes. We are involved in a worldwide process of integration and interdependence; now only realism and common sense can pro-

vide the answers to basic social problems. It is imperative in relations between states to establish a balance of interests and attempt to reach agreement.

Paradoxical as it may seem, the power we have to destroy ourselves also gives us a better chance to avert a nuclear disaster, to renounce war and to lay the foundations of a secure and non-violent world. The dialectical logic is such that the more likely the self-destruction of civilisation, the more energetic the efforts for survival, and the more irresistible the desire for security. This natural human urge must be taken into account when assessing the international situation because it is a truly decisive factor in the choice between self-destruction and survival.

There must, of course, be no oversimplification of the problem: good intentions do not of themselves produce positive results. By this I mean that in our complex world, with its knowledge and its means for determining the fate of the Earth, *reason has an immensely greater role to play in the tenacious struggle against adventurism, aggressiveness and a possible apocalypse, and in defence of the future of man the creator.* The survival of the human race depends not only on the blind forces of nature, but also on human will.

Irrationality cannot be allowed to cause a nuclear disaster. The real world, despite its contradictions and conflicts, offers viable alternatives to war as a means of resolving interstate problems.

I believe that all the conditions are there for creating a more secure and peaceful world, for meeting the formidable challenges, for eliminating violence from international life, and for ending the arms race.

I do not believe that there is any insuperable contradiction between global problems on the one hand, and the proletariat's class interests, and the struggle for national liberation and social emancipation on the other. While they appear to be different, even incompatible, they have one and the same historical character and have been evolving alongside contemporary society. In other words, as the world becomes more integrated, so social and historical progress has naturally created an agenda of problems, both general and particular, which are interrelated and arranged in an order of priorities.

The unprecedented development of the productive forces, new social relations, and the scientific and technological revolution are the distinguishing features of social progress today. Efforts to solve the problems which are common to the whole of mankind are now the main condition for further advance, and this *must be seen by the progressive, revolutionary forces as the way to attain their own supreme goals.* From this point of view, action by the proletariat, and the battles for national liberation and social emancipation cannot be viewed in isolation. Without in any way

betraying our class ideals, we must make sure that the struggle for them relates always to the concrete conditions and we must try in the course of this struggle to solve global human problems, something that would create the proper prerequisites for the satisfaction of particular interests as well.

The external debt has various social consequences. In most Latin American countries it has led to a sharp economic depression; by contrast, in the United States, which is regarded as the biggest debtor, it has led to the militarisation of the economy and a marked rise in the level of consumption. That is why the debt problem must be seen in all its complex entirety. Globally, the debt has been having an increasingly adverse effect on the economic and trade relations between states, thus generating and exacerbating many other difficulties. Strategically, it demands not utopian but realistic and effective solutions so as to encourage a general economic upswing and to put an end to the inequality in the development of different nations.

How is this to be achieved? The ideas expressed by Mikhail Gorbachov at the United Nations on December 7, 1988 clearly indicate, I think, the prospects for turning the external debt from the retrogressive factor it is today into a constructive instrument of progress.

That the burden of the external debt on our continent is so heavy shows in the fact that the moratorium on payment announced by certain Latin American countries is not due to a refusal to pay, but rather to an elementary lack of the means to do so. Such is the case with Panama. It refused to submit to the dictates of the United States and consequently faces economic aggression. As a result, its economic activity has been reduced by 40% and this is why it is unable to pay. Panama is stuck in a descending spiral because it cannot obtain new loans for the normal functioning of its economy.

The threat of economic disaster hanging over Latin America compels the recognition that the *debtor countries have a real community of interests and that they must work together rather than individually to resist the creditors.* A resolute opposition is taking shape in face of the usurious and interventionist demands of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which are aimed at the further plunder and predatory exploitation of our resources. Latin Americans are now collectively analysing various alternative strategies.

It seems to me that the new thinking, which continues to gain adherents and encourage a favourable international climate in which to tackle global problems for the benefit of mankind, is the only constructive solution. A compromise between debtors and creditors will not ruin anyone, especially since both ultimately feel

the effects of the external debt. This problem could be solved through a set of measures designed to make the less-developed countries more competitive, to revive the world market and trade, to use international sources of investment and so on. This would offer the peoples fresh prospects for cooperation and the establishment of relations of friendship and peace.

As a means of suppressing the will of the Central American peoples for freedom, democracy and prosperity, war has suffered a crushing defeat. It has brought nothing but death and destruction, and political and diplomatic defeats for the US administration, which started it in the first place; it has caused profound disappointment in the United States, and, in Latin America, it has provoked general condemnation of the forces which obediently followed the aggressive line of US imperialism.

The outrageous argument that the upheavals in Central America are the result of Soviet and Cuban attempts to undermine US security is out-and-out demagoguery: the development of the Central American crisis itself, and the fact that the growing US interference has exposed the monopolies and the local oligarchies in their plunder and oppression of the countries of the subregion, are proof enough to the contrary.

In these conditions, the prolonged general crisis in Central America has become a factor of instability for the United States as well. That is why it has been looking around for new approaches to the Central American situation. But these are still based on the strategic interests which US imperialism is not prepared to renounce. In other words, these new approaches are an effort to *adapt the hegemonistic US line to the political, economic and social realities* that have emerged in the subregion in recent years. They are a mix of pragmatism and realism in proportions favouring the superpower interests of the United States.

One ought to note, however, that there are signs of change in the attitude of the Bush Administration in view of the failure of Reagan's plans to settle the Central American conflict by military means. Objectively, there is an inclination towards a policy not based on force, something which offers hopes of a dialogue, a peaceful settlement, and new prospects for our peoples' struggle. Mutually acceptable and desired results can be achieved through realistic action when flexibility begins to take over.

For historical reasons, the relations between Panama and the United States are burdened with global, regional and bilateral contradictions, which is why the confrontation between them is highly complicated.

The first group of problems springs from the global geopolitical pretensions of the United States as a su-

perpower, with its "national security" doctrine. Our country is an important element in the deployment of the US armed forces throughout the world. The United States has assigned Panama the role of a component in its electronic communications system within the SDI (Star Wars) project. There is, moreover, the undoubted strategic interest in the geographical location of the Isthmus, which provides direct access to the Pacific and the Atlantic. Thanks to modern science and technology the US no longer requires the Canal to control the outlets to these oceans.

Regional antagonisms stem from the US urge to establish Latin America as its secure hinterland, and that is why the Pentagon has located its Southern Command in Panama. It includes a sophisticated intelligence system for surveillance of the continent, and also the most important logistic centre south of the Rio Grande.

The problems in bilateral relations revolve round the elimination of the residual colonial presence in the Canal Zone, the defence of the Canal by Panamanian forces, and the transfer of the Canal to Panama's jurisdiction.

Of these three groups of problems, the United States is prepared to solve only those within the latter group, and that only incompletely and with reservations. Our people's demand for complete decolonisation and the dismantling of all foreign military installations in the country without exception conflicts sharply with the strategic global and regional interests of the United States. This is the cause of the crisis which has weighed heavily on our country for almost two years. Washington believes that the way out is to remove the patriotic military and civilian leaders who have continued the policy of General Omar Torrijos and to set up a pro-Washington government capable of settling the colonial issue on the basis of new juridical relations. This would mean, for instance, concluding a treaty with the United States on maintaining certain existing bases and providing territory for new ones designed exclusively for strategic aims unrelated to the defence of the Canal.

Panama's political and social forces have split into supporters and opponents of continued US military presence. Those who want genuine independence, including the PPP, have set up the Coalition of National Liberation (COLINA).

The May elections were to have decided the character of the future government, but the possibility of a constitutional way out of the crisis was frustrated by the intervention of the United States, which decided to follow the well-worn path of Reagan's failed policy. Since the Bush Administration represents imperialist interests and is linked to the most conservative circles, one would scarcely have expected it to renounce its

strategic and geopolitical interests, or what is known as US national security.

Washington has given its utmost support to the Democratic Opposition Alliance, which includes parties and social forces supportive of the aggressive anti-Panama policy of the United States. The US has stepped up its psychological pressure, sent in an additional military contingent and toughened up its economic sanctions. It has resorted to blackmail and has switched on the propaganda machine to full volume; all for the purpose of *smearing Panama's civilian and military authorities and isolating them internationally*. At the same time, considering various scenarios, Washington has tried to contact individual members of the present government, offering deals and concessions simply to be allowed to stay on in Panama beyond the year 2000.

The new situation in the country has helped to rally diverse organisations round the common demand for fulfilment of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. This unity exemplifies the mutual understanding among those forces which, despite their specific interests, have been able to put the needs of the nation first and to reach agreement on joint struggle. COLINA includes bourgeois nationalist, revolutionary democratic, and centre-left parties, as well as the PPP. The task of this fairly broad alliance is not confined solely to participation in elections and the establishment of a democratic government relying on popular support; the idea is *once and for all to achieve national independence and to change Panamanian society for the better*.

Our participation in the coalition is due to the fact that its objectives coincide with the main elements of our minimum programme, which calls for national liberation and democratic development as the prelude to the transition to socialism. The basic facets of the document which has given life to COLINA contain the following demands: territorial integrity and the withdrawal of all US troops; the transfer to Panama of the Canal within a specified time and its nationalisation; complete sovereignty and freedom of choice; broader democracy and a policy of social progress. As for the present conflict with the United States, the coalition is prepared to discuss bilaterally only those problems which are connected with the fulfilment of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. Any problem lying outside their frame, as well as global or regional issues, must, we believe, be examined by international bodies with due consideration of the diversity of interests at world or Latin American level.

Let me note in particular that in the face of US aggression, the patriotic military is firmly on the side of Panama and its people, determined to support its demands and resist hostile US forays.

In this situation, the PPP regards the coalition as truly expressive of the party's own aspirations towards the creation of a free and democratic homeland. We did not join the coalition to gain any short-term electoral advantages, but out of a desire to unite all Panamanians against colonialism and for national liberation, and to invest the mass struggle with greater political significance.

"THERE ARE COMMON SOURCES..."

Interview with a "Model" Socialist

Guy SPITAEELS

Chairman, Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community; Chairman, Socialist Party of Belgium (Francophone)

In 1974, the Socialist and Social Democratic parties of the EEC member countries united in a Confederation, which under its charter is aimed at strengthening their mutual relations and helping them to work out a common stand on problems stemming from the existence of the European Community. The replies of Confederation Chairman Guy SPITAEELS to WMR questions were received courtesy of Pierre Beauvois, Director of the Drapeau Rouge.

■ **What is the point of having a Confederation of EC Socialists? Is it a revival of the internationalist aspirations of the working-class movement or an effort to create a counterweight to the right-wing forces?**

One should not speak of a revival of the internationalist aspirations of the working-class movement because they have always existed, as evidenced by the existence of the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community and the Socialist International.

Our Confederation is a political structure which has been gaining more and more weight as it becomes an element of the power system within the European Communities, and this is of fundamental importance for our economic and social life.

The formation of an internal market will entail sectoral reconversions and an important regional redistribution of resources and plants. It is important therefore that the European Socialists should be united in giving priority to an active policy of employment and development of the disadvantaged regions. We seek to prevent a growth of competition between states that would lower the social protection of wage-workers and salaried personnel and reduce social transfers. The Confederation of Socialist Parties and Social Democrats is an indispensable structure for ex-

changes of ideas on how to respond to these problems.

■ **Given the significant differences between the various socialist parties of Western Europe, how would you define their common features? What is a "model" European Social Democrat now?**

There may, perhaps, be differences, but our Confederation remains the only European political movement which brings together parties from the entire Community, in other words, it is the only movement encompassing the complexity of Europe as a whole. This shows that on many issues our parties are actually much closer to each other than has been assumed. This is also borne out by our *Manifesto*, which contains realistic proposals common to all Socialists of Western Europe in the face of the major problems over the decade ahead, be it economic restructuring resulting from the single market, the state of the environment, the reform of the European monetary system, or the reinforcement of the democratic process within the Council of Ministers, the EC Commission and, above all, the European Parliament.

A "model" Socialist—and I have always regarded myself as one—or a Social Democrat is one who fully shares the general desire to build a united and

democratic Europe which would develop an effective social policy and strive to prevent itself from becoming a dead weight in the world economy or in the area of international relations and security.

■ **What did you have in mind when you said at the Congress of the Socialist Parties of the European Community that the communist challenge is now one of the three main challenges which have to be faced? Forty years ago Paul Spaak¹ uttered the famous words: "I am afraid!" Is there any difference between the two statements?**

What I said at the Congress of the Confederation has little in common with what Spaak said. After all, that was 40 years ago! Five years ago, the Warsaw Treaty countries still seemed a monolithic bloc, unattractive, even repugnant in its rigid ideology, inferior living standards and human rights violations.

The threat was easily identifiable because it was dangerously illustrated by the ideological confrontation, the accelerating arms race, Moscow's rigid control of the satellite countries when the slightest attempt to deviate from the norm was cut short, and by direct or indirect involvement in regional conflicts. In short, the prospects were most disquieting and Spaak was certainly not alone in the West in fearing the Red Army.

Fortunately, the situation has definitely changed. Some significant steps have been taken towards detente: the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the asymmetrical reductions under the INF Treaty, the extremely rigorous verification, the unilateral cuts in conventional armaments announced by Mikhail Gorbachov, the opening of the Vienna talks, etc. We have been watching with interest and confidence the developments under way in the East.

Although I am a confirmed optimist, you will understand that it is important for responsible Western politicians to remain vigilant so that the pressure of illusions should not, at some moment, place our democratic countries in a situation of military risk or mortgage the liberties which we, Socialists, so cherish.

■ **When Mikhail Gorbachov was asked what now divides Communists and Social Democrats, he laid stress on the common sources, recalling, in particular, that when Lenin's party carried through the October Revolution it was called social-democratic. What would be your answer to this question?**

There are, of course, common sources favouring dialogue. But the differences go beyond the question of names. In this regard, the democratic tradition is already a major factor, among others. That being said,

there are certainly new developments in the East today: the economic, political and social restructuring is already a reality in some of the countries of the East and some promising successes have been scored.

■ **How is one to explain the fact that socialist parties are more liable to have contacts with communist parties, especially those in power, in other countries, than with communist parties in their own countries?**

It is natural that Western socialist parties, either already in power or aspiring to it, give preference nowadays to contacts with the ruling circles of their Eastern neighbours. In so doing they reveal their imagination and initiative with regard to East-West relations, notably in appreciating and supporting the processes under way. By contrast, the communist parties of their own countries seldom have much electoral support, at least in Belgium and other neighbouring countries. The socialist parties are not against talking to them, however, although the dialogue is inevitably less intense.

■ **What is your attitude to the new political thinking as a means of constructive rapprochement among all the forces disturbed by the global problems of the nuclear age? As a socialist leader of international standing, what do you think of the idea of a "common European home"?**

I am still not quite clear as to what new political thinking actually means. On the other hand, I know that there is a new approach to security issues which is directly linked to the new approach in East-West relations. Fortunately, many leaders have now discovered that security does not consist in stockpiling missiles, but rather in averting nuclear accidents, violations of human rights, and economic malfunctions, and that the most effectual means for dismantling the barriers separating the peoples of Western and Eastern Europe is, without doubt, to promote cooperation and the development of political, economic, cultural and human relations.

The political authorities have become aware of the need to stimulate East-West political dialogue, an indispensable stage towards mutual respect and understanding between our peoples.

¹ Paul Henri Spaak (1899-1972), a Belgian socialist leader, diplomat and prime minister from 1947 to 1949. NATO Secretary-General from 1957 to 1961. His speech about the "threat from the East" was a high point in the Cold War.—Ed.



A NEW STAGE OF POLITICAL REFORM

Academician Yevgeni PRIMAKOV

member, CC CPSU; Chairman, the Soviet of the Union, the USSR Supreme Soviet

The 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, held in Moscow from May 25 to June 9, was an important landmark for Soviet society and ushered in a new stage of perestroika. It has demonstrated the power of a growing democracy, provided rich material for thought and for the study of the current changes, and its results have provoked lively discussion at home and abroad.

Before and during the Congress, I heard complaints that in 4 years perestroika had resolved few issues, especially in the economy, with shortages of many goods still being felt and queues no shorter. There's a financial imbalance, serious economic difficulties most concentratedly expressed in the state budget deficit. This is true. But the Congress also demonstrated *how much perestroika has already done*. Above all, we must concede that a forum conducted in such an atmosphere of openness, with a real pluralism of opinions on the past, present and future of our society would not have been possible without it. Even a year ago this would have been almost inconceivable.

FREEDOM AND PLURALISM OF OPINION

One of the features of the new stage of perestroika launched by the Congress is its highly democratic nature, which appears, having pervaded the whole of society and given it a sense of liberation, to have gone beyond the international experience of parliamentarism. New forces have come out of the shadows, and a road has opened up for many nontraditional political leaders. Numerous people's deputies gave speeches which were distinguished by their maturity, their wisdom and their readiness to tackle issues in a statesman-like way. Moreover, this unprecedented assembly was a signal success in that, generally, they took their cues not from higher-ranking comrades, but from the mandates of their electors and their own judgements.

The Congress is also significant in that it accurately reflected the times, offering a broad national, social and political cross-section of the contradictions and complexities of society. This was very useful both for the people, who now have a greater degree of self-awareness, and for the leaders. The image it gave was not a superfi-

cial, tendentious or made-to-measure one, but a true picture of the USSR in the fifth year of perestroika. It is very important to have such a picture before you when further renovation and development of socialism is being decided. The course to be charted demands a realistic understanding of the character and potential of our society.

People's deputies have spoken up unanimously for perestroika, thus reflecting the genuine mood of the majority. Of course, there are people (some of whom must have been present at the Congress) who believe that perestroika is not the only way of dealing with the country's problems and who may even feel a nostalgia for administrative command methods. However, the fact that they dared not profess their views openly from the rostrum in front of the TV cameras is indicative of the general atmosphere of the country and of how far society has advanced along the path of reforms.

The Congress has given full vent to a pluralism of opinions, something that was viewed rather abstractly until recently. But this pluralism was less obvious in discussions on the state's development strategies. The fact is that many seemingly different positions have in common a basic recognition (albeit in various measure) of the need to decentralise, to end past deformations in relations between the federation and the republics, to add substance to the economic sovereignty of the latter, to advance towards a self-regulating economy, and to further extend democracy with full-scale organisation and a high degree of responsibility. Neither at the Congress, nor after it, were there any speeches categorically rejecting the idea of greater autonomy for economic units, stronger discipline, an intensified anticrime drive or the rectification of past mistakes in national state construction and the functioning of administrative bodies.

As to the tactics for overcoming the current difficulties, primarily in the economy, the divergence of opinions was much more in evidence here. Differences emerged in respect of the scope and tempo of proposed measures, and of how resolutely a deputy or group of deputies were suggesting them. Some favour extraordinary steps, while others would prefer a calmer, more considered approach, believing that there has already been a turn for the better, that the country is coming out of crisis and that certain

levers need to be consistently strengthened without resorting to emergency measures.

These debates mirror a real-life contradiction: once you admit the necessity of extraordinary steps, then you inevitably require administrative measures, which by their very nature are uneconomic. The paradox lies in the fact that they ought ultimately to lead to the furtherance of perestroika: to decentralisation; to movement towards a self-regulating system of production; and to the use of nonadministrative methods of guidance over the economy and society as a whole—economic, moral and democratic methods, but by no means command ones. Here, two possibilities emerge: either our grasp of this actual dialectic leads us to look for a way out through more perestroika; or extraordinary measures lead us to the point where we deviate from it and begin to reinforce the command administrative system.

But no matter how sharp the debates on economic issues, ecology, relations between nationalities, and other topics, all the participants were united by the common belief that we can no longer engage in retrospective analysis, concentrating on the grim legacy of the past. Yes, the weight of the past is great; and we did not immediately recognise this legacy for what it was, even after the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. But it would be wrong to confine ourselves to such a statement today, which is why the people's deputies mainly discussed the errors, deficiencies and omissions that have occurred in the restructuring period itself. This attests to their focus on the present and future, on the search for *optimal solutions to the country's predicament and on giving new impetus to perestroika*.

Even at the 1st Congress many comrades were demanding, with understandable impatience, the immediate and straightforward adoption of certain measures, including those of an economic and legislative nature, forgetting the need to act in a considered and well-thought-out manner without undue haste. Taking the deputies' wishes and suggestions into account, appropriate instructions were given to the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the USSR. On a number of urgent problems the Congress itself passed concrete decisions in the interests of the least provided-for sections of the population—pensioners and invalids. Among other things, they also undertook to study the possibility of extending periods of leave. Furthermore, deputies formed commissions for the inquiry into the most complex issues of the country's history and of relations between nationalities.

The work of this new and highest organ of power was a triumph for *glasnost*: the whole country and the world at large saw and heard what the deputies were saying. Some of their statements were blunt, categorical and sometimes even erroneous, but nothing was censored. Admittedly, there were deputies more concerned with making an impression than with getting down to business, but this is only to be expected as one of the inevitable corollaries of democratic procedure.

That not all were ready for the scope and openness of the debate is accounted for by the generally low level of political culture. We saw once again how appearances differ from reality: earlier, when the Supreme Soviet was actually programmed as a mechanism for unanimous voting on every item, we considered ourselves as having a high degree of political culture. Now we see that that was nowhere near enough. Yet the creation of such a culture is an *indispensable stage* in the formation of democratically functioning representative bodies, and of a rule-of-law state as a whole. But it will come in time. We have already begun to borrow a lot of what is worthwhile and applicable to us from abroad, from countries with a great deal more experience of parliamentary custom.

TOWARDS A HUMANE, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

Our society has now reached the point where genuine sovereignty for the Soviets must begin. The preamble to the 1st Congress resolution, adopted by a majority of votes—On the Main Areas of Domestic and Foreign Policy of the USSR—says that this Congress, "in expressing the will of the people, has taken upon itself the plenitude of supreme state power in the land. The people has entrusted its fate to the deputies, and there is no loftier duty than to honour its mandate".

The realisation has begun of the Congress-backed line of the 19th All-Union Party Conference aimed at a clear *demarkation of functions* between the party and state bodies at all levels, the formation of a socialist rule-of-law state and the consistent implementation of the principle whereby all public organisations, including the CPSU, operate within the framework of the Constitution and the Law. The Congress then unanimously sanctioned the immediate commencement of work on preparations for a new Fundamental Law of the USSR, to this end setting up a Constitutional Commission. This Fundamental Law will embody the principles of humane, democratic socialism and affirm the social, economic and political foundations for the construction of a Soviet state with a Leninist federal structure. It will provide the kind of economic, social and political structure that will once and for all preclude the rise of a personality cult, authoritarianism or the retention of command administrative methods.

By the next Congress of People's Deputies, set for the autumn, necessary amendments to the existing Constitution will have to be drafted with account taken of suggestions made at the first forum.

The USSR Supreme Soviet, elected by the Congress, has started work on a permanent basis, actually becoming the *most important link in the system of popular government*. It is taking on, firstly, legislative functions and, secondly, real control over the executive power, control which presupposes both serious budget discussions and close examination of the candidates for the cabinet posts by the Supreme Soviet Committees and chambers—the

Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. Even at the 1st session of the Supreme Soviet, soon after the Congress, not all ministerial candidates proposed by the head of government received the deputies' support.

The problems of *Soviet federalism*, the sovereignty of the republics and the ensuring of the rights and legitimate interests of the peoples inhabiting the USSR, large and small, are being discussed with particular sharpness at the new stage of political reform. With all the differences in approach, it is especially important here to display wisdom, responsibility, restraint and far-sightedness in the choice of solutions. And this is possible only on the basis of reason, law and comprehensive dialogue. We consider close contacts and consultation—primarily between the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics as absolutely sovereign, independent bodies—to be vital on a wide range of issues, the central one of which is perhaps that of the republics' economic sovereignty. These questions still require a great deal of discussion and argument. It is important that we conclusively overcome the deformations that arose under Stalin and in the stagnation period, naturally at the same time doing everything to ensure that our national economy as a whole does not suffer. This, I believe, would benefit not only those who live and work at the centre, but also those in the republics.

THE PARTY IS NOT GIVING UP ITS VANGUARD ROLE

The decisions taken by 19th Party Conference and subsequent Central Committee plenums on the division of functions between party and state bodies does not infer an abandonment of the *party's vanguard role*. Lenin believed that the party must guide public and state organisations *through the Communists* working in them, not through the creation of structures which substitute for or duplicate the appropriate bodies of administration. A distorted system involving the virtual subordination of the elected authorities to the apparatus, of representative to executive and of government to party bodies, appeared under Stalin.

It is clear that by retaining its role as the ruling party the CPSU will concentrate on its essential task of working out a political course of societal development and carrying out cadre policy without occupying itself, as before, with the day-to-day running of all spheres of public life, with all branches of industry, or with the drafting of laws which were then rubber-stamped by the Supreme Soviet.

Among the arguments in favour of the party's continued vanguard role, those associated with its past services or the historical path traversed under its leadership are not the only ones. The CPSU, having launched and driven forward perestroika, is today seen as the only force consolidating Soviet society, the various nations and nationalities and the Union and autonomous republics. Of course, errors may occur, not least in the party apparatus. But this latter should never be confused with the party

itself, something which has occurred in individual statements, including some made at the Congress. The composition of its deputies, among whom 87% are CPSU members, is very indicative in this respect. So is it really possible to set the Congress of People's Deputies in opposition to the party, or to posit the establishment of a parallel system of power?! All power is now in the hands of the Congress, but this does not mean that the party has ceased to be the vanguard force, even though the role of the vanguard in present-day conditions is to be understood in an entirely different way.

If the party acts in the old manner, if its organisations fail to adapt their methods to the changed conditions, then the prestige of the Communists will be in jeopardy. In his concluding remarks at the Congress, Mikhail Gorbachov said that "the party sometimes falls behind certain processes under way in society. If it wants to be the political vanguard of society, and to fulfill this mission in the future as well—and society needs such a vanguard force, an exponent of programmatic aims—the party must readjust more quickly than society."

How, then, do communist deputies square party discipline with their duties to the electorate, with their independence and initiative in upholding the latter's interests? Personally, I am not aware of any party decisions which would require a people's deputy to vote against his conscience, irrespective of whether he is a CPSU member or not. Of course, we know about the parliamentary practice in some countries where the deputies vote only in strict accordance with the decision of their group. We do not have such a formal sense of discipline, simply an adherence to certain principles by virtue of which, in pursuing your own line, you remain a member of the party. For example, as a member of the CPSU and its CC I can vote against particular candidates at the Congress regardless of the leadership's position. But if it's a question of basic policy changes then, naturally, as a Communist, I support the decisions of the CC. This is obviously the key to dealing with a Deputy's party discipline.

PERESTROIKA AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD

It is only natural that the Congress and its decisions should have attracted enormous attention throughout the world. The new state-legal mechanisms in the USSR are being compared with the world experience of parliamentarism and with the practice of other socialist countries. And the international significance of our political reforms should obviously be examined in terms of exchanges of experience, especially between socialist states. The Soviet Union today frankly admits that it is by no means closer to the truth than anyone else. Each country has its own specific conditions, historical traditions and unique tasks. Objectively, however, our experience, and especially that of the 1st Congress of People's Deputies, shows that *socialism is amenable to renovation, that it has not ex-*

hausted its potential and that it is inseparably linked with such values as honesty, openness and democratism. This largely means a return to the moral ideals of the Lenin period. At the same time we see signs of the fact that socialism blends into the surrounding modern world by acquiring features which stem from the global context of its development.

The above-mentioned factors are bound to influence the activity of communist parties in different parts of the world, and the growth of trust towards the Soviet Union among other social forces. Our perestroika, which is steadily advancing along its charted course despite collisions and difficulties, is having a stabilising effect on the international situation as a whole, thus helping to save humanity from possible extinction.

As the 1st Congress of People's Deputies stressed in its resolution: "The abandonment of dogmatic perceptions; a realistic approach to the various phenomena and processes of international life; a return to universal human values of their lost significance; the de-ideologisation of inter-state relations; and an organic reunification of the policy aimed at defending the country's interests with morality — these are the distinctive features of new thinking, in accordance with which a radical shift has occurred in the foreign-policy course of the USSR."

Our friends and partners in different parts of the world have been able to see for themselves that Soviet foreign policy and new political thinking are inextricably linked to internal reform in the Soviet Union. Without it, without the democratisation now under way in our country, there would be no new Soviet foreign policy and none of the tangible results it has made possible. Since the Congress, this course has become for our people and the world even more open and predictable than before. This interdependence is perfectly straightforward, one might almost say mathematically so. With unprecedented exactingness, at times even amounting to captiousness, people's deputies are demanding an open and democratic procedure for the adoption of foreign policy decisions and an end to the practice whereby decisions (even those as important as sending troops into Afghanistan) were taken in secret. All questions relating, among other things, to the overseas use of Soviet armed forces, large credits to foreign states, and economic aid have now to pass through the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and its ratification of treaties with foreign states will no longer be formal, based instead on comprehensive and democratic discussion.

The restructuring of all aspects of social life is designed to extricate the Soviet Union from the serious crisis in which it found itself at the beginning of the 1980s. We are determined to rid ourselves of everything that stands in the way of socialist development, to give socialism a modern face, and to open up new horizons of progress for Soviet society. This assessment, confirmed in the Congress resolution, reveals the essence of this crucial moment in our history.

RELYING ON THE PEOPLE'S ENTHUSIASM AND CREATIVE EFFORT

KIM GI NAM

First deputy head, CC Propaganda Department,
Workers' Party of Korea (WPK)

If socialist construction is to proceed apace, it is imperative to release, stimulate and develop the revolutionary enthusiasm and creative activity of the masses. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea this has become the personal concern of every citizen, which is why they all try to work imaginatively and solve the problems that arise in the building of a new society as masters of that society should. Nevertheless, the Workers' Party of Korea, which directs the process of progressive change, has been striving to enhance the role of the working people and seeking to perfect original forms of mass leadership while giving priority to political work.

Kim Jong Il, member of the Political Bureau Presidium and CC Secretary of the WPK, says: "If revolutionary tasks are to be successfully fulfilled, political work to educate and rouse people must be made the cornerstone."¹ The idea is that we *must first of all equip the people with a knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and of the party's line and policy, and teach them to apply them in practice.* This is the key task because the role and place of men and women in the revolutionary struggle and in socialist construction is determined by the level of their ideological consciousness, which cannot, of course, be raised by means of orders and instructions. All sorts of minutes, statistical reports, decisions and resolutions are of little use in the all-round education of human beings.

The priority of political methods and the foremost significance of moral ways of stimulating people, however, does not suggest that the negligent are not to be subjected to administrative penalties, or that there is no need to improve the economic and technical conditions in which production processes run, or to hold out material incentives for success. The fact is that socialist society is a

Kim Gi Nam was born in 1929. He is a trained teacher and was at one time a dean at the Kim Il Sung University. He was later deputy department head at the WPK CC, and editor-in-chief of the journal *Kenroja* and the newspaper *Rodong Shinmun*. He is an alternate member of the WPK CC and a deputy of the Supreme People's Assembly (Parliament).

transitional one, and along with moral incentives, we must practise the socialist principle of distribution according to the quantity and quality of labour. Political methods of mass leadership are not an end in themselves, but merely a means for successfully fulfilling the tasks and implementing the line and policy of the WPK, which in turn reflect the people's will and aspirations.

The party gives primary attention to the ideological education of the working people, and has been working hard to enhance their class consciousness in the revolutionary proletarian tradition, to help them to be firm of spirit and to teach them the Marxist method of analysing the real world. It is all the more important to do this because *our people are building socialism in a divided country and in direct confrontation with US imperialism*. Besides, in the key sectors of social life we now have a generation which knows nothing of the horrors of economic exploitation and colonial oppression. These younger people were not tested in the revolutionary struggle.

We also take account of yet another specific feature of our history: for a long time the country was very backward and its development was retarded by its dependence on the imperialist powers. Once liberated from foreign rule, our people began to build a new society, but we were once again hurled back by the three-year war which the US imperialists unleashed against democratic Korea. That is why we have no right to waste any time: where others take one step, we must take ten and a hundred. The main thing is to teach the working people not to retreat in the face of the difficulties and obstacles arising in socialist construction.

As we look back on the past, we can see clearly the trying conditions in which our people have had to fight for the right to live and work on their own native soil in the way they want. Even in the postwar period, rather than ceasing their interference, reactionary US circles and their henchmen stepped up their provocative moves against People's Korea. Together with the constant threat of external aggression, the situation was worsened by the splinter activity of anti-party elements within the WPK. Economic construction was hampered by a shortage of materials and funds as a result of the country's trials. Indeed, even the first few successes in industrialisation and the building of a new society could not rid us of all the problems which had accumulated in the earlier period.

What were we to rely on? How were we to advance the revolution? Those were the paramount questions which then faced the party, and it found the right answers. Keeping faith with the masses, the Communists worked among them, told them about past and present difficulties, and set an example in courageously facing adversity. *As a result, the Korean people, with firmer will and greater strength of spirit, succeeded in overcoming the unfavourable circumstances through their own efforts, bringing about a radical change in socialist construction, and starting consistently and purposefully to build up the country's*

strength and develop the political, economic, cultural and other spheres of public life.

By concentrating on political methods, with considerable attention given to shaping such key human qualities in communist society as boundless loyalty to the leader, party and revolution, the WPK CC is working to unite the people around the common idea and the common purpose. We want to turn loyalty to socialist ideals and to the homeland into unflinching conviction and a conscious duty towards selfless struggle for a radiant future and for the benefit of the entire people.

The party's experience shows that political work is successful when oral, visual, aesthetic and other forms of agitation are well organised. That is why the WPK has spared no effort or resources to organise this work, primarily in the economic sphere, and to orient its propaganda activity towards the solution of long-standing problems in the sectors of the national economy, urging the working people to broaden the mass movement of innovators and front-ranking workers in production, something that is crucial for the free expression of revolutionary enthusiasm and creative activity.

WPK CC General Secretary Kim Il Sung says: "The mass movement is an effective method of their mobilisation, the revolutionary method of work, which helps to step up the advance of the revolution and construction by relying on the people's collective forces."² The WPK CC tries to blend the party's united will with the wishes and interests of the people, working to consolidate the cohesion and cooperation of the working people of our country, acting as initiator of various forms of shock-work and patriotic enterprise, and promoting the free expression of talent and initiative. Thus, in the postwar period, our party put forward this militant slogan: "Let us forge ahead as fast as Chollim!"³ and called on the masses to struggle for faster social construction, higher labour productivity and fulfilment of state plans ahead of schedule.

The innovators multiplied their successes everywhere as the movement developed and gained in depth. The five-year and seven-year plans were overfulfilled at many factories and plants, and in 1970, for instance, the country's industrial output was up 31% on 1969.

The Chollim movement is an organic blend of collective innovation in the cultural and economic spheres, and the WPK's work to educate and re-educate the working people. It has helped passive citizens to become activists, and lagging citizens to become front-rankers. Apathy, conservatism and mysticism with respect to new technology and new methods of production—obstacles to successful socialist construction—were swept away. The working class and all other working people of our country are displaying revolutionary enthusiasm, tapping reserves, making up what is lacking, breaking the mould of the old norms and notions of productivity and creating new ones.

The present period is characterised by the fact that our society has risen to a qualitatively higher level and is developing on the basis of the ideas of Juche. *What is*

specific about this stage is that we seek to transform all our citizens in the spirit of the working-class ethic and to teach them to rise to the ideological and material summit of communism.

In these conditions, the party has begun a movement for the Red Banner of the Three Revolutions: ideological, technological, and cultural. It has called on all the people to carry out these revolutions much faster under the slogan: "Ideology, technology and culture according to the requirement of Juche!" In other words, the main thing now, we believe, is to reform our men and women ideologically and culturally to prepare them for the attainment of new objectives, for the solution of vital problems in the technical reconstruction of our national economy, to help them gain deeper knowledge about Nature and about the essence and laws of social relations. The party has invigorated the activity of revolutionary organisations, seeking to mould working people ideologically in every way as men and women of the communist type capable of successfully carrying on economic, political and spiritual construction.

This is a serious and large-scale effort, but its chances for success can be gauged from the fact that even when some people doubted the wisdom of the decision taken a few years ago to begin more than 260 building projects in Pyongyang, questioning whether Korea could cope with such a vast task since the country was also building major power plants, chemical complexes, railways and highways, our people, having learnt from their own experience the truth and power of the great ideas and wise leadership of the party, remained convinced that anything the country needed was possible. Thanks to the dedicated efforts of the builders, more than 170 projects have already been completed, among them a sports stadium, the Central House of Youth, the East Pyongyang Great Theatre, the International Communications Centre and other athletic, cultural, and municipal facilities; 60 kilometres of city roads have been laid, 28 bridges built, and 300 kilometres of underground communications installed. Many other major construction projects in the capital are soon to be commissioned.

Workers in agriculture scored some equally impressive gains. Full of enthusiasm they made able use of all the potential inherent in the people's power to increase agricultural production. In the course of the second seven-year period (1978-1984), our peasants received many modern machines, equipment for irrigation works, and large quantities of chemical fertilisers. Statistics show that the number of tractors increased by 50%, lorries by 30%, and trailers by 70%; in addition, 200 water reservoirs and more than 3,000 pumping stations were built for the needs of farming.

This all helped to accelerate industrialisation and modernisation of the agrarian sector, which rapidly and comprehensively developed: in the early 1960s, the country harvested 3.8 million tons of cereals, and in 1984—10 million tons. The task now is to increase the crop

to 15 million tons. With their revolutionary spirit our peasants have every possibility of achieving this.

Recently, in order to stimulate the revolutionary enthusiasm and creative activity of the population and to create the conditions for their widest practical application, the party called on everyone to "Live and work like heroes!" This new movement is designed to instil in citizens the heroic traditions of their fathers and grandfathers forged in the revolutionary liberation struggle led by Comrade Kim Il Sung against Japanese imperialism. The fighters of the insurgent army displayed unparalleled bravery and courage in the battles to liberate and revive the country. The first generation of our people's heroes has shown just what people can do for the sake of great ideals. Their followers today have achieved equally impressive results on the labour front.

An Austrian public figure who recently visited our country told journalists: "I have been to many countries of the world. I have seen the construction of mammoth dams, towering luxury hotels, railway lines and major steel mills. But in People's Korea I was amazed by the fact that the building of similar projects was carried on simultaneously and swiftly. My general impression of Korea is that it is a 'country of construction'." His impressions are realistic. In the current, third seven-year plan period (1987-1993), the WPK CC and the government have set the task of building 150,000 to 200,000 well-appointed flats a year, and this will increase per capita living space by 30%.

The next turning point in the development of the movement of innovators and front-rankers was marked by a countrywide congress of heroic shock-workers in 1988, which was held in an atmosphere of general approval of the WPK's policy. Its participants called on the people to fight against conservatism and stagnation, to do away with carelessness and negligence everywhere, to overcome the fear of the new and to put an end to the defeatist mentality which is still to be found here and there. The participants at the congress referred to the tried and true experience of achieving amazing results through the use of modern methods and forms of labour organisation and the application of bold technological solutions. Thus, it took no more than 5 years to build the eight-kilometre barrage of the West Sea sluice in the estuary of the Taedong-gang river. It took 1 year to complete the construction of the first section of the Song Won Dam at the Tae Chon hydroelectric power plant, and a 40-kilometre tunnel for the supply of water to its turbines, a project that was initially said to require 10 years to build. Our engineers and workers scored a success in laying a railway line more than 100 kilometres long in the north of the country. This required the building of 46 bridges and 37 tunnels.

The record of socialist construction in our country shows that a working-class party can overcome the difficulties only when it puts its trust in the strength of the popular masses, boldly relies on their creative initiative and talents, and skilfully organises the working people to fulfil

revolutionary tasks. This helps to multiply over and over again the strength of society led and inspired by the party. That is why world imperialism will never succeed in its desperate attempts to discredit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to prevent our people from realising their cherished aspiration: to build the most advanced economic and social system. It is already clear to us that the future belongs to socialism, which is superior to capitalism in every respect. That this is a realistic prospect is proved, for instance, by the fact that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine has struck deep roots in the minds of many peoples of the world, and that dozens of countries on the globe have opted for the socialist way of development.

The Workers' Party of Korea intends proudly to carry high the banner of the revolution and socialism, and vigorously to accelerate the building of a new society, relying on the enthusiasm and creative activity of the popular masses, firmly defending their gains against attacks and slander on the part of reactionaries of every stripe, and moving on to the great day when the country is re-united.

¹ Kim Jong Il, *On the Ideas of Juche*, Pyongyang, 1987, p. 77 (in Russian).

² Kim Il Sung, *Historical Experience in Building Up the Workers' Party of Korea*, Pyongyang, 1986, p. 114 (in Russian).

³ A legendary winged steed which carries its rider to the land of happiness at fabulous speed.—*Ed.*

* * *

THE GREAT BEGINNING IS NO ILLUSION

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In many socialist countries much keener interest is being shown in problems relating to human beings, their endeavours, motivations, and the meaning and quality of their lives. Major reforms are being carried out, and conservatism is being combatted in politics and economics. All

past experience—what has been gained and what has been lost; the illusions and the errors—is coming under close scrutiny in heated debates centring on the scarcity of material goods and democracy. It is being said, after all, that more food, more housing, more hospitals and more power to the people mean more socialism. No one objects to such an approach, but how is it all to be achieved? Here, the search for an answer is being directed towards conscious human creative effort itself.

That is why I think it is worthwhile turning to Lenin's idea of communist labour, which he expressed in his article "A Great Beginning" over 70 years ago. Was the very idea of communist labour itself, perhaps, a great illusion? That is a question the Soviet author Natalia Morozova failed to consider in the piece she wrote to mark the anniversary of Lenin's article.¹ But it seems to me a question that we should do well to ponder today as the task of making better use of labour incentives is justifiably coming to the fore. The author devotes herself to a serious attack on the distortions of Lenin's idea which have occurred in the course of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. However, the question she ought to have broached is, even if bureaucratic distortions could have been avoided, would voluntary labour in the form of subbotniks have helped in building socialism?

Lenin drew attention to the spontaneous social activity displayed by working people when the young socialist state was under duress, work that came to be called subbotniks. In 1919, Lenin said: "Communism is the higher productivity of labour—compared with that existing under capitalism—of voluntary, class-conscious and united workers employing advanced techniques. Communist subbotniks are extraordinarily valuable as the *actual* beginning of *communism*; and this is a very rare thing, because we are in a stage when 'only the *first steps* in the transition from capitalism to communism are being taken'..."²

Lenin greatly appreciated the workers' new attitude to labour, and said that, as the experience of earlier formations shows, the socialist system of production would not be established right away, not without a long series of reverses, mistakes and relapses into the past. Old habits and rigid approaches die hard and are bound to slow down progress. For some time the old remains stronger than the new, the rule in Nature as in social life. Lenin was by no means claiming, of course, that the primary and crucial role would belong to the communist subbotniks. He merely sought to identify new shoots within the old mass, to analyse them, determine an attitude towards them, and help them in every way to develop.

Streamlined, modern production relying on advanced techniques, technology and labour organisation; workers' voluntary and conscious discipline; model conditions of health and safety at work; the best dining rooms, nurseries and secondary schools; comfortable homes and clean neighbourhoods; constant supplies of basic goods and services; a flat for every family; health care for all—the

acknowledgment of human needs and a desire to satisfy them is at the root of these things. These were, in turn, the elements Lenin saw as needing to be cherished and encouraged: "Less political fireworks and more attention to the simplest but living facts of communist construction, taken from and tested by actual life."³

But was the transformation of the selflessness of millions prepared to sacrifice themselves in defence of the October Revolution into a universal habit of working the communist way a realistic prospect? Despite Lenin's awareness of the great complexity of the problem, the question still arises: wasn't the great beginning really just a grand illusion?

Making this shift has turned out for many generations to be the most challenging task, requiring the ceaseless improvement of the material foundations of society, its political institutions and the people's spiritual life.

Soon after the ruinous Civil War and the armed intervention by the capitalist powers, Lenin said that the main impediment to the supreme goal in Russia was the low cultural standard of the masses and the underdeveloped state of the material productive forces. But he did not consider the situation hopeless. He was concerned with the future, and among his last behests were: the plan for the electrification of Russia (GOELRO) as a way of ensuring scientific and technological progress; the new economic policy as a way of building up the productive forces steadily and harmoniously; an orientation on building up the material basis of socialism in industry, agriculture, transport, trade and the services, with emphasis on economic levers, competition and a new kind of cooperation among the various sectors of the economy; the establishment and consolidation of popular power; and an accent on the universal development of culture, and the raising of working people's consciousness to a socialist level. The situation was compounded by the hostile encirclement, which made the building of the new socialist system exceptionally difficult. Would the USSR have enough time—a breathing space in peace—to build socialism? He imagined that the reactionaries were simply preparing another crusade against his country?

Lenin repeatedly said that real, objective criteria rather than mere words were required in the effort to raise social consciousness to the socialist level.

Human beings fully express themselves in their work. Labour is the very essence of human behaviour because this conscious activity sets man apart as a species. The human personality is realised in the process of labour, a Marxist philosophical idea which provides the theoretical underpinning for the constitutional principles of socialist states, where labour is both a right and a duty of every citizen, and a matter of honour. Consequently, the principle of social justice—"From each according to his ability, to each according to his work"—and the attendant socialisation of the means of production constituted the basis of the socialist system.

The level of a person's consciousness and culture is

reflected in the attitude to labour and to social ownership, and status in a truly socialist society is determined by quality of work. It is true that at the present stage of socialism economic coercion is the incentive to producer activity, although there is not the exploitation or threat of starvation as under capitalism. Nor is that the only incentive: there is an immense growth in the importance of moral satisfaction.

Even in the past, one can find people who were not motivated solely by economic or "administrative" pressure, but who worked freely and consciously, especially in exceptional circumstances or when their society was under threat. That is when people perform miracles, for they are motivated by supreme patriotic and national values. Although these efforts tend to be short-lived, Lenin did reflect on long-term voluntary and conscious labour for the good of society in peace time. Was there sufficient justification for thinking along these lines? This kind of labour can be seen in all socialist countries during historical transformations, and I can mention some examples from Poland's experience.

After our country's liberation in 1944 and 1945, voluntary and unpaid work was performed on a massive scale as people worked enthusiastically to clear the streets of rubble, to rebuild bridges and roads, schools and hospitals, to start factories and plants, and to repair machine-tools at their enterprises. A broad national movement began under the slogan: "A Whole Nation is Building Its Capital" and large funds were donated by the population for the rebuilding of Warsaw.

The lack of roads in the countryside was solved through the voluntary collective labour of Polish peasants. As a result there are now paved roads to almost all of the 30,000 villages in the country.

Another selfless movement emerged in the 1960s—"1,000 Schools For the Millennium of the Polish State"—which was largely achieved through collective action. Millions of volunteers in town and country helped to lay thousands of kilometres of drains and water pipes, and to build hundreds of nursery schools, clubs, houses of culture, surgeries, first-aid posts, sports facilities, children's playgrounds and fire stations. That was when the National Health Protection Fund was set up, which collected more than 53 billion zlotys in the form of donations for the building and repair of over 1,500 facilities.

Some time later, considerable work went into "Party Action Days", which involved millions of PZPR members and independents in spring drives to improve the condition of towns and villages. More recently, collective actions, especially in the countryside, have once again manifested the civil consciousness of the Poles. In 1986, the Polish Collective Action Commission was set up under the Council of State to coordinate this movement, with equivalent bodies set up under provincial, district and city people's councils. The Polish Committee for the Popular Promotion of Schools and over 10,000 similar committees were organised in the localities, with hundreds of

thousands of members, on the initiative of the Patriotic Movement of National Revival. It was decided that 70-80% of the estimated cost of facilities erected by volunteers would be paid by the state.

Our poet Julian Przybos characterised collective action in these words: "Unpaid, voluntary labour for society, for future generations, performed as for one's own self, is Superlabour!" Without such collective action, the history of socialism in Poland would have been far less rich.

As PZPR CC First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski told a meeting of the chairmen of voivodship people's councils when they met to discuss voluntary initiatives: "We are all responsible for Poland's tomorrow. The people's concerted and creative labour, including social initiatives, inspired and supported by the councils, undertaken and carried out by citizens for the common good, will predetermine the content of our history in the next century, a history not of the correction of mistakes and stabilisation, but of the all-round development of the People's Republic."

This is particularly important now, when we have begun to renew socialism; when we are considering its humanistic essence, its present state and its future.

Socialism offers a new quality of life and people will attain it at a high stage of political, cultural and spiritual development. This is the more true of communism. Material goods in themselves are not enough, although the new system requires general prosperity.

It bears repeating that Russia began to build socialism under extremely arduous conditions: the aftermath of centuries of despotic czarist rule, lack of freedom in society, and a tangle of antagonistic social, national and regional contradictions. There were also the poorly developed productive forces, the cultural backwardness of the majority of the population, the economic blockade and the constant threat of invasion. There was no experience to go on, and so it was impossible to avoid mistakes in the trail-blazing course of development.

The situation did not favour the building of socialism. The tortuous birth pangs combined with the dual acceleration of fast-paced industrialisation and forcible collectivisation to create exceptionally dangerous social tensions. All of this, taken together, paved the way for the use of violent methods and repression, phenomena which tend to corrupt and demoralise society, turning some into tormentors, executioners, hypocrites and flatterers, others into victims, and still others into submissively fanatical enthusiasts or terrified sycophants. One should also bear in mind that the fear and the bureaucracy were rooted in the past, and could not be changed overnight by revolutionary decrees. This was a kind of purgatory, a path of suffering. In such circumstances, the entire burden of socialist construction ultimately falls on the people.

Even in the darkest days and despite everything, the builders of socialism fully devoted themselves to construction. In the USSR I witnessed the enthusiasm and self-sacrifice of millions, and took part myself in the labour effort of ordinary Soviet citizens. When the Nazi hordes

invaded Poland, I took my family to the Soviet Union. I started work there before joining the Soviet resistance in the fight against the Nazis.

This experience, I think, shows that despite terrible pain and suffering, despite having its ideals discredited, socialism can still overcome the obstacles, forge ahead and revive itself through the power of human aspiration.

It is impossible to say in which country our ideal will first be realised in economic, moral and cultural terms. For various reasons no single country has yet finished building socialism. In many countries this construction is proceeding unevenly, having entered upon a totally new phase—the phase of renewal, democratisation and the renewal of thinking and the whole of life.

Is there any point in bemoaning the fact that the building of socialism did not begin where we might have expected, where civilisation and culture were most developed? After all, the rest of the world would have followed the example of the best, being moved by the power of attraction and under the leadership of its own social vanguard. But here you have people who dared to realise the ideals of socialism in an unusual way, starting in a relatively backward country. Was that just one of history's surprises? Or was it a deviation from the natural laws of development?

That is an interesting question, but no answer will be found by those who think in abstract and stereotyped terms. What happened as a result of the October 1917 Revolution was "natural", albeit unusual. Social progress breaks through in tortuous ways, whenever an opening presents itself, very much like a winding mountain stream with its pools, rapids and waterfalls eventually carrying its waters out into the wide expanses. Out there, in the future, as Lenin suggested in "A Great Beginning", the communist attitude to labour may no longer be exceptional or rare. The moral factor—the human factor—will be the distinctive feature of the new social system although, of course, material considerations will not disappear. Then we shall be able to say that socialism has attained maturity because men and women will have reached a high level of development (although we should not forget that people are not angels: *Errare humanum est*—To err is human).

The task for the builders of socialism now is to encourage people in the habit of a fair day's work for a fair day's pay, with rational organisation at every level of society. The renewal, the evolution of democracy, scientific and technological progress, and peaceful cooperation between peoples all have a contribution to make.

¹ See Natalia Morozova, "Lenin's Contribution to Perestroika", *WMR*, No. 4, 1989.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 427.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

WHO WILL GIVE THE YOUNG A HELPING HAND?

The young generation's desire and readiness to participate in the solution of the tasks facing socialist society largely depend on the ability of the parties to enlist and inspire young hearts and minds. Below are accounts of how these relationships have been developing in the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia.

TRUST AND RESPONSIBILITY

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The decisions of the 11th SED Congress (1986) on continued and consistent efforts to implement the party programme have given the people of the GDR, particularly the young, an opportunity worth pursuing. These decisions are helping to create living and working conditions better than those of previous generations.

Drawing on a rich store of experience in conducting a consistently Marxist-Leninist youth policy, the party has formulated new tasks connected with the development of an advanced socialist society—a historical process involving far-reaching political, economic, social, intellectual and cultural change.

We can see that of all social groups, this change is particularly important to the younger generation because such transformations shape its future. The SED is therefore pursuing a youth policy that is part and parcel of its overall socioeconomic course and in line with the present requirements of social progress. At the same time, the party is making the education of the young a special field in its work.

There are almost 3 million people between the ages of 14 and 25 in the GDR—more than 17% of the total population. The responsibility for their well-being rests with all civil, political and government institutions, the careful treat-

ment of the young generation—whose interests are represented by the national Free German Youth league (FDJ)—having an obligatory character thanks to a long-standing Law on Youth.

The right political conditions for the young to be able to develop an enthusiastic and creative attitude are being established, making it possible to channel the energy and skills of young people into tackling modern problems, and at the same time giving them room to promote innovation, test their abilities in practical work and make their lives meaningful.

The 11th Congress of the SED addressed an appeal to all FDJ members and to all the young men and women: "You, the rising generation, as you reach your prime should proudly bear the banner of socialist gains on German soil into the next century. Be prepared! You are contributing your work and your readiness to defend your country, your knowledge and skills, your dedication and your creative enthusiasm to the shaping of the future of our state of workers and peasants."¹ This strategy is based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and on the militant experience of the revolutionary working-class movement.

In 1845, Marx and Engels noted that "history is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which uses the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity".² Hence one of the party's permanent tasks is to ensure that young men and women reliably master socialist ideas and, in revolutionary unity with their fathers, and with their elder brothers and sisters, take their own steps to fulfill the historical mission of the working class.

As noted at the 11th Congress of the SED, the country's younger generation is among the more vigorous champions of the people. Young men and women are

supporting the revolutionary cause with a great sense of civil responsibility. Given the dynamic internal and external conditions in which advanced socialist society is taking shape, the main objective of our youth policy is to help the young gain a firm and class-based Marxist-Leninist attitude to all situations. Such a commitment makes them convinced and unswerving fighters for peace and progress and vigorous builders of their socialist country. The important thing is to reach and involve everyone.

The SED is particularly anxious to create a state of affairs whereby the younger generation, while studying Marxism-Leninism, would constantly feel the *practical connection* between party policy and the theory of socialist society. When this bond is present, the political work and the day-to-day activities of party members offer an example to young people, demonstrating to them the role and the mission of the Communists. The party realises that for the young this is a turbulent age full of diverse problems, like those related to the ideological competition between the two sociopolitical systems and to the struggle for peace.

Young people are finding their bearings in life and mastering the material, intellectual and cultural realities of our society against the background of the GDR's dynamic socialist development and rapid progress in science and technology. A high level of education, an interest in politics, a desire for independence, a hunger for information, heightened social activity and communicativeness are typical of the younger generation. The party is encouraging the development of all these qualities, helping young people to grasp the demands life makes on the individual and to understand how they should be met. The young are particularly aware of the problems involved in choosing an occupation and recognising the rights and duties that go with it, joining civil organisations, studying at school and university, honouring one's duty to serve in the National People's Army, starting a family and so on.

In the GDR, the younger generation is open to global influences, a situation vigorously exploited by class adversaries who mount large-scale subversive ideological operations against our people. Using powerful and sophisticated technology, the enemies of socialism go to great lengths to confuse our young men and women and impose an antisocialist ideology on them. More than 30 Western radio channels (including local ones) and 9 television networks beam their German-language programmes to us. This is why we believe that every Communist should be sensitive to the mood of the young and respond promptly and tactfully to any questions that arise. Party members should be able to explain in detail the true aims of these imperialist forays and staunchly defend our youth policy against attacks from class enemies. Open dialogue with young people about the underlying truths of Marxism-Leninism, current events, and the accomplishments, advantages and values of socialism demands an atmosphere of trust.

Discussion of these subjects is useful wherever young

people work, study or relax. *A constant effort to strengthen relations of trust between them and the party is laid down in the SED Programme and Rules as an assignment for all 2,400,000 full and probationary party members.* Within the FDJ political education system alone, more than 80,000 Communists conduct monthly classes for over 1,700,000 young men and women.

As the GDR prepares to mark its 40th anniversary, our party is doing a great deal to convey to the younger generation the rich experience accumulated by the fighters against fascism and by veteran activists.³ Knowledge of all the stages our republic has gone through in its development "enhances the respect young people feel for the achievements of the preceding generations, of their parents and grandparents; it will also promote personal dedication to continuing our revolutionary cause".⁴

In socialist society, the young develop as shapers of the historical process. But this is not simply because the present generation happened to be born into new social conditions. We need a *purposeful and differentiated strategy which covers society as a whole while helping young people to fulfill their creative mission.* The guiding principle for the SED in these activities is "Youth should have trust and responsibility."

Practical action accords with the present and future interests both of socialist society and of the young. Those just starting out on their careers are given assignments calling for skill, initiative and independent thought. The main thing is that they should master the advances in science and technology. As stressed at the 11th Congress of the SED, this is a "task of revolutionary importance for the entire younger generation".⁵ After all, the fulcrum of competition between the two systems is shifting increasingly to the sphere of science and technology.

In our country and in today's world, this approach is consonant with Lenin's demand that every step in the education, upbringing and training of young people be linked indelibly with their participation in the practical work of the masses in the more important areas of the struggle for progress. Our experience confirms that this is necessary.

Firstly, the dramatic changes in the development of the productive forces and the objective connection between the revolution in science and technology and the large-scale proliferation of the technological innovators' movement have prompted us to create the necessary conditions for the earliest possible involvement in this process of those who have just graduated from general and vocational training schools, colleges and universities. For example, more than 75% of all young workers take part in the "Marketplace of Tomorrow's Masters" movement. Their creative contribution saved 1,920,000,000 marks in 1987, and 720 patents were filed. More than 5,300 teams of young researchers fulfilled 5,925 complex contracts.

Secondly, the SED is drawing on the creative potential of the younger generation, its high-level vocational and general training and its ability to grasp quickly all innova-

tions in the field of science and technology. Our younger citizens' social and professional mobility, political maturity and commitment to the ideals of our society, as well as their relative freedom from the traditional forms and methods of work make it possible to involve the masses of young people in the implementation of the party's economic strategy.

Thirdly, in mastering the achievements of the revolution in science and technology, young people test their maturity and socialist consciousness. They can consider themselves to have succeeded when they see the results of their work as a direct contribution to economic development and higher living standards.

The record shows that this process promotes valuable personal qualities: an ability to add constantly to one's knowledge; initiative and inventiveness; a creative spirit; dedication and discipline at work; persistence in the pursuit of success; and a thorough and professional attitude. At the same time, young people are able to assert their talents and skills. Besides being an economic imperative, assisting them in their development is also a major humanitarian objective of our society.

The principle of trust and responsibility with regard to the young also involves support for the various economic initiatives of the FDJ and for the "Marketplace of Tomorrow's Masters" movement; help in creating the proper work environment for 45,000 youth workteams; sponsorship for 112,000 economic and cultural projects and for the research teams led by young people; assistance to the FDJ in the "Make Our Cities and Communities Beautiful" drive, in environmental protection and in the improvement of young people's conditions of life and work; and efforts to make our young men ready to defend socialism.

The Free German Youth League, the party's militant reserve, plays an indispensable role in implementing SED youth policy. Since its establishment in 1946, the FDJ has been actively assisting social progress. Its 29,000 grassroots organisations comprise some 2,300,000 workers, farmers, students, intellectuals and servicemen. They are able to join the FDJ irrespective of their social background or religious convictions, united in their resolve to pool their efforts in the struggle to strengthen socialism and peace, and in their desire to take part in the implementation of our party's policy, which seeks to benefit the people and meet the interests of all social groups.

As a body representing the interests of all young people, the FDJ must be able to promptly and accurately identify the differentiated and dynamically developing needs of our youth and its commitment to independent thought and action. At the same time it is required to encourage young people to feel part of the collective, to find their place in life and to realise that their interests are best served by political organisation and in the common struggle of all generations for socialism, peace and the humanitarian aims of SED policy. Success in this en-

deavour will increase the FDJ's influence among young people.

The young members of the FDJ are working to promote social progress and to create political conditions in which their diverse needs and requirements can be met. There are 37 FDJ members in the People's Chamber (Parliament) of the GDR, the overall number of MPs aged between 18 and 30 being 60, or 12% of the total. As to the entire system of popular representation, 33,106 deputies out of 206,752 are under 25, and 21,321 have been elected on an FDJ ticket.

The party is encouraging the FDJ to take full advantage of the wealth of opportunities offered by the Law on Youth to express youth interests effectively and unflaggingly. This confirms young men and women in their conviction that the FDJ is ready to respond to their recommendations, proposals and criticism; that it knows how to effect the required changes at work and in the community by acting within the FDJ frame of reference and by cooperating with government agencies and civil organisations; and that it has the power to do this.

The fact that young people trust the FDJ to represent their interests shows, among other things, that as an integral political organisation, it is able to construct a differentiated approach to youth problems and to act accordingly wherever young people work, study or live. Naturally, attention is mostly focused on workplaces.

The FDJ closely follows community initiatives in order to ensure that the growing demands for social prosperity in urban and rural areas are better and more fully met. It monitors the quality and choice of consumer goods, electrical appliances, computers, sports equipment, toys and games and other products. Observance of the principle of adequate remuneration for work done makes it possible to meet these demands in terms of range and quantity.

The FDJ is an assistant of the party and its militant reserve. Those FDJ young men and women who adhere to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, accept our party's Programme and Rules, work vigorously and help strengthen and defend socialism, will eventually apply for probationary SED membership. *The party, in the person of those Communists who work with young people, encourages this.* Between the 10th (1981) and the 11th party congresses, probationary membership was granted to more than 325,000 politically mature FDJ activists. Today, people under 25 make up 12.2% of SED membership and those aged between 26 and 30 constitute 10.9%—an overall total of 537,225 Communists. Many of them play a key role in their collectives and on FDJ committees.

Young people's timely involvement in socially meaningful activities enhances their sense of civil responsibility and their readiness to play a vigorous part in the work conducted on behalf of the entire nation by the forces comprising the GDR National Front—the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany, the Christian Democratic Union of Ger-

many, the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany, the National Democratic Party of Germany and many other civil organisations. The SED's work with young people therefore assists in the implementation of its long-term policy of alliances.

¹ XI Parteitag der SED, Berlin, 17 bis 21 April 1986. Bericht des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands an den XI Parteitag der SED. Berichterstatter: Genosse Erich Honecker, Berlin, 1987, pp. 88-89.

² Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 50.

³ The reference is to the German antifascists who were the first to advocate a rapid return to normalcy after the defeat of Nazism.—Ed.

⁴ Erich Honecker, "Mit dem Volk und für das Volk realisieren wir die Generallinie unserer Partei zum Wohle der Menschen". Aus dem Referat auf der Beratung des Sekretariats des ZK der SED mit den 1. Sekretären der Kreisleitungen, Berlin, 1988, S. 104.

⁵ XI Parteitag der SED, p. 89.

DEMANDING CHANGE

Borislav VASIC

desk head, *Mladost*, Yugoslav Socialist Youth Federation

Yugoslavian society has recently encountered a whole series of difficulties. How are young people reacting to these problems? How do they see the perspective of socialist development now? WMR turned to a young Yugoslavian journalist for answers to these and other questions.

To begin with, most of our young people are loyal to communist ideals and do not question the vanguard role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in socialist construction. But the problem is that they often don't like its forms of organisational, ideological and political work. Not a day passes without meetings or discussions being held and a lot of decisions being taken, but with little practical effect. This largely explains the LCY's modest intake of young recruits and the steep fall in membership over the last three years.

Does this mean that young people assess the party's work differently from the older generations of Yugoslav Communists? There is no reason why a "fathers and children" problem should arise here. What really makes us

anxious is the conspicuous lack of simple and direct contact between generations. Young people usually meet party veterans at formal occasions where they, or a party leader, tell us about past revolutionary traditions. While we're eager for their heroic stories of 45 years ago, there's an overdose of old-style positivism that "everything was good then, everything was nice". Yet this is characteristic of nearly all the veterans' reminiscences, whereas we want the real story, what is historically and socially true.

We have been told since school about the war heroism of our fathers; we know that Communists, representatives of the workers' movement, and partisans fought selflessly for a better life, and no one should forget this. But we also know that often mistakes and wrong decisions were made which receive little or no publicity. *Mladost* draws attention to this and welcomes authors who try to take a more trenchant look at the past. They are entitled to their opinions, and we should discuss them in public. Openness is a must for any democratic society, conditioning progress in its political life.

Most young people are acutely aware of the need for political action, but there isn't always the opportunity for this within the traditional social structure, through the YSYF for example. Because of this, large numbers of young people are joining various informal groups which concern themselves with ecology, limiting the arms race and other issues.

This has provoked heated debate in *Mladost*, particularly on the question of whether Socialist Youth members should be able to join informal groups (working broadly in line with the party's strategic aims) if they find this a quicker route to problem-solving than with YSYF or LCY? There is no consensus on this as yet and the discussion continues.

The Western press is suggesting that the youth of Yugoslavia are distrustful of socialism. I don't agree. They have demonstrated and they will continue to demonstrate, not against socialism but in protest at its deformations, at bureaucracy, and the negative phenomena which still exist in society. When this was discussed in the pages of *Mladost*, the unambiguous conclusion was that they demand changes, not in order to destroy socialism, but to develop it.

We are now able to travel and to compare notes, and we know what capitalism is. This explains our sober assessments and the concrete aim of achieving a genuine self-government in the country. To be sure, the future of socialism in Yugoslavia largely depends on how attractive we can make it now. In order to do this we must first overcome our present economic crisis.

The economic difficulties have certainly influenced the social position of youth. There still hasn't been a crisis anywhere that has left the young unscathed. The state of the economy worries everyone in Yugoslavia, and especially us (young people on low incomes are always a

vulnerable part of any society). As prices continue to rise, so the position of students worsens and their living standards decline. An increasing number of young couples cannot get a flat from the factory or office where they work, nor can they afford to rent one. At the same time we know that some of our contemporaries do have enough money to spend on clothes, entertainment, and whatever they need. Consequently, there's a youth stratification, mirroring the situation in Yugoslavia: 10% of depositors own more than 80% of bank deposits.

There is another social problem directly linked to economic status, namely, the time it takes to assume adult responsibilities. Most young people have no chance of financial independence. I have already mentioned that young couples usually have to live with their parents, and young people often depend on them for jobs and support in a time of runaway inflation. So there's little leeway, if at all. Sociologists maintain that if this trend continues, our young people won't begin to "mature" until they're 40.

Naturally, *Mladost* is widely discussing ways to make the economy healthier. There's constant debate, often

throwing up diametrically opposed views. Some insist that the point is not the right to a private business, but whether it can provide at least 10 or 15 jobs. The same applies to joint ventures with foreign capital. People don't think it's a question of the amount of shares any foreign partner may hold, but whether jobs are created, more consumer goods are produced, and greater access to new technology provided. Debate exists to *air different views*, not to demonstrate a general consensus. Besides, similar discussions are taking place in many socialist states, and I don't think there's any reason to fear for the future of socialism in our country.

What awaits the young generation in the near future? This is perhaps the most difficult question, but I shall try to give an opinion. Of course, I hope that things change for the better in the next couple of years. Realistically speaking, however, it is obvious that any substantial shifts will take several years. We must work hard to attain the socialism we want, since complacency will only hurt us. In conclusion, let me repeat once more: the young are demanding change.

* * *

A BUSINESSMAN LOOKS AT ALBANIA

I cannot believe that in this day and age there is still one hermetic country—Albania. This kind of isolationism is associated with the era of subsistence economies, but is it possible today? Or am I being too categorical?

R. OPANASENKO,
Odessa, USSR

Czechoslovakia is one of the principal trading partners of Albania—so WMR asked Miroslav CUKER of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade to reply.

I have been to Albania many times in the course of my work and I wouldn't call it hermetic. Some time ago, perhaps, but not now—Albania has diplomatic relations with nearly 100 countries and trades with approximately 50. And it has an even higher profile internationally through its participation in various organisations. Also, it plays a significant part in promoting commercial exchanges and economic cooperation, both bilateral and regional, in the Balkans.

■ ***What sort of commercial ties exist between Czechoslovakia and Albania?***

On the whole they are of the classical commodity exchange type. We supply lorries and diesel locomotives, machine-tools and various equipment, oil pipes, steel, rolled metal, etc., and buy raw materials and farm produce.

We have a balanced trade turnover with a tendency towards growth, exchanges and cooperation at sectoral level auguring well for our future relationship. A start has been made, with Albanian cooperatives using our designs to manufacture components for the Czechoslovak engineering industry.

And there is still a great deal of untapped potential. Let me give you a case in point. Albania, like many other countries, purchases Czechoslovak lorries, but it suffers from a chronic shortage of spare parts—even though the local factories capable of producing them have been operating at half-capacity (factories built in the 1960s with assistance from socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia). We have offered our Albanian partners the necessary means with which to produce their own parts for imported lorries.

■ ***What about living standards in Albania?***

According to official sources, by 1990 (the last year of the eighth five-year plan period) sales of consumer goods are expected to rise 25% on the figure five years ago.

That living standards are growing year by year is clearly

visible. People dress neatly and stylishly, if not in the latest fashions.

More and more Albanians have TVs, as the sight of rooftop aerials suggests. There is a national TV network and they also receive programmes from Italy and Yugoslavia. Other increasingly common consumer durables include washing machines, refrigerators, motorbikes and bicycles. But owning a car is still exceptionally rare.

Hitherto infrequent foreign visitors are now a familiar sight, with politicians, public figures, scientists, specialists, and ordinary tourists coming to Albania.

To sum up, I would say to the reader from the USSR that, yes, he is being "too categorical", this view of Albania now is somewhat out-of-date. The situation is changing and we have fewer and fewer reasons to call it a "hermetic country".



WWR INTRODUCES

REZSO NYERS—CHAIRMAN OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY (HSWP)

At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, held in June, Rezso Nyers was elected Chairman.

Nyers was born in 1923 in Budapest. In his youth he worked in printing as a typesetter. In 1940 he joined the Social Democratic Party of Hungary and was later elected assistant secretary of

a city borough organisation of the SDPH. In 1948 he was elected a secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party for the County of Pest, later working at Party Headquarters.

In the 1950s he was an administrative official at the Ministry of Internal Trade and worked as Vice-President and then President of

the National Association of Cooperatives. In 1960-1962 he was the Minister of Finance and was later elected Secretary of the CC HSWP and a CC Political Committee member. From 1981 he was a scientific adviser at the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Since May 1988 Rezso Nyers has been a member of the Political Committee of the CC HSWP. Recently, he has combined his work in the Political Committee with the post of Minister of State of the HPR.





UNIVERSAL SECURITY: OPPORTUNITIES, OBSTACLES, PROSPECTS

Universal security was the subject of a "round-table" discussion organised in Vienna by the WMR Commission on Peace and Democratic Movements. Questions from the Commission were tackled by Prof. Robert LEGVOLD, Director of the R. W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, Columbia University (USA); Karsten D. VOIGT, member of the Executive Board of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, member of the Bundestag (West Germany) and spokesman of the SDP Bundestag faction on foreign affairs; Prof. Vitaly ZHURKIN, Director of the Institute of Europe and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; and Air Commodore Jasjit SINGH, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (India).

Below is an abridged record of the discussion.

- **What are the more important aspects of the international situation today? How does it compare with the detente of the 1970s?**

Legvold. There are some parallels. East-West relations were changing twenty years ago, as they are today. Vietnam stressed the need to think differently about the use of military force, and military approaches are becoming increasingly unpopular today. The new kind of geometry in international relations—with emphasis on the growing interdependence of countries, continents and social systems, and an awareness of the importance of North-South relations—also dates back to the 1970s.

Zhurkin. Certain similarities with the period of detente should not blot out the fundamental differences. Firstly, the economic problems are much more acute. The gap between the developed and the developing countries is now extremely dangerous. And the arms race burden is becoming so literally unbearable that it may actually contribute towards the settlement of debilitating regional conflicts.

Voigt. The threat of an East-West war has diminished and there are promising signs of arms control. The situation in the Third World, however, is less clear. Another worry is the proliferation of new military technology worldwide. Alongside the dynamic economic growth in the US, Western Europe and some Asian countries, we

have growing economic problems in Eastern Europe and in a lot of Third World countries. And the same ambivalent situation with human rights: improvements in Eastern Europe and Latin America, while the situation in other parts of the world has been worsening.

Singh. What makes these times different, I think, is that today's imperatives are greater than ever. Among the more impressive new factors are the democratic breakthroughs in a number of countries, including the USSR and Pakistan. The increased military capability of the Third World contrasts with its enormous debts and economic backwardness. Generally, it seems, the pressure of universal problems is increasing.

FROM ANTAGONISM TO PLURALISM

Voigt. In the past we used to discuss the world situation in terms of one main contradiction, that between the two systems. Now we have a different language, reflecting the change from antagonism to pluralism. East and West, there is a growing tendency towards pluralistic developments, or at least towards different ideologies and religious and political persuasions.

- **Would you agree that the idea of pluralism seems to alter the hierarchy of universal contradictions and threats?**

Legvold. It certainly does, although some priorities remain. In the past, East-West military rivalry obscured some aspects of international relations, as it were, but now we have a greater number of urgent problems on our hands.

Zhurkin. A more pluralistic and more genuinely international system may hold greater potential for stability, but this is no reason for complacency.

Legvold. During the first detente the United States and the Soviet Union tried and failed to keep their relations separate from Third World problems. Today, the great powers' role in the developing world is very much on the agenda.

The fragmentation of the bipolar world really began in the 1970s, and part of the emerging multipolarity was manifest in the Sino-Soviet-American triangle, not always a factor of stability in international politics. But bilateral relations are improving now within that triangle. A self-confident Western Europe is moving towards 1992. Euro-pessimism is being replaced with optimism. So the structure of pluralism is an important part of what is occurring.

Zhurkin. It is also becoming a salient feature of the internal development of each of the systems. The de-ideologisation of state-to-state relations is also helping greatly towards a better international atmosphere. Last but not least, there is the growing recognition of the priority of universal human values and interests.

Voigt. In Europe in the 16th century there were the so-called religious wars between Protestants and Catholics. Under the first agreement resulting from those wars, every duke or king had the right to decide which religion was to be professed in his region. Later on, people gained the right to leave the country if they did not accept its religion. Then, the constitutions formed on the ideas of the Enlightenment stipulated that the state should not decide about religion and convictions. In short, the idea of tolerance and pluralistic democracy is largely based on historical development. And the last point of development is pluralism within individual ideologies.

Singh. East and West are now accepting much of what Jawaharlal Nehru was talking about in the 1940s. But at that time neither the Soviet Union nor the United States listened to our ideas about settling ideological conflicts, reducing economic inequities and fitting political disagreements into a more or less harmonious view of the world.

STABILITY AND CHANGE

■ **There is Inarguable progress in international affairs, including the normalisation of Soviet-US relations, the INF Treaty and progress towards the peaceful settlement of a number of regional conflicts. What are the reasons behind these positive changes? Has humanity grown wiser?**

Voigt. At least East and West no longer believe in each other's aggressiveness, which is very important.

Legvold. Conceptual change in the Soviet Union is worth noting. In his UN address Mikhail Gorbachov raised the 1789 French Revolution to the level of the October 1917 Revolution in Russia—the result of Soviet leaders thinking differently from the way they did in the past. But much of what is called new thinking in the Soviet Union today is in fact reminiscent of new ideas current in the West 20 years ago, such as world interdependence, the limited role of force, and the complexity of international politics. But as detente failed and we returned to the so-called neo-cold war, the United States unlearned those lessons which it is only now remembering again. New thinking is also a must in the Third World, especially in areas in conflict. But what are the prospects for conceptual change there?

Singh. Changes are certainly necessary. Even before independence in 1946, India had tried to get the Asian countries to agree on the principles of nonviolence and peaceful coexistence. Some of these were formalised in the historic 1954 Indo-Chinese agreement. Now China has made the Pancha Shila principles the basis of its foreign policy, and India has translated them into practical steps. So tried-and-true experience should be used alongside new approaches.

Zhurkin. What if we take stock of the postwar progressive ideas?

Voigt. Convergence—a term I have always thought is wrong—is again being used to characterise present-day tendencies in world development. There are, after all, many negative aspects of our societies that might also be said to be converging. I would prefer to call the development from antagonism to pluralism *co-evolution*, which presupposes not only compromise in arms control, but also growing interdependence.

Legvold. But we have to be realistic about serious impediments to co-evolution. There is the risk of East and West forgetting the Third World as they develop their relations (as was sometimes the case in the past). The West has fears about the durability and depth of the change in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. And then, there is instability in some parts of the world, including explosive problems in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

Singh. Virtually all significant changes in human history have been brought about by revolutionary ideas.

Voigt. To continue the last point, there is no guarantee that industrial modernisation is combined automatically with ideological modernisation. When we in West Germany were very modern in terms of technology, we had a deep ideological crisis, with the antihumanistic Nazi forces seizing state power. We cannot exclude the possibility of social progress being interrupted again by a

spiritual or economic crisis. So there is the conceptual task of *combining stability not with the status quo but with change*. Some countries have had changes in one respect but tried to preserve old values and traditions in others. However, the status quo even in one area often holds back progress in other directions. Stability in East-West or North-South relations can be enhanced, I think, through greater flexibility.

Zhurkin. You have pinpointed a very important problem. Balancing stability and change may well be the greatest challenge of the 1990s. It raises the problem of introducing new thinking and developing flexible international structures. It is a serious challenge to nations, to social groups and their leaders, and I don't think there are universal recipes.

Voigt. I'd criticise new thinking for overestimating global problems and underestimating the class struggle.

As I remember, in the origins of the socialist movement there was a debate about the correlation of domestic change and international peace. This took place even before the split between the Social Democrats and the Communists. The communist movement's, and Lenin's, position was that the world war should have been transformed into a civil war,¹ and that the precondition for international peace was the success of the workers' revolutionary struggle. But now some Soviet thinkers say that the precondition for domestic reform is disarmament.

Furthermore, left-wing parties in the South are criticising their friends in the North, arguing that the main problem is not that of nuclear war or of disarmament, but of underdevelopment. On the one hand they are underestimating the importance of East-West relaxation and disarmament, and on the other failing to offer solutions to potential Third World armed conflicts.

Zhurkin. In developing a class approach to war in his discussion with the Zimmerwald Left, Lenin was thinking also on the other level, in terms of a more general human approach. He said, in particular, that the development of military technology may make war so destructive as to render it unthinkable. In our situation this means that the global danger of nuclear war should be something which unites the richer North and the poorer South.

Legvold. I believe that the problem of stable change *within* societies is becoming a priority. Many of us in the West are concerned about the ability of socialist countries to modernise their economies and make the transition from an earlier to a modern form of socialism.

Voigt. If you want to have change and stability, you need increased exchange, interchange. Then you will have more openness, and the old "enemy images" will be forgotten.

A FAREWELL TO ARMS?

Zhurkin. Reconciling present realities with long-term

goals is a delicate problem. For example, the Warsaw Pact and NATO have existed and played an important role for almost half a century. In a normal international situation their military orientation ought to start fading away, and the Helsinki process could lead to the creation of some other structures or organisations on an all-European scale.

Legvold. Alliances are insurance policies. We have to find an *alternative* insurance policy. And I don't think that some organisations should be created artificially for the purpose.

Zhurkin. We really do need this kind of alternative base, and we see it in the form of a common European home as the next stage of the Helsinki and Vienna processes. Maybe, in the long run, the division of Europe will be overcome, first of all, by enlarging and developing existing organisations like the Council of Europe. The East European nations are considering cooperating with the Council and, who knows, eventually they may become members. The Assembly of the Council of Europe already sends its representatives to Moscow and other East European capitals.

Voigt. The problem is whether we develop new all-European institutions or whether we use old European structures and processes, like the CSCE process. We should do both, I think. Perhaps some of our structures conceived as a means of "protecting ourselves from the East" can now function by opening themselves up to cooperation with the East.

■ **Arms control remains central to universal security, although it is not yet disarmament. What are the prospects for arms control in the 1990s?**

Legvold. I think the 1990s are going to be the decade of arms control. The task is to create a safer and more stable nuclear relationship. But that process cannot go very far without significant conventional arms control. For the first time since 1945 we are discussing arms control seriously, and we have entered a new era because of the Soviet Union's unilateral steps. It should, however, be a reciprocal process.

Zhurkin. There are definite contradictions between the Soviet idea of a denuclearised Europe and the Western idea of mutual deterrence. It is necessary to find correlations between these two approaches, especially since many advocates of mutual deterrence are also in favour of reducing the arms levels. So we can go at least half the way together. Many people in the West are already thinking in terms of *minimal* deterrence, which means that we can move ahead even further.

Secondly, a correlation is needed between nuclear and conventional force reductions in Europe and strategic force reductions. Moving beyond a 50% strategic force reduction will be impossible without serious, dramatic cuts in conventional weapons.

Singh. Little effort has so far been made to limit naval forces, particularly nuclear weapons at sea. There are far too many of them, and this has no rational justification. Why are such forces kept in the Indian Ocean, for example?

Legvold. In my view, it is impossible to create a consensus on universal nuclear disarmament. In the United States, there are active political groups sharing the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and ready to act on that conviction; people at the other extreme believe that nuclear weapons have kept the peace, therefore deterrence is necessary (even though they recognise the need to manage the military competition). The last group doesn't know whether nuclear weapons have helped to keep the peace or not, but as one of that group I am not prepared to argue that they have not.

New policy concepts are emerging in this context in the Soviet Union, such as reasonable sufficiency, strategic stability and defensive defence. But is there consensus in Soviet society, not least within the military, on these concepts?

Zhurkin. Discussion is ongoing in the Soviet Union, and different views are being expressed. There are other officially recognised concepts, among them the necessity of strengthening defence through political means, and this is shared by politicians, military leaders and ordinary people alike.

I personally think that the threat of an attack against us from the West, or of an attack from the East against Western Europe is negligible, almost zero. But there are people who think differently. Our discussion is becoming more open, and helping to clarify these issues. The creation of a special committee at the new Supreme Soviet will make this debate more structured, authoritative and effective.

Voigt. I remember the time when our military men were saying that the whole idea of restructuring the forces in a defensive way was an illusion because of Soviet intransigence. Now the situation is changing for the better, something which can serve as an example for other regions. States in conflict should sit down and discuss their perceptions of the threat to their security, what they think about adequate regional confidence-building, and exchange information on the configuration and restructuring of their armed forces. I would call this a *new type of security culture*. Incidentally, why not initiate an international debate which would involve experts from different countries and regions?

Singh. There are contradictions between the approaches of the five nuclear powers to nuclear disarmament. The US, for instance, provided implicit support to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Given such developments, new threats are likely to arise soon in Asia.

Legvold. Let me put a question. If some version of the currently negotiated START agreement could be achieved

in the next, say, 18 months—and what happens after this would depend on conventional arms control—what ought to be the agenda of strategic arms control in the 1990s?

Zhurkin. Further reduction by some percentage and almost inevitable involvement, in one form or another, of the other nuclear nations in addition to the two biggest ones.

Voigt. The more you reduce, the more problems you get. How can we maintain the political credibility of the American-European linkage without the deployment of nuclear weapons? How can we have conventional stability in such a situation?

Singh. I think that the possible use of new technology (even beyond Star Wars) in developing a potentially vast range of highly-sophisticated weapons deserves careful examination. The problem of any agreement on such weapons systems, particularly once they are deployed, becomes extremely difficult.

Legvold. As an American, I'd like to say a few words about the Star Wars idea. Most people in the US have reached the conclusion that we will never have the Star Wars programme as it was originally introduced. That we are not going to have a kind of comprehensive space-based defence is now recognised by the new President and most of those within his administration. I am convinced that the administration is prepared to remove that obstacle to the START agreement. However, many of the SDI-related technical initiatives will go forward, which means that the US will be engaged in developing means of active defence into the 1990s, as the USSR is likely to do. And that brings me back to my question: what is the function of strategic arms control in the 1990s beyond the START agreement? One of the functions of those negotiations will be to discuss the *role of defence* as both sides see it, not as the US will impose it unilaterally.

Singh. The comprehensive disarmament plan tabled by India at the 3rd Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament was evolved after a broad discussion amongst a group of our experts. I don't think it has received the kind of attention it deserves. In particular, it proposes confidence-building measures in the East-West, North-South and South-South contexts.

Legvold. What India has done in this sense is very commendable. It is important that as many competent people as possible, including politicians from Japan, China and major European countries, focus on the complex of problems involved in universal security in general and disarmament in particular.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

■ **What about regional conflicts and the possibilities for ending them?**

Legvold. Both the Soviet Union and the United States

have recognised that military intervention in various regions of the world should be a part of their bilateral dialogue. There is new language on the Soviet side—a "balance of interests" rather than a "balance of force". Instead of thinking exclusively in terms of the threat posed by imperialism and neocolonialism, there is a new readiness to recognise that East and West have interests of their own in the Third World. One of the new ideas is a notion that more of the burden for dealing with problems of this kind should be transferred to cooperative multi-lateral institutions and removed from the responsibility assumed by the superpowers in dealing with them either on behalf of alliances or on behalf of themselves.

Zhurkin. Not long ago most local or regional conflicts, whatever their origin, were looked at as part of a bigger global bilateral conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Today, the situation is very different, primarily because of the part played by international institutions and organisations, particularly the UN, which for the first time in many years has begun to play an active role in the settlement of regional conflicts. Moreover, other nations are also becoming increasingly involved in this.

Whereas before there were very good schemes, sometimes even international proposals, now we have actually gained practical experience from Afghanistan, Angola, the Iran-Iraq conflict, etc. There are also attempts to relieve the tension around Nicaragua. Only the oldest and most difficult conflicts, like the Israeli-Arab one, remain unmanageable. I think there is hope that we might make the 1990s the decade of settling regional problems.

Singh. In view of the positive impact of new thinking and the world's weariness with conflicts and wars it is, perhaps, a realistic goal. What is required in the future is a conscious disengagement by the great powers from regional conflicts, including disengagement from extra-regional deployments and the scrapping of such structures as the US Rapid Deployment Force or the Central Command. There have to be some mechanisms ensuring crisis management and eventual conflict resolution.

Voigt. You cannot say that the presence of big powers is negative in all circumstances. While in principle it is true that the presence of the Soviet Union and the United States should not be maintained in the same way worldwide, and that it would be better if they were disengaged, we should not be dogmatic and say that their influence at present is entirely negative.

Singh. That was not my meaning when I discussed disengagement. The great powers' ability to moderate, to mediate and to have a stabilising influence remains in any case. And it is, perhaps, best exercised through international agencies, where it is not unilateral.

Voigt. The United Nations can only function if East and West cooperate. This precondition is not sufficient in itself

because other states must have a say and cooperate. Multilateralism can work only if everybody wants it to work.

Zhurkin. We should not overlook the apparent re-emergence of the UN as moderator and peace-keeper. The UN peace-keeping operations, rewarded with the Nobel Peace Prize, and the proliferation of UN observer teams are evidence that the capabilities of the United Nations are not exhausted at all, and that they could be enlarged.

■ **What is the relationship between universal security and human rights today?**

Voigt. I think that any diminution of this inter-relationship has rightly been described as lacking in morality. When we go back to socialist thinking, to *The International*, the fight for peace and the fight for human rights are lines in the same song. Originally, this interrelationship was at the heart of the labour movement. And I have honestly never understood how we reached the ironic situation where the demand that these two be connected came from the Reagan Administration while those linked with socialist traditions rejected it.

Zhurkin. Little by little the problem of human rights became a political problem in relations between states. And here everyone is to blame. Take the Reagan Administration, for instance. It exploited weak spots in our reality in order to undermine the USSR and divert world attention from the human rights situation in the US. The problem of human rights was also politicised in the approach of the socialist community: we referred to it as "the so-called human rights problem", as if it were a chip in the political game.

We have reached the stage where the countries which signed the Vienna Final Document have provided the first large-scale and diversified programme of human rights in history. Under it, domestic legislation and administrative practice should correspond to international covenants and agreements and be verifiable internationally. Every European nation would also report to an annual human rights conference. It is possible now to depoliticise this very important area, which is certainly interconnected with security.

Legvold. Yes, the problem of human rights has been excessively politicised in East-West relations, just as the problem of security has been excessively militarised. For many Americans there was a political element in dealing with the Soviet Union: not just Ronald Reagan and not just Alexander Solzhenitsyn, but indeed the author of the original containment article, George Kennan, argued that the source of instability and competition and friction between East and West was the nature of the Soviet system. And, in turn, for many years the basic Soviet analysis was that the main source of problems in East-West relations was the character of imperialism, the nature of the American system, and so on. Each side believed that the

essence of confrontation in our relationship was the essence of the other side's system. Hence too little emphasis on one's own behaviour. It seems to me that one of the important changes is occurring here, and creating a different basis for the future. Evolution on the question of human rights figures in this new East-West relationship as well.

Zhurkin. Ten years ago the problem of human rights was probably the most acute problem in the ideological struggle between the two systems. Everyone, East and West, is moving now towards an acceptance of human rights as a universal set of values.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Voigt. There is a basic controversy at the root of the concept of common security in that the definition of peace is understood differently in East, West and South.

Legvold. Many people in the West see a fundamental evolution in the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence. I don't believe that Lenin invented peaceful coexistence in its modern form. For him it was a tactical notion—a breathing space, a short-term necessity—because the revolutionary doctrine aimed at the triumph of socialism all over the world. The person who invented peaceful coexistence in the modern sense of the concept was Khrushchev, and he did it in the context of coming to terms with nuclear weapons. Now the Soviet leadership, faced with a wider range of problems which are changing the notion of national security, seem to be revising Khrushchev's linkage of peaceful coexistence and the class struggle.

Voigt. This interrelationship was set down in the *Communist Manifesto*, and later by Engels in an article published by the German newspaper *Vorwärts* in 1890-1891.² Among other things, he said that certain regulations and certain interests of bourgeois states, and the situation in Europe itself, could lead to a regulation of conflicts before we had a socialist revolution. Even at that time Engels believed that Europe could disarm under certain circumstances. In the opinion of our party, these statements mark the beginning of arms control, at least in the socialist tradition.

Zhurkin. In later post-revolutionary years Lenin looked at the future Soviet Union as a state which would coexist with other nations for some considerable time. That is why he launched his domestic stabilisation policy, and why there were so many statements about cohabitation, or coexistence, some of which seemed strange at the time—for example, when he said that disarmament was the ideal of socialism and the ideal form of the existence of socialism.

But I agree completely that it was not until the late 1950s and the 1960s that the theory of peaceful coexistence began to be developed. Only after the 20th CPSU Con-

gress and the 1957 and 1960 international conferences of communist leaders was it recognised for the first time that world war was not inevitable. As in any process of political rethinking, that recognition was not confined to one single event, but was a process, and it started with Khrushchev.

Singh. Pancha Shila, the fundamental and long-established principle of Indian civilization, is a living example of peaceful coexistence. The criteria of mutual respect and noninterference, going back to the pre-1947 period and the early years of Nehru's leadership, have now been written into the Declaration of Delhi signed by the Soviet and Indian leaders. India was one of the first countries to begin practising peaceful coexistence with different political systems, within the world democratic process, and also one of the first countries in Asia where the Communist Party went through normal multiple electoral processes.

Zhurkin. International principles are the stronger the more national roots they have and the more varied their sources. One can say that the West has done more on the rights of the individual, socialist societies on social and economic rights, and some of the Eastern societies on the traditional moral aspects of human rights.

NEW DIMENSIONS

■ *What are the nonmilitary aspects of universal security?*

Legvold. In the 1970s we talked about some of these issues that are now usually called global issues, and we even began to think about their relationship to security. But those were in many ways exotic issues, which did not invade our everyday life or overlap. Who could have foreseen the greenhouse effect, the poisoning of the Rhine and the Danube, or such health care problems as AIDS?

The economic predicament of large parts of the Third World has grown to enormous proportions. One of the first national leaders to talk about the potential link between Third World debt and international security was General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov. As we go into the 1990s, a number of national leaderships are looking for cooperation beyond arms control and the economy. Linkage of the traditional security problems with new ones is emphasised by public opinion as well.

Zhurkin. For the first time there is emerging a kind of consensus that the traditional understanding of security (i.e., in military terms) is too narrow, if not fundamentally wrong. The situation is changing because the economic health of society—buying power, goods on shelves—is as much a part of national security as social and humanitarian health. In the West this reconsideration of security was prompted by the ecological movement, while in the socialist world it is associated with the emergence of new thinking. These changes in political and

social psychology are creating a good basis for dramatic moves in the field of arms reductions and, generally, in improving security.

Singh. In India people have always tried to look at security in wider terms, not merely in terms of economic development but also of the social, ethnic and cultural unity of the country.

For example, many of the rivers flowing into India come from China, Nepal and Bhutan, and many of the rivers flowing into Pakistan actually go through India. So soil erosion and deforestation up in the mountains are connected with silt in the plains. We are trying to contain desertification in the western parts of the country, but it will be a longer, costlier, and less effective process without cooperation with our neighbours. In short, I think that the necessity of cooperation with regard to nonmilitary threats and their management is so great as to demand serious and objective discussion.

Voigt. The real problem is to combine morality with economic and political interests in the *concept of enlightened self-interest*. I would mention five points where a gain for one country will mean a gain for all: the diminution of US budgetary and balance-of-payments deficits; an agrarian reform in the European Community; the settlement of conflicts in the Third World; conversion from military to civilian production in the industrialised countries; and the attraction of private capital as well as public money into the social infrastructure. One final point: we also need a new conceptual approach to the developing countries which would have a multilateral basis in order to avoid both a paternalistic approach on the part of the North and constant recriminations from the South. A new world order is only possible through a series of small well-considered steps along the path of reform: the final goal can only be reached if you have an idea of the steps which lead to it.

Legvold. On the one hand, justice requires development, less inequity, and access to resources; on the other, it also requires limitations on authoritarianism and on the sources of political instability within society. The great problem is how can the most powerful countries contribute? How can they use their resources to help when there is so much pressure at home to expend those resources on dealing with domestic problems?

Zhurkin. We should remember that there are always counter-pressures on every nation to act as part of the international community, as part of the world family. Certainly, the correlation between the domestic needs and

international obligations of nations has always been a problem fraught with contradictions. Political, moral and psychological mechanisms should be developed to smooth out these contradictions.

Singh. International politics cannot be managed without basic moral approaches, based on human justice and equity, nor without greater cooperation for sustainable development. The great powers must be more selective in the type of support they give, particularly to broader-based governments. Past experience shows that much support has gone to authoritarian governments because they were considered easier to deal with.

Legvold. In conclusion, we seem to have been talking more about where we would like international development to go than about where it might actually lead. For instance, the degree to which Soviet perestroika deepens and stabilises and endures is bound to have a dramatic effect on Western thinking. But what if the process is reversed or redirected, what negative effects might that have?

Voigt. I can think of three obstacles to positive world processes. One is nationality problems both between and within nations, which are again assuming violent and destabilising forms. Secondly, socially-motivated domestic factors (unemployment in the West and lack of economic results in the East), which might lead to a preoccupation with domestic troubles and the growth of reactionary elements and conservative answers. And thirdly, a regional crisis outside Europe or a technical incident (explosion or misuse of weapons technology), which might have an impact beyond a regional level.

Zhurkin. I would add two more problems: firstly, proliferation, primarily but not only of nuclear weapons; and secondly, a reaction to the uneasiness engendered by new processes that might be called the security of the familiar (better the devil you know...), something characteristic both of individuals and sociopolitical forces.

It will take a lot of time, dialogue and discussion within societies and between states to back the principles of universal human thinking with universal action for the good of humanity.

¹ "It is the task of Social-Democrats ... to work to transform the imperialist war into a civil war for socialism." See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 41, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 350.—*Ed.*

² This article was published in 1893.—*Ed.*

A BREAK IN THE CLOUDS

The Vienna Talks on Conventional Arms in Europe

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and NATO consider the lowering of military confrontation in Europe to be a major precondition for broader East-West cooperation, and the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe are to play a priority role here. A great deal is at stake: the negotiators are discussing ways of cutting back some 100,000 units of weaponry, including tanks, warplanes, helicopters, armoured troop carriers and artillery systems.

Mikhail Gorbachov's initiatives and George Bush's response to them have given a strong political impetus to the disarmament process and set the tenor of the second round of the conventional arms negotiations, which closed in Vienna's Hofburg Palace on July 13.

Below, the chief negotiators of the United States, West Germany and Czechoslovakia share their impressions of the progress so far and the prospects ahead in the talks.

THE TIMETABLE IS REALISTIC

*Ambassador Stephen LEDOGAR
USA*

The second round was very business-like, and we have made a good deal of progress. I think that all participants can take satisfaction from having done good work.

In the first round both sides put their opening positions on the table. The East's proposal was more far-reaching and more visionary, but far less specific on details, whereas the West's proposal was very intensively concentrated on details. Gradually, the two basic approaches began to be more alike. I think that a lot of credit for this should go to the NATO heads of state and government, not least President Bush.

Despite the fact that we believed that three units of account, mainly tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers, were the ones we should concentrate on, our leaders became convinced by the arguments of the Eastern side

that it was also necessary to come to grips with aircraft, helicopters and personnel. So they instructed us to come up with a proposal that would include all the six of the elements that the East was insisting upon, and we have already taken a first major step in that direction. But there still are many problems and difficulties in the way.

First of all, we have different approaches to some of the definitions, such as "combat aircraft", which means that our numbers are different. The other side's attitude is that essentially half the East's combat aircraft should be exempt from the negotiation on the basis of assigned mission, but that all of the combat aircraft on our side should be included on the basis of capability.

Secondly, there is the whole question of how to provide for the distribution, after an agreement, of the remaining entitlements around Europe. We were both saying let's have 20,000 tanks on each side, but I don't think either side wants to have them all bunched up in any one particular region, like Central Europe. So both are trying to come up with approaches that would require the spreading out of the remainder, which involves agreement on regional schemes, sub-ceilings, etc. We have different approaches and different relationships.

Another group of questions arise from the fact that we are 16 sovereign, independent countries, all with different requirements, different points of view and different equipment. Now I'm pleased to see more diversity on the Warsaw Treaty side. The different members have more freedom to express their different views, requirements and

WMR continues to focus on the problems of conventional arms reductions. See the article "Confidence, Not Weapons" by Erwin Lanc, *WMR*, No. 7, 1989.

preferences. So it is also a negotiation within each alliance, and only later between the two alliances. Sometimes this leads to very complex things, a last-minute problem with one of our members, for example. But we always seem to work it out and we were pleased to be able to put our expanded framework proposal as a follow-up to President Bush's Brussels initiatives on the table on the last day of the second round.

So we are all the more pleased that we are ahead of the schedule laid out for us by our NATO leaders, but we cannot sit down and rest now because we are turning to very formidable issues. All the NATO allies remain convinced that the timetable—the conclusion of the first agreement in 1990—that we have set for ourselves is reasonable. And the statement made by the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO in Bucharest last June shows their interest in moving forward as fast as possible, and they have, according to their Declaration, instructed their experts to press on and to expedite the work. My Soviet counterpart has said that his side is prepared to meet the challenge. I think that with goodwill and hard work on both sides we can meet this timetable.

A RECORD OF RAPPROCHEMENT

Ambassador Rudiger HARTMANN
FRG

The second round was a very dynamic one; we had give and take on both sides, and important proposals were made. The West accepted the inclusion of aircraft, helicopters and personnel, which had been the subject of controversy between East and West, and we also saw a lot of movement on the Eastern side, particularly on the question of regionalism. In all, I think, we have achieved more than one could have expected at the beginning. The previous Vienna negotiations never got near what we have already achieved in two rounds. This shows clearly that both sides want an early agreement.

I think there are a number of factors behind the present rapprochement. Firstly, a number of us, from East and West, took part in the previous negotiations and undoubtedly learned lessons from them. Secondly, both sides had over two years to prepare for those negotiations. The third factor is that there was on both sides a readiness to take in the views of the other side, and not to form rock-hard positions too early.

As to our differences, let me first deal with aircraft. Of course, we believe that the East's present set-up with aircraft is mainly oriented on defence, that is on attacking incoming aircraft or missiles. But, without much difficulty, these aircraft can be also used to support ground attack or to give protection to aircraft executing ground attack. It

is hard, if at all possible, to differentiate between the various types of aircraft. Moreover, the West mainly has multi-purpose aircraft. So there is a structural problem which cannot be solved simply by including or excluding aircraft which have defence tasks now but which may change their profile in a war.

The question of what should and should not be included with regard to light tanks and artillery is not very difficult, and is likely to be resolved, I hope soon. But the question of depots is a fundamental question for the regional differentiation/separation of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. We thought it was quite clear that weapons that are stored cannot be used for surprise attack. The Eastern partners disagreed. We then offered monitoring of storage as a measure to provide assurance. This was welcome, but it was not felt to be enough because even if there is this monitoring, the East says, the depots could rapidly be made use of by active units. If we can solve the depot problem, then we can solve other problems of regional differentiation.

And there is the problem of the destruction of weapons. Although we do not yet know how many of them we will have to destroy and when, my idea, which I've passed on to my government, is that we should look for ways and means of rendering combat-incapable those weapons which are to be reduced. For example, turrets could be taken off tanks and stored somewhere quite apart.

What are the prospects?

I expect the forthcoming third round to move as fast as the previous one did. And the longer-term perspective relates to the conclusion of the Treaty within 6-12 months. The Political Consultative Committee of the WTO noted at its meeting that it was a realistic schedule. At the moment there is no reason why we should postpone it, and I am quite optimistic.

If you want to achieve results in multilateral diplomacy you have to have a deadline. Deadlines do work. We have an excellent example: without such a system the change from the Reagan Administration to the Bush Administration would have made it impossible to achieve the CSCE document and the mandate for the talks. The Americans wanted a CSCE document by January 19, 1989; it was clear to everybody that if it were not achieved, a long delay might occur. So everyone was prepared to go ahead and work constructively.

A TWO-WAY STREET

Ambassador Ladislav BALCAR
Czechoslovakia

Both sides seem now to be speaking a common language on a number of major issues and this has paved the way for advance towards the early conclusion of a treaty

on conventional armed forces in Europe, the first such treaty on our continent.

Now one can see not just the outline but even the structure of a future treaty. There will be equal ceilings on the conventional forces of NATO and the WTO at a much lower level, making it possible to resolve the problem of imbalances and asymmetry. In Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, regions will have corresponding sub-ceilings. The aggregate ceilings for the two alliances will be complemented by sub-ceilings for individual countries and for the forces outside national territories. This backbone of the original agreement has been built from the proposals and initiatives of the two alliances.

There are, however, differences and contradictions between the positions of NATO and the WTO. It would be too much to hope for total unanimity. The main thing is that they are comparable. We do not see any insurmountable differences in the quantitative proposals on the future accord.

The sides' positions have grown closer primarily because of a favourable international situation and an increasing movement from confrontation to new political thinking, which is centred on human survival. This priority was behind the proposals of the WTO countries on conventional armed forces in the spirit of Mikhail Gorbachov's recent initiatives, and behind their urging an early accord. The NATO Council responded along the lines of President Bush's initiatives. Broad international public interest in the Vienna talks and their results is also encouraging the negotiators. Finally, the prevalent atmosphere at the talks is one of realism, political goodwill, and the desire to listen to and understand the partner's arguments and to make reasonable compromises for the sake of advance.

Undoubtedly, the talks have made good progress, but they could have been even better. A serious obstacle was the unwillingness of the NATO countries to the very last day of the second round to count three major elements of the armed forces: aircraft, helicopters and personnel. They still want us to reduce all our combat aircraft, including purely defensive ones like air defence interceptors which are incapable of ground attack operations. But this approach does not seem to tally with the understanding that the first phase of the reductions should involve only the

more destabilising offensive weapons, i.e., the attack aircraft of battlefield (tactical) aviation.

Another concern is the tendency of our partners artificially to narrow the problem of troop reductions simply to cutbacks in the armed forces of the USSR and the US outside their national territories. But why shouldn't Britain, France, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands cut back on the roughly 100,000 troops they have in West Germany? NATO's earlier approach—that equal ceilings should be fixed on all the troops outside national territories—seems more reasonable, and is shared by the WTO.

Regrettably, little progress has been made towards accord on tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery. Our partners refuse to count light vehicles, of which NATO has some 2,000. This is not a negligible force since the ceiling on the tank fleet is to be 20,000 for each side. Their approach to armoured troop carriers and artillery is the same—they use various pretexts for excluding some of these systems. This would leave many gaps in the fabric of the future accord.

There is a similar tendency on the part of the West with regard to arms depots. For example, at short notice NATO can complement its entitlement of 8,000 tanks in Central Europe with another 4,000 from its depots. That is why arms depots are, to use the football idiom, a "roving striker" which can give NATO advantage in any part of Europe and at any time. Our partners do not want to include them in regional sub-ceilings because they are trying to secure an opportunity to move weapons freely within regions. In fact, this would mean "freedom to circumvent" the regional limits of the future treaty, because the WTO countries have almost no such depots.

To conclude, there has been a break in the clouds over the Hofburg Palace where the talks are taking place, but the skies are not yet as clear as everyone would like them to be. Difficulties still remain to be resolved and we have yet to work out a detailed system for information, control and stabilisation measures. The unprecedented challenges confronting the negotiators demand unprecedented joint efforts because, as everyone knows, talks are a two-way street. The delegations from the socialist countries are prepared to work constructively.

50 YEARS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II

THE WAY IT WAS

Veteran Communists Remember

WMR asked veterans of the communist movement who lived in various countries and under different circumstances during World War II to share their recollections and offer some ideas that might be useful to communist parties today. Below we publish replies from Denmark, France, the GDR, Lebanon and Poland.

Ignacy LOGA-SOWINSKI

Polish working-class leader, former member of the Politbureau of the CC PUWP, Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions and Deputy Chairman of the PPR Council of State

At 4:45 a. m. on September 1, 1939, the Nazi forces attacked Poland, and World War II began. The pretext for the invasion was an alleged attack by Polish troops on a German radio station in the frontier town of Gliwice. We know now that it was an act of provocation on the part of the SS, and that the "Polish troops" involved were German criminals dressed in Polish uniform who were shot immediately afterwards.

At the time, like thousands of other Polish Communists, I was in prison. When we heard the news that our country was in mortal danger, we did not hesitate to ask the prison authorities to let us join the army. On leaving the prison gates, some of us came under fire from Nazi troops.

I will never forget the heroic defence of Warsaw, where I fought until capitulation on September 27 following fierce fighting against superior enemy forces. We had been waging that battle single-handed, waiting in vain for help from our Western allies, Britain and France, which under our treaty with them were to come to Poland's assistance within a fortnight after an act of aggression against her. Little did we know that already on September 12, at a meeting in Abbeville, the Anglo-French coalition had secretly gone back on its obligations.

What did the French and the British hope for as they watched the Nazi forces sweep eastwards across Poland? Frankly, like all the other anti-fascists, the Polish Communists expected the Soviet Union and Germany to clash

in 1939 in spite of the nonaggression pact signed between the two ideological adversaries on August 23, because Hitler was not likely to be restrained by a piece of paper. We were out by 22 months.

The question arises whether Hitler's attack on Poland was not in fact made possible by that pact. All the pros and cons, all the circumstances, and the interplay of all the forces and governments of the countries concerned should be taken into consideration here. We believed that an anti-Hitler coalition between the Western countries and the Soviet Union did not materialise in 1939 through the fault of the British and French governments, which sought to turn Hitler's aggression eastwards so that both Germany and the Soviet Union would be exhausted in a war. Their plan largely succeeded.

However, developments did not quite follow the course envisioned by the two powers. With hindsight, the plans of the other sides involved in that great war can be seen not to have worked either. The war taught a lesson to all; in essence, that an act of aggression does not benefit the aggressor and cannot be committed with impunity, and that humanity can put a straightjacket on any madman who attempts to unleash another world holocaust. No major social, national or international issue can be resolved by force today.

In 1939, the Polish Communists were in a very tight spot for yet another reason: in 1938 the Communist Party of Poland had been disbanded by a Comintern resolution signed by representatives of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Italy and Finland. That unjustifiable decision, as well as the earlier repression of CPP leaders in the Soviet Union, was a great tragedy for the Polish Communists.

At a time when we were persecuted and when accusations were hurled at us from all sides, it was important to remain loyal to the idea and not to break down. Moreover, throughout the early period of the war, until Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the communist

The recollections of Salomão Malina, Chairman of the Brazilian Communist Party, about serving in the expeditionary force which fought on the Italian front, were published in *WMR*, No. 8, 1989.

movement was bound by the Comintern's assessment, according to which "this war is a continuation of a protracted imperialist dispute in the capitalist camp"; therefore a reactionary war and an unjust one on both sides. The Polish Communists did not agree with this conclusion, and from the outset joined in the struggle against the Nazi invaders.

Clandestine organisations were formed in Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz, Katowice, Lublin, Poznan, Rzeszow, Radom, Kielce, Plock, Wroclaw and other cities, and in January 1942 they united in the newly-established Polish Workers' Party and its armed wing, the People's Guard (Gwardia Ludowa). Though numerically not the largest components of the Polish Resistance, they were especially active and militant, and were the first to launch guerrilla warfare.

It is hard to describe the turn-around in our mood following the defeat of the Nazi forces at Stalingrad. The general talk was that the war was as good as lost for Germany. Our party called for the formation of a National Front. The party leaders proposed to the resident mission of the London government in exile that all our forces be united in order to liberate the country. Unfortunately, our proposal was turned down, and we continued to fight separately. Lack of unity, mistrust and even political enmity detracted from the common struggle against the invaders.

The party was doing everything it could to promote the Resistance. A guerrilla People's Army (Armia Ludowa) was raised, and joined the Polish armed forces formed in the Soviet Union. By the end of the war, two fully-fledged armies and a detached corps of Polish troops were fighting alongside the Red Army.

The total contribution of the Polish people to the victory can be appreciated from the fact that we fought longer than any other Allied country — 2,078 days till May 8, 1945, not only on our own territory but also in Western Europe (in France, Norway, Italy and the Netherlands), Africa and on the Eastern Front (from Lenino to Berlin), and that an 800,000-strong Polish army, hundreds of thousands of guerrillas and millions of Resistance fighters contributed to that struggle.

Poland suffered 6 million dead, or 22% of the population. In Warsaw alone, twice as many people died as the US lost on all fronts. In Poland, Hitler did not install a puppet government like those of Quisling, Petain or Tiso. The Polish people lost 38% of their national wealth, the capital was reduced to rubble, hundreds of towns and villages were razed, and priceless cultural treasures were plundered.

But all the blood was not spilt in vain. Europe was saved. After centuries, Poland regained its western lands up to the Odra-Nysa border, and its northern lands, the birthplace of Prussian militarism. Our national security relies on an alliance with the USSR, the country that made the greatest contribution to the victory over the Nazi Reich.

After the war Poland began to make effective social and political progress on the basis of people's democracy,

which was gradually winning majority support. Now that we are taking a critical look at our history and counting our mistakes and losses, I still think that our achievements outweigh our failures.

The task of the Polish Communists is not just to defend these achievements from falsification, but also boldly to carry on our new policy in order to pull the country out of the crisis and to rebuild socialism on the basis of democracy and social justice. Life itself, the best teacher of history, does not deceive.

Kurt SEIBT

Chairman of the SED Central Auditing Commission and President of the GDR Solidarity Committee, once an inmate of the Nazi Brandenburg Jail

On September 1, 1939, the leader of the Nazi party organisation of the German Theatre where I worked summoned all the actors and auxiliary personnel and delivered a speech. Contrary to his expectations, there was no applause: people were afraid; there was silence, and several famous and respected actresses broke down and wept.

A clandestine cell of the Communist Party of Germany was active in the theatre, and on the same day it got together to discuss what to do. We knew that many of our actors were not among Hitler's supporters. Three of them wrote a leaflet "To All Actors", which in the spirit of the humanistic tradition called for the overthrow of the barbarous Nazi dictatorship and for an end to the war. Copies were passed on to many other artists and intellectuals.

The outbreak of World War II was not, perhaps, such a surprise to the Communists as to other Germans. Our territorial Resistance organisation and the clandestine branch of the Communist Party in southeast Berlin (Adlershof, Altglienicke and Bohnsdorf) had been closely following the political signs pointing to preparations for a predatory imperialist war, particularly after the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

In late August 1939, shortly after the conclusion of the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the Central Committee sent its representative, Willi Gall, to give guidance to our group. He urged stronger political resistance to the Nazi regime, passed on important political information regarding clandestine work, and reported in detail on the decisions of the party conference in Bern.

That important gathering of German Communists had warned against the imminent danger of a world war stoked up by Nazi imperialism and militarism, identified ways of averting the war threat, and formulated a democratic alternative for the country after the overthrow of the Hitler dictatorship. Addressing us just a week before the outbreak of the war, Gall stressed the need to promote cooperation

among all the opponents of Hitler, and above all to strengthen unity between the Social Democrats and the Communists.

We set down to work immediately and agreed with comrades from the Social Democratic Party on close cooperation. They helped propagate our materials, made their materials available to us, and shared their information and experience.

Soon our clandestine group published the first issue of the newspaper *Berliner Volkszeitung*, which on its front page carried the motto "For Peace, Freedom and Democracy!" For us, as for the other resistance fighters, September 1, 1939 ushered in a new phase of hard-fought and costly struggle against the war and Nazi barbarity and for a really new Germany.

We were preparing the second issue of the paper when most of our group were arrested. Our leaders, Gall and Otto Nelte, were executed, I was given a life sentence, and others long prison terms. On December 8, 1939, I was committed to the Brandenburg hard-labour prison, where I spent the entire war.

In spite of isolation and very harsh conditions, a clandestine organisation of the Communist Party operated in the prison, which helped us staunchly to withstand all the trials. Erich Honecker was among those who supported me in solitary confinement and passed on news from the outside.

Political prisoners were stunned when the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union and overran a large chunk of its European part within a matter of months. We felt unbounded joy and relief when we heard that the Nazi advance had been checked outside Moscow in November 1941. Then came Stalingrad. Every victory won by the Red Army strengthened us in our belief that the day of liberation would come.

For me the war ended on April 27, 1945, when the Red Army reached the Brandenburg prison and opened the doors to freedom. We were overjoyed, and also thankful to the Soviet people, who had made the greatest sacrifices in the war against fascism.

We were faced with the new, immense task of eliminating the socioeconomic, political and spiritual roots of fascism. On June 11, 1945, the Communist Party of Germany issued a public address which outlined ways of abolishing the rule of monopoly capital and establishing an antifascist, democratic regime.

In 1932, the Communist Party had 300,000 members; more than half were thrown into Nazi prisons and concentration camps, and one out of ten perished. Ten months after liberation, the party already numbered 620,000. The unification of the two main political trends in the working-class movement, the Communists and the Social Democrats, culminated in the establishment of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in April 1946.

Ever since liberation from Nazism, our party has been consistently working for the establishment of a broad alliance of all the antifascist and democratic forces. The

recreated trade unions, young people and many of those with bourgeois and petty bourgeois backgrounds became involved in it. Within that alliance, the SED has always worked shoulder to shoulder with the Christian Democratic Union, the Liberal Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, the Democratic Farmers' Party, and civic organisations.

Today the tradition of joint actions among all democratic forces is manifest in the policy of the SED and allied parties, and in the policy of the German socialist state, aimed at building a broad coalition of reason and realism for the good of peace and humanity.

Etienne FAJON

CC member, the French Communist Party, former member of the Politbureau and the CC Secretariat, Director of *l'Humanite*; one of the 27 "Road of Honour" communist deputies, he was sentenced in April 1940 and deported to Algeria

l'Humanite was banned on August 26, 1939, and a decree was issued on September 26 to dissolve the Communist Party. I was dismayed that the French government was fighting not Germany but the working class of its own country, its trade unions and its party. A witch-hunt for Communists was started. At the same time the government was making preparations for a war against the USSR, raising an expeditionary force for operations in Finland and massing forces in Syria with a view to bombing the Caucasian oilfields.

The larger segment of public opinion was befuddled by a wild anti-Soviet campaign over the nonaggression pact the USSR had signed with Germany in order to gain time to strengthen the country's defences.

I was scripted the day after the outbreak of World War II. Soldiers and ordinary people were troubled by that "phoney war". They did not immediately understand the Communists' position, but neither did they approve of the repression directed against us.

In spite of enormous difficulties, the PCF had already laid the groundwork for a clandestine organisation by the autumn of that year. On October 28, I personally distributed the first clandestinely published issues of *l'Humanite* and I continued leafletting until I was arrested.

The defeat of the German armies at Stalingrad, which turned the tide of World War II, was the event that most influenced my life and work during the six years of war.

Stalingrad did not change the general course of action of our party, which began its struggle against the Nazi invaders in 1940 and carried it on to victory. It did, however, alter the conditions of that struggle by dispelling the myth of Germany's invincibility, infusing confidence into the patriots, and contributing to the massive growth of the

Resistance. The enemy forces deployed in France were weakened, and increasing demoralisation set in among their French collaborators. All this gave our party better opportunities to unite the patriotic forces and to broaden the armed struggle with a view to a national uprising.

The last phase of the war in France was ushered in by the Allied landings in Normandy in June 1944. Armed actions by the French Interior Forces (FFI), of which our francstireurs and partisans were the most numerous and dynamic element, contributed to the success of the Allied landing and then, with mass popular support, to the liberation of Paris and the entire national territory. Many FFI fighters joined the reborn French army and carried on the struggle in Germany until the enemy capitulated.

The liberation of France was paralleled by an extraordinary upsurge of the popular movement. The PCF emerged from the underground, increased its membership by hundreds of thousands, and extended its influence to one-fourth of the population (winning 28% of the votes in the 1946 elections).

In that situation the rehabilitation of the country was started successfully, major social and democratic gains made, such as the nationalisation of several banks and large industrial plants, an advanced social security system built, and new rights won for the working people. The forces of reaction had not yet reared their heads, and the anti-Hitler coalition was still in existence on the international scene.

It would be absurd to transfer the experience of that time into the present context mechanistically because the situation in France and the world in general has greatly changed in the last 45 years. But the fact remains that intervention by the majority of workers and citizens and the efforts of a strong and influential communist party are the prerequisites for any advances.

Ib NØRLUND

member of the Executive Committee and Secretariat, CC, the Communist Party of Denmark, a veteran Resistance fighter, author of books on history and politics

I first visited Moscow in the summer of 1939 on the business of the Communist Youth International, and also to take part in the celebrations of the 70th birthday of the great Danish writer Martin Andersen Nexø.

Everyone I talked with in Moscow asked me what I thought about the Soviet Union's long-drawn-out talks with Western countries and whether they would lead to a treaty. I took a sceptical view of the architects of the Munich deal,

but expected them to enter into an agreement with the USSR. It was hard to foresee what would happen.

One Sunday morning in August I saw an unusually long line at a newsstand. I also bought a paper, and saw on the front page the picture of Ribbentrop and Molotov signing the nonaggression pact. I rushed back to the hotel to read the news with the help of a dictionary.

...I heard about the outbreak of war from CYI General Secretary Raymond Guyot, who was certain that the French Army would not take long to bring Hitler to his knees. I was told to leave for Denmark.

Before departure, I met with Georgy Dimitrov and Otto Kuusinen to talk over the situation. It is not hard to imagine with what relish anticommunist propaganda exploited the idea of "the Communists and the Nazis working hand in hand". In our discussion, Dimitrov effectively drew a line between state policy on the one hand, and ideology and politics on the other, and reaffirmed the need for the anti-fascist struggle that we were waging.

On April 9, 1940, Denmark was overrun by the Nazis, and on June 22, 1941, yielding to their pressure, the government arrested about 500 Communists, including members of parliament.

In 1942, I and several other prisoners at a concentration camp dug a tunnel under the barbed wire and escaped. I travelled via Copenhagen to Fyn Island in the heart of the country. After all I had gone through, I was not going to risk leaving the house during the day. We went about our underground work at night, gathering strength for resistance to the occupation authorities and the treacherous policy of the Danish government. Almost daily we heard about strikes at large factories and other courageous deeds.

One morning in August 1943 I was told that I could walk the streets without fear because they were flooded with people. Local resistance had erupted into a kind of national strike, which involved not only factories but also all the shops and offices. In short, the whole of Fyn, practically the whole country rose up in a Resistance movement, one which had long been gathering strength but was now rushing ahead like a spring torrent. I remembered Lenin's words that the masses can learn more in a few days than is possible in decades.

The all-out strike on Fyn lasted six days, and the whole country was in turmoil. On August 29, the collaborationist government had to resign. The occupation authorities called a state of siege in the country, and that was the end of the myth of a "model protectorate". The Danish people had by rights joined the antifascist war of liberation. The Communists gave a good account of themselves. The membership of the party quintupled, and at the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1945 it polled 255,000 votes (against 40,000 in 1939) and won 18 seats. These are glorious and instructive pages of history.

Youssef Khattar HELLOU

**CC member, Lebanese Communist Party,
former member of the CC Political Bureau and
chairman of the Central Control Commission**

After the emergence of a fascist threat and especially after the 7th Congress of the Comintern, Communists consistently exposed Nazism and its undemocratic character. In 1937 we established an Anti-Fascist Committee, and in May 1939 Beirut played host to the First Syrian-Lebanese Congress of Anti-Fascist Fighters, at which Communists were joined by other progressive political forces.

Generally, we expected that the talks between the British and French delegations and that of the Soviet Union would bring about the conclusion of an anti-Hitler pact. But it was not to be. The collapse of the talks greatly worried the patriots and the people in general in our country, and that worry grew even worse when the French colonial authorities began to mass troops in Lebanon and Syria even though the theatre of operations was far away in the heart of Europe.

Three camps took shape in our politics in the period before and after September 1, 1939. One urged united support for the policy of the colonial administration, some of its representatives volunteering for the French Eastern Army in order to set an example to others. Another, fairly small group leaned towards the Axis powers. Still another, led by the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, stood in opposition to the other two.

The colonial authorities unleashed a campaign of terror, coming down hard on the Communists and all the other democratic forces. Many organisations disbanded or suspended their activities, and only the Communist Party decided to carry on. Immediately, a wave of arrests swept the party, and most of its leaders were taken into custody. The party went underground, regrouped during the first three months of 1940, began to publish the newspaper *Nidal al-Shaab* (People's Struggle), and built a network of contacts among grassroots organisations. An optimum combination of legal and clandestine activities was worked out.

The war was drawing nearer as the Nazi forces advanced in Africa along the Mediterranean coast towards El Alamein. Clearly, we needed troops in order effectively to join in the struggle against Nazism. On June 21, 1941, the Central Committee held a plenary meeting to consider a course of action should Nazi troops enter the country. The decision was to mount armed resistance.

The plenary meeting was drawing to a close in a Damascus suburb when we heard heavy artillery fire: the British and French troops had launched their attack on Syria. News of fighting on the Lebanese border also came in. We then agreed to return to our organisations and to summon support for the British and the French to overthrow the Vichy government. We were confirmed in our decision when the news came that Hitler had attacked the USSR.

After the USSR had entered the war, there were three signal events in our struggle: the rout of the Nazis at Stalingrad, which helped us win our battle for national independence on November 22, 1943; the victory over fascism on May 9, 1945, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon on December 31, 1946, as a result of Soviet pressure.

During the war and the independence struggle the Communists became adept at a policy of alliances and pioneered a special form of patriotic front, the Lebanese National Congress, which united a number of parties, democratic organisations and individual leaders. Our party had a leading role to play in the Congress and did a great deal to rally workers, the Armenian population, peasants and intellectuals around it. A large number of intellectuals cooperated with the Communists.

Here is another fact worth mentioning. In 1942, when fierce fighting was raging on the Soviet-German front, we established a Society of Friends of the Soviet Union, which was joined by many public leaders and prominent cultural figures in Syria and Lebanon. Their main goal was to keep the people informed about life in the Soviet Union and to muster support for its struggle against the Nazi invaders.

Thanks to the efforts of the Lebanese communist leaders Farajallah Hellou and Nicolas Chawi, and also of Moustafa Al-Ariss, head of the printers' union and then of the General Federation of Factory and Office Workers of Lebanon, our party grew numerically and came to play a noticeable role in national life. Shortly before September 1939 it had about a 1,000 members, but by the end of the war the membership had grown to more than 10,000, reaching 18,000 in late 1946.

I witnessed or took part in all those events. I take pride in having been first arrested and imprisoned way back in 1932, after I had made a speech at a school rally on August 1, Anti-War Day. It was a great honour to have been found guilty of antiwar protest, which the French colonial court considered communist propaganda.

“THE WOMB IS FERTILE STILL...”

Lutz HOLZINGER

Deputy Editor-in-Chief, *Volksstimme*, newspaper of the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ)

The words of Bertolt Brecht in the title, I think, aptly express the menace of Nazism, which even today, half a century after the outbreak of World War II, continues to reappear as relapses into neofascist ideology.

The 1938 *Anschluss*, the forcible takeover of Austria and its destruction as an Independent state, was Nazi Germany's first act of aggression and a sort of prelude to World War II. During the various acts of remembrance in our country there was general public condemnation of these events of 50 years ago. It is indicative that this April the local authorities and inhabitants of the town of Braunau, where Hitler was born, steadfastly refused to allow neo-Nazis to celebrate in any way the centenary of the birth of "their" Führer. Instead the antifascists set up an obelisk in Braunau which reads: "For Peace, Freedom and Democracy".

But just how subdued the Austrian establishment has been in overcoming the tragic consequences of the past was shown by the campaign to elect Kurt Waldheim Federal President three years ago. His participation in the Wehrmacht's Balkan expedition, which he had earlier denied, came to light, but that did not discredit him in the eyes of most of those who work in the mass media and did not harm his standing with a sizable section of the voters either. He was presented rather as someone who had "done his duty", like "hundreds of thousands of other Austrians".

Just how hard it is for some of my country's politicians to recognise its ambiguous role in the period of national socialism is evident from the treatment of the surviving victims of Nazism—the former inmates of prison cells and concentration camps, and the Resistance fighters—who have had to wait until the 50th anniversary of the *Anschluss* to receive even a fairly modest handout as a symbolic recognition of the injustice of the persecution to which they were subjected. Austria's role was ambiguous because, although on the one hand it was the first victim of the Nazi campaigns, on the other many of its citizens accepted the Nazi regime with delight. Much still remains to be done to clarify the extent to which the Nazi legacy has continuity in the thinking of the bureaucrats in the ministries, the executive agencies, the judiciary, among those who run the economy and those who lecture at the universities.

It is not very surprising, therefore, to find again and again an ambivalent morality when it comes to getting rid of the national socialist past. Public speakers before a foreign audience or on ceremonial occasions always make a point of stressing their commitment to antifascism, which is written into the Constitution. Meanwhile, racist and anti-Semitic views and xenophobic attitudes are tolerated at home and in conversation. Such views are inevitably expressed whenever the occasion arises, bearing out what Brecht said: the womb which once spawned fascism is fertile still.

Such an occasion was provided by two events in Vienna last year: the erection of an antiwar and antifascist monument designed by the sculptor Alfred Hrdlicka, and the premiere at the Burgtheater of a play by Thomas Bernhard entitled *Heldenplatz*.¹ Both the sculptor and the playwright are well known in Austria and abroad, and both have dealt in their works with the central events of 1938.

Because one will find the truth more readily in the art of bourgeois society than in its politics, it is not surprising that the rightists strongly objected to the erection of the monument and to the staging of the play, both of which are antifascist. What was surprising, perhaps, was the participation in the protests, some of them highly vociferous, of members of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), which is in the "Grand Coalition" government together with the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ).

It all began in 1983, when the Vienna City Council, with the backing of the communal council, invited the sculptor to design a monument to the victims of war and fascism to be erected not far from the Vienna Opera House in the square fronting the Albertina picture gallery. The area has remained vacant since World War II, when a direct hit on the Philipshof buried almost 300 people in the ruins. There were objections to the monument from within the ranks of the conservative ÖVP and the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and a noisy campaign was mounted last summer. A non-party paper, with the largest circulation in Austria, branded Hrdlicka a "Stalinist". The minister of science and research, an ÖVP member, tried to have the decision to make the site available for the monument free of charge reversed for the reason that an underground garage was to be built there, despite the fact that earlier the public had been hypocritically assured that the victims buried under the ruins should on no account be disturbed by foundation work for the monument. The City Council leadership began to vacillate, but Heinrich Keller, then Central Secretary of the Socialist Party of Austria, declared that his party, which had a majority in the Federal Government and the City Council, would not alter its decision on the siting of the monument.

Why then all the noise over a work of art which no one had yet seen? The pretext was apparently provided by the designer's statement that the sculpture would centre on the figure of a Jew being humiliated by the Nazis, while the monument would be crowned with the Proclamation of Independence of April 27, 1945 with the names of the signatories, including that of Johann Koplenig, Chairman of the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) at the time. This reminder of the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis and of the role the KPÖ played in the establishment of the Second Republic was undoubtedly the reason for the campaign with its anti-Semitic and anticommunist slogans. The reason it failed was principally because of the resolute resistance offered to the neo-Nazi efforts by antifascists of various political persuasions, and because the authorities to a certain extent realised that such occurrences could have unpleasant repercussions abroad. Austria's prestige had obviously suffered as a result of Waldheim's past and, on the anniversary of the *Anschluss*, no one wanted another scandal—not over a work of art unequivocally directed against war and fascism.

As originally intended, the monument was unveiled on November 1988 in the designated place. Since then it has become one of the sights of the Austrian capital. While

opinions as to its expressiveness and aesthetic value may differ, the monument itself is a reminder of the horrors and victims of fascism and war, prompting one to reflect on the need to avoid a repetition of the past.

This story is by no means an isolated case. The rightists were outraged when Claus Peymann, the director of the Burgtheater, announced his intention to stage *Heldenplatz* by Bernhard, one of the most prominent Austrian playwrights, to mark the 50th anniversary of Crystal Night, when the Nazis staged a Jewish pogrom in Vienna. The author was accused of having made the central figure in the play an emigre who returns to the country and finds nothing good in it. The bourgeois press attacked Peymann and Bernhard, and strong pressure was put on Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky and Minister of Education and Arts Hilde Hawlicek to have the staging cancelled. These attacks were foiled by the resistance of many workers in the arts and spokesmen for the democratic forces. Despite threats from rightists the premiere passed off without incident. A handful of extremists did manage to deposit a carload of rubbish in front of the theatre, but this had no subsequent effect, and the piece played to full houses. Sadly, the author died in February this year after a grave illness. In his will he prohibited the staging and publication of his works in Austria for 70 years as an expression of his bitterness at the moral climate in his country.

The reactionaries, however, were not dismayed by the failure of their campaigns against the antifascist monument and the humanistic play, and have continued their fight, openly and under cover, against progressive writers and artists. The targets of their attacks are mainly those who have come to Austria from abroad, who are being insulted and intimidated in an effort to force them to leave the country, although their presence here does much to stimulate aesthetic creativity.

It is worth noting that the rightists have found almost no accomplices in the world of literature and the arts and that many of these people have actually taken an anti-bourgeois stand. Bernhard himself, for instance, though in no sense a revolutionary, subjected bourgeois society to withering criticism in his plays.

Unfortunately, however, events have confirmed the fear among democratic circles that the *influence of Nazi Ideology has yet to be eliminated* and that it fuels the activity of the right-wing forces in Austria. These forces are seeking to exploit clerical thinking and religious beliefs among some strata of the population for their own ends. In this context, one should note the changes in the leadership of the Austrian Catholic Church.

Cardinal Franz König, who was regarded as a liberal, even as a progressive, was succeeded as Archbishop of Vienna by Hermann Groer, a conservative. A section of the clergy and the laity protested in vain against the Vatican's appointment. Among those who have now gained prominence in the church are some who were criticised earlier for their reactionary views by a significant number of clergymen. In view of the influence of clericalism in Austria, one should not underestimate the effects of such changes. Although the Catholic Church is not directly involved in political struggles, it does have a tremendous influence on some spheres of social life and on the policy of the state with regard to family matters, marriage, school education and the mass media, for instance. As a rule, this influence does not benefit the democratic forces.

These relapses into neofascist ideology are, of course, inseparable from the overall situation in the country. The conservative and reactionary forces would like to redirect political, ideological and cultural life, restoring the sway of rightists here. Although these are areas where progressive circles find it hard to maintain, let alone expand, their positions, it is nevertheless gratifying to see that in the literary and artistic life of the country, as these events prove, progressive attitudes prevail, and that it is possible to prevent a return to the evil past.

¹ Heldenplatz (Heroes' Square) is a large square in front of the Hofburg Palace in the centre of Vienna where hundreds of thousands of people thronged to welcome Hitler after the *Anschluss* in May 1938.—Ed.

* * *

From Our Mailbag

JAILED FOR SUPPORTING THE INF TREATY

Your journal (No. 4, 1988) published my article on how the INF Treaty had been received in Hasselbach, West Germany, where a US cruise missile base was located. So what has induced me to take up my pen again? A theme close to my first article.

During the struggle over Big Politics Issues there is a

tendency to forget the many thousands of people who have helped towards the success of detente, among them the hundreds of thousands of my compatriots who have taken to the streets countless times in towns and cities to draw attention to the dangers of the nuclear arms race. Less sensational, perhaps, but equally committed and for-

ceful have been actions carried out near the bases, not least the sit-ins on the roads to nuclear weapons depots.

The police regularly remove protesters from the road. But matters do not usually end here, those involved in peaceful blockades being charged with obstruction and breach of the peace and fined a month's salary. They are accused of violent behaviour when they have merely been shouting antinuclear protests and singing songs. And what's particularly outrageous is that 18 months after the signing of the INF Treaty people should still be tried for what the Bonn authorities themselves now support!

One of them, Holger Jaenicke, often took part in these pacifist protests. The courage and persistence of this reserved, physically handicapped man are impressive. He lives with a couple of friends in Carl Kabat House, named after the American priest who penetrated a military base and symbolically struck a huge ICBM with a hammer several times, for which act he was sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment! Prison failed to stifle this appeal to human conscience, and his example began to be followed beyond the USA. About 900 West Germans signed up with the Civil Disobedience for Disarmament campaign, each undertaking to "take part in nonviolent blockades at least once a year".

Holger, now 26, followed the same path. At 16 he joined a group opposing military service, part of the German Peace Society. He has been active in the peace movement since 1979, having become a staff worker at the Reutlingen Peace Bureau. Holger considers himself a politically oriented Christian, his belief based on a chapter from *The Fifth Book of Moses*: "...I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live..."

On August 9, 1984, the anniversary of the Nagasaki tragedy, Holger Jaenicke took part for the first time in blockading the road to a Pershing depot in Mutlangen. He was arrested and fined for "violent behaviour". Having refused to pay the fine, he was sentenced to twenty days in prison in March 1986. "I was not frightened," he said, "I had read in the writings of Martin Luther King and Mahatma Gandhi about how a readiness to suffer for the whole world is an expression of one's special responsibility, and I have been conscious of our moral and political power ever since."

Despite the fact that an agreement on dismantling the base at Mutlangen had already been reached, Holger was again charged and fined 1,650 marks for his participation in five successive blockades. This represents four months' wages. But again he told himself: "The question of money

cannot be allowed to alter my responsibility to the fight for the missiles' withdrawal." He spent another 110 days in a cell.

More than 20 West German peace supporters were imprisoned last year for what amounted to support for the Soviet-American treaty.

Holger sums up his impressions thus: "The letters I have received and the conversations I have had with other prisoners served to strengthen my conviction that others are not indifferent to the injustice of imprisoning people for their peace-loving views. My friends wrote that they had followed my example by participating in the blockade of a poison gas depot in Fischbach."

Last November, Jaenicke was again jailed for four months for his many attempts to block the road to the Hasselbach base. The judge refused to suspend the sentence.

Let me give you another example. Doctor Wolfgang Sternstein also belongs to the Christian peace movement. He was sentenced to 84 days for obstructing the movement of nuclear missiles to Hasselbach and Mutlangen. The doctor did not flinch: "I go to prison in the knowledge that what I did was right. I would do the same again tomorrow." Referring to the 7,000 (!) cases against pacifists, he went on: "Now that the missiles are being dismantled, the Federal Government would do well to admit that the peace protesters were right. Even if they are not prepared to concede on this, then the least they could do is to declare an amnesty."

People like Holger Jaenicke and Wolfgang Sternstein must not be forgotten. Their actions have helped significantly towards disarmament. Perhaps, although their names are not so very illustrious, these and many others who have made great and anonymous sacrifices should really be among the candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize.

I want to remind you of these people who need solidarity. For them it is important to be confident in the justness of their cause and to know that there are like-minded people everywhere who believe as they do in peace. Letters of support to these and other condemned pacifists would be most welcome. The addresses are: Mr H. Jaenicke, Carl-Kabat-Haus, Schulstr, 7, D-7075 Mutlangen; Dr W. Sternstein, Freundensbuero Hunsruck, Boppar-der Str. 25, D-5448, Kastellaun, Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Wolfgang BARTELS
(FRG)





“WE HAVE NEVER HAD SUCH A CONGRESS”

Osiel NUÑEZ

Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), representative on WMR

The 15th Congress of the Communist Party of Chile ended on May 14, 1989, and the 200 delegates rose to sing the first few bars of *The International*. No more than that because the Communists were forced to hold their overwhelming emotions in check and maintain the strictest secrecy: the party forum was held in a country still ruled by the Pinochet dictatorship.

The Congress, which adopted important final documents and elected a new General Secretary, Volodia Teitelboim, was a turning point in every respect. It reaffirmed the correctness of the party's course of renewal, and of the political, organisational and ideological consolidation of the party in order to defeat the tyranny and assert popular and national sovereignty.

Although the Communist Party is banned, its theses and other pre-congress documents were given coverage in the regular press and discussed by democratic forces and public organisations. It was a truly nationwide exchange of views.

Some 10,000 meetings in more than 2,000 grassroots organisations were held in the runup to the Congress. Communists democratically took decisions and by secret ballot elected their secretaries, and also delegates to around 200 local conferences, which discussed major resolutions, formed party committees and chose delegates to regional party congresses. Most of the delegates to the 15th Congress were the democratically elected representatives of regional party organisations, members of the previous Central Committee, and comrades invited by the national leadership to attend as non-voting participants. Delegates from the Chilean Communists in exile arrived as well. There is every reason to say that *it was the most democratic forum ever convened by any Chilean political party*.

Precongress documents urged bold and resolute renewal and demanded greater activity from leaders, rank-and-file members and activists. They formulated the task of combining continuity with renewal to resolutely stamp out every manifestation of bureaucracy, conservatism and dogmatism in the party. To this end it was necessary to

discuss all the problems thoroughly and frankly and to listen to different opinions without fear of redemptive criticism and self-criticism. The Congress seems to have justified the hopes pinned on it.

THE ESSENCE OF RENEWAL

Its hallmark was a *critical look at party life*. Delegates deplored the failure of the leadership to convene a congress for the previous 19 years. Dictatorial rule was given as a mitigating, but not an exonerating circumstance and the Party's leaders were found to have lacked courage and political will. Such a long interval between congresses harmed democracy within the party and held back the evolution of party policy, thus detracting from the Communists' role in the struggle against the dictatorship.

The delegates learned the lesson and amended the Party Rules: now a congress must be convened every four years, with a postponement of up to two years allowed only in exceptional circumstances. Another new stipulation is that the General Secretary shall be elected for a term of four years, and may be re-elected only twice. The Congress called for *fortifying the principle of collective leadership* in order to avoid the excessive concentration of authority in one person and to ensure the free interplay of views within regular party organisations at every level. The delegates agreed that unity was barren unless reached through serious discussion. It was the lack of far-ranging and principled debates that had bred excessive centralisation, abuses of power and other violations of the ethics of party life.

The Congress made it clear that every Communist has the right to voice a personal opinion in his or her organisation, even if some comrades may consider it "deviant". The revolutionary course must be continuously improved, and not made into a sort of totem to be revered by all the tribe. Otherwise the party will degrade into a sect isolated from the mass of people, and will be unable to lead them to the ultimate goal of a really humane, just and free society. Life demands a regular revision of tactics, and at crucial turning points of history a reconsideration of strategy as well.

The principles of *party unity and democratic centralism*, obliging every Communist to abide strictly by the decisions taken regardless of his or her position in the preceding discussion, were reaffirmed. The broadening of democracy in the party was discussed and special emphasis laid on the use of modern scientific techniques in studies of national, regional and international realities.

Another focus of attention was the *role of primary organisations*. Under conditions of dictatorial rule many of them failed to forge firm links with the mass of people, and now work amidst the people should be intensified. The

leading role will be played here by grassroots organisations on the shop floor, in other areas where the working class is concentrated, and also by territorial structures in the districts whose residents are active in the struggle against the dictatorship.

The Congress spoke highly of the role of the Communist Youth of Chile and reaffirmed the party's support for this the strongest organisation of young Chileans. Youth and students are a major social force which has made a great contribution to antidictatorial actions.

Other urgent issues on the democratic agenda were the relationship with the country's ethnic minorities, work amongst women, professionals and intellectuals, and an approach to changes in the various strata of our society, particularly in the working class. The Congress expressed unconditional solidarity with the peoples fighting for national liberation, first of all with the peoples of Nicaragua, El Salvador, South Africa and Palestine.

A COURSE TOWARDS A POPULAR UPRISING

The Congress reaffirmed and expounded the party's policy line now known as the *course towards a mass popular uprising*. This combination of strategy and tactics is aimed at resolving the main present-day contradiction, that between the dictatorship and democracy. Our task is to put an end to fascism, to win and extend popular rule, and to ensure that the people forever become masters of their destiny. The party is seeking to achieve a favourable alignment of forces, to organise mass actions, to ensure broad unity, and to use diverse forms of struggle depending on concrete circumstances. In advancing the goal of an uprising, the party took account of changes in the system of dominance and oppression and in public mentality, the combative mood of the people, and the lessons of the history of Chile and other countries.

By and large, such a policy line stemmed from the experience we ourselves gained before the 1973 coup. Its stronger point was the clear goal of a left alternative to power, while its weakness consisted in the lack of a general political concept of creating and defending a popular government against counterrevolution.

Firstly, a mass popular uprising will mean an open break with the fascist state because no compromise with it in the spirit of democracy and freedom is possible. *Secondly*, it will be an uprising of the people as a reflection of the demands of every strata of the population. *Thirdly*, it is conceived as a real mass action because the masses will be its main driving force, fighting to achieve victory, to uproot fascism and to establish democracy with full respect for the people's sovereign rights.

The Communists were the first to characterise the regime installed after the September 1973 putsch as *fascist*. This prompted the need to unite all the democratic, non-fascist forces against the dictatorship, but unfortunately our overall policy line was not revised accordingly.

Differences in the central leadership over preparations for a popular uprising and lack of debates held back the evolution of this concept, and varying interpretations of it continued till the 15th Congress.

The policy for a mass uprising envisages diverse forms of action depending on concrete circumstances, and it is important to master an armoury of techniques in order to mobilise the masses and secure success in every area of the struggle. In this way it is possible to tackle immediate tasks and simultaneously work towards longer-term objectives. The party's policy line therefore should not be an immutable model of behaviour, but should vary dialectically at the level of tactics and even strategy when warranted by the situation. This does not rule out a certain element of stability within it. Very important recommendations, including those on the party's military policy, were worked out in this spirit.

The Congress reaffirmed that the country needed a *democratic, popular, anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution* which, in accordance with the will of the majority, will eventually open the way to socialism. Power must be handed over to the working class and the entire people. The task today is to mobilise forces on a large scale in order to put an end to fascism and its state structures and to achieve the full-scale democratisation of social life.

The ruling classes are regularly using violence against the people, especially at a time of crisis. The Congress noted that the democratic forces should work consistently to *organise the masses for self-defence*. The experience accumulated over the years of the dictatorship makes it possible to build a national self-defence movement at the right time.

Delegates stressed the continued importance of work in the armed forces and noted the substantial efforts already made, such as women's protests at localities with troop deployments and students' fraternisation with some police units. The Congress urged more open and resolute action that would involve broad sections of the people.

In spite of the deep abyss between the armed forces and ordinary Chileans, and the Pinochet regime's ruthless repression, the Communists believe that if troops themselves join in mass actions, some movements for change may emerge. Of course, it would be too much to expect such movements to make initiatives or embrace revolutionary positions, but under pressure from the people and their political parties, some of the military may revert to democratic tradition.

The Communists think that the democratisation of the country must go hand in hand with the purging from the armed forces of all the fascist-minded officers, and of all those who have smeared their reputations with crimes and human rights violations. The National Information Centre (CNI)¹ and its repressive arms must be disbanded, the so-called national security doctrine and "internal war" concept scrapped, and the army training system revised and

restructured along democratic lines. Otherwise any success of the people will be short-lived.

WINNING DEMOCRACY

The present dictatorial state is coming apart at the seams. Given popular actions and the pressure by all the opposition forces, combined with a profound sociopolitical crisis and the abysmal poverty of most Chileans, the only way out is the restoration of democracy.

The Congress noted that this could be achieved primarily through campaigns for the election of the President, senators and deputies.² The party forum urged Communists, the other opposition forces, and the entire people to unite because the task was not just to win the Presidency, but to thwart any attempt to perpetuate the dictatorship, with or without Pinochet.

The party suggested that the opposition put forward the same candidate and work out a common programme for the dismantling of the fascist regime and an accord on the general outline of the future democratic system. Joint actions in the parliamentary elections are a guarantee of a broad left representation and of an overall opposition victory. In view of the importance of the tasks in hand and the need to approach the Pinochet regime as a single whole, the Communists decided to give support to the Christian Democratic leader Patricio Aylwin as the candidate of the Association of Political Parties for Democracy.

The atmosphere in which the election campaign has begun is anything but democratic. But the people are pinning on the elections their hopes for having their economic, social and political needs met. The masses are growing more active, and it is possible to make the authorities respect the election results and block the dictator's plan to squeeze a future government into the frame created by fascism.

The prospect of toppling Pinochet in the December elections depends immediately on a new upsurge of the civil disobedience campaign, the democratisation of social life, the success of the struggle for solutions to the people's vital problems, and exposure of the regime's criminal nature and scandalous dealings. The resistance put up by the dictatorship may cause crises situations in late 1989-early 1990, and they should not catch the popular forces unawares. The aggravation of contradictions can bring about an end to the tyranny, and the Congress told Communists to *be ready to act*.

If Chile ends up having dual power, i.e., a government elected by the people and an army "shadow cabinet" with control functions, the Communists will support the civilian authorities and demand that the armed forces bow to the sovereignty of the people. The party urges the people to be ready to resort to popular uprisings against the chief enemy in order to defend the process of democratisation from possible fascist counterstrikes.

Any future change of government will create more favourable conditions for mass action, and the Congress

stressed the importance of strengthening the legal Broad Party of Left Socialists, and also the United Left Alliance as a means of consolidating ties between the Communists, Socialists, radicals, Left Christians and non-affiliated progressives. We stand for the development of the Left Socialists' grassroots organisations so that that party could concert people's actions and represent a democratic alternative.

The 15th Congress suggested that all the interested parties should agree a common platform that would reflect the interests of millions of Chileans. The priority demands are to remove Pinochet from his posts; to revise the Constitution so that it should have no fascist provisions; to retire the senior commanding officers of the armed forces and of the Carabineros, and the fascist alcaldes; to renovate the judicial authorities; to release political prisoners; to disband the repressive agencies; to put on trial those who are guilty of human rights violations; to lift the ban on Marxist organisations; to create new jobs; to raise wages; and to suspend payments on the external debt.

A REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION

Our forum gave strong support to renewal in the Soviet Union as "a revolution within a revolution", and appreciated the changes there as the most significant development in the history of the world revolutionary movement in recent decades.

Perestroika means a return to Lenin, who always believed revolution to be the creation of the masses. Perestroika is not one man's invention, but the answer to the long-overdue need of Soviet society to rectify the mistakes and distortions of Stalinism and the period of stagnation. Revolution requires a continuous analysis of the changing situation and a creative approach to old and new problems.

The Chilean Communists do not share the fears that glasnost may lead to chaos and the loss of moral values. A free exchange of opinions is vital. In spite of possible extremities and overreaction, in the long run the results of perestroika will help resolve problems of concern to all of us.

The CC report to the 15th Congress noted that the duty of every revolutionary is to contribute constantly to the process of renewal. This process has specific features in the various socialist countries. Not all of them have been plagued by economic stagnation, and each faces different problems. For example, the German Democratic Republic has demonstrated the ability of socialism to give answers to the challenges of our time, to sustain a decent standard of living, to master high technology and to score successes in diverse fields of activities.

The Cuban people have proved that in Latin America, too, socialism brings people freedom and social justice and meets their vital needs. The Republic of Cuba is ahead of the other countries of the region in developing health

care, education and sport and in the fair distribution of goods and services. It is a forceful example of solidarity with the embattled peoples, as the Chileans have learned at first hand. At present the Communist Party of Cuba is rectifying past mistakes and tackling a number of problems, many of them caused by the 30-year-long imperialist blockade of the island.

The Congress stated that the Marxists see an *unbreakable link between the cause of world peace on the one hand, and national liberation from imperialist rule and respect for man's right to life, bread, work and social justice on the other*. Efforts for peace and defence of sovereignty do not clash with but complement each other. The assertion of world peace and solutions to other global problems are fully in the interest of the working class, of all the peoples and anti-imperialist movements, and meet the vital needs of the Latin American nations.

After the Congress, General Secretary Volodia Teitelbolm and other comrades attended numerous meetings in residential districts, at factories, in universities and theatre houses, and then went to the 12,000-strong rally at the Santiago stadium to tell Chileans about the resolutions of the party forum. These were follow-up actions on one of the decisions taken by the Congress, namely, to make the party more open, to broaden its legal actions, and to forge stronger links with the masses as the chief driving force of far-reaching change needed by Chile and its people.

¹ The Chilean security service.

² The elections are scheduled for December 1989.

* * *

ON THE ROAD TO MARXIST UNITY

Madi DANFAKA

member, Political Bureau and Secretariat, CC,
Senegal Party of Independence and Labour (PITS)

Joe Berry, one of our readers in London, complains that *WMR* is not giving any coverage to such an important issue as communist party splits. Two or three years ago this reproach could have been justified, but today there are no such "taboos": in recent months, authors from India, Jordan, New Zealand and Spain¹ have looked at the reasons and remedies for national communist disunity. A contribution from Senegal follows. We hope to continue our debate on this important and highly sensitive issue.

It is hard to point to any common reasons for national communist schisms because of the vastly distinctive conditions in which communist parties evolve and struggle. However, as our own experience shows, much of the disunity stems from the difficulties our movement experienced during the 1960s, above all the Soviet-Chinese

conflict, which, fortunately, is now a thing of the past. Creditably, our party, then still quite young, took no "outside" cues, although we often saw eye to eye with the CPSU and were even dubbed "pro-Soviet". In reality, we always did our best to help restore international communist unity.

Splits of an entirely different kind came after the mid-1970s. They arose mainly out of divergent assessments of national domestic life and parties' strategy and tactics. We must consider how far we can view an *improper functioning of the rules of democratic centralism, and the limited scope for wide and open party debate* as a principal cause of those crises. Dissent from the official line was then often simply ignored.

It is important here to note that any reliance on the principle of democratic centralism largely depends on a party's status and the context of struggle. Although its theoretical formulas are known and sound, difficulties crop up when we attempt to apply them in practice, an objective contradiction which told on the life and work of a number of parties, including big and influential ones.

Our movement has traditionally accepted the priority of centralism over democracy when a party operates underground because of the demands of security and other restrictions. In such a situation the danger of rifts is particularly great. I think that *it should be possible, in whatever circumstances, to hear out and consider all opinions in a party*, including those of rank-and-file members and primary cells. This helps to preserve and strengthen unity.

Our predecessor, the Senegal African Party of Independence (PAI), was founded in 1957 and operated illegally for almost two decades. It suffered a series of rifts. The leadership expelled all dissenting comrades, as was done, unfortunately, in many parties. Others quit, unable to

withstand the strain of an underground struggle. Difficulties also arose because one part of the leadership was inside the country and the other abroad.

The 1972 PAI congress, which met illegally in Senegal, discussed orientation and took an important decision to dissolve the old leading bodies, which were all but defunct as a result of reprisals, splits and emigration. It also suspended the general secretary, Majmout Diop, who was living abroad and had been the object of numerous complaints. But we drew no definitive organisational conclusions, considering that they would not help either to clarify issues or to work out decisions capable of taking the party forward. The congress simply asked the new Central Committee to contact Diop and hold a discussion with him.

However, circumstances did not permit this. In 1976 Diop succumbed to the trick played by the then Senegalese President, Leopold Sedar Senghor. By accepting from the latter written permission to legalise the PAI under the pretext that he had been its general secretary before its prohibition, he committed an act of betrayal and displayed a lack of moral integrity. For the entire previous decade Diop had been out of touch with the party. A schism thus occurred within the PAI between this usurper and the overwhelming majority of leaders and activists whose courageous struggle had forced the neocolonialist authorities to recognise Marxism as a representative ideological and political current in Senegal.

The party launched a struggle against the Senghor—Diop operation and won. It became clear to public opinion that the sole lawful representative of the Marxist-Leninist tendency in the country was the African Party of Independence which had been led by Seydou Cissokho.

But the Senghor regime, and then that of Abdou Diouf, did not abandon their attempts to drive our party to the periphery of political life. In 1981, when Article 3 of the Senegalese Constitution was reviewed and a multiparty system was allowed, the law banned the existence of any two parties or their publications with the same name. They wanted to draw us into rearguard battles for the name.

At the Central Committee's 18th Plenary Meeting in the same year it was decided that after gaining victory efforts should be concentrated on ensuring and unfolding the legal activity of the party. Thus was born the *Party of Independence and Labour of Senegal*. The meeting's resolution said that by adopting and proclaiming its new name it was *reaffirming its complete loyalty to the spirit and traditions of the PAI*.

Our founding congress was a major landmark for the national communist movement, but did not end its division. Indeed, Diop has continued to act from Marxist positions. Whether we like it or not, certain public circles regard him as a defender of ideals similar to ours.

Another political grouping, the Democratic League—Movement for the Labour Party (LD-MPT), was proclaimed its adherence to Marxism, although it has not formed as a result of a split within the PAI (some of the League's

leaders were, however, past members). In its early years, the PAI united numerous representatives of the youth and intelligentsia. At any given moment, it included many of the country's leading figures. It was not by chance that the Diouf government, formed in the wake of the 1983 elections, had three ministers who were former members of the PAI. However, the question of whether the Democratic League owes its existence to a PAI split is not so important. The main thing is that it has declared its adherence to Marxism and that its actions blend into the present-day revolutionary movement.

What kind of future do we envision? Above all, we start from the new state of affairs in the international communist movement. *There is no more important task now than the unification of all democratic forces on a national and world scale, including those outside the Marxist tendency*, in order to end the negative repercussions of the capitalist crisis.

Rapid changes in the capitalist system and its methods have somewhat confused the masses. Some people think that the time for ideological clarity is past and are turning to pragmatism. Our job is to give the masses proper reference points, revealing the real and inspiring perspective which would mobilise them for struggle. We are therefore confident that unity among Marxists, and in turn among all progressive and peace-loving forces—all those who are suffering from the aftermath of the crisis—is extremely necessary in Senegal.

Our party sent letters to the PAI and LD-MPT leaderships and even to the Maoist movement, whose members now assert that "the Chinese have sold out", inviting them to meet and discuss a Senegalese Marxist union. We have received various replies. Whilst the League and PAI have agreed to start a discussion, the Maoists say that theirs is not a Marxist party, but a democratic movement which includes Communists.

We are very attentive to these positions, not only out of considerations of a general order—the recognition of the need for the unity of democratic forces—but also because there is a tendency towards hegemony on the part of Senegal's two major Socialist and Democratic parties. However, this does not meet either the requirements of the current situation or the traditions of our people.

Here it is necessary to profoundly and objectively analyse the possibilities for an organisational fusion of the parties which have for some time confronted, and even fought, each other. Such a merger requires both time and patience. The PITS considers that agreements between the higher echelons (i.e., achieving unity at the level of the apparatuses) is not enough. This would not correspond to the will of the real social and political forces that form the basis of these parties. Such superficial unity would be doomed. To be effective, the drive for unification should come from below. *The Marxist tendency in Senegal can then become a pole of attraction which will have to be reckoned with.*

Unity of action could become an important element in

a policy of alliances *if the aims are clearly defined and each side adheres to its assumed commitments*. This requires a clarification of ideological differences and their gradual settlement. Unfortunately, this is still a problem. The recent presidential and parliamentary elections (February 1988) have shown that agreed actions did not materialise even at this pragmatic level.

Taking a long-term view, not only does the LD-MPT call itself a Marxist party, but it also strives to promote solidarity with the socialist states' policy. This is an important circumstance, regardless of the motives behind the striving. Although differences with the League do exist, it would be wrong to say that we are ideologically incompatible. We continue to study this party's stand and to hold consultations with its leadership. The differences still remaining concern both strategy and tactics.

Take the attitude to the school teachers' union. Through its presence within it, the League's leadership is seeking more political influence. The PITS regards this as a violation of the democratic principles of mass organisations. After all, these also include nonparty people who need the union for the defence of their vital interests and not for any doctrinal arguments.

This also applies to the National Confederation of the Working People of Senegal (CNTS), which operates under the auspices of the ruling party and in which our comrades are active. Yet the League's leaders "disdain" to work

there, declaring that this is a rotten organisation and that it must be destroyed. They remain unembarrassed by the fact that the CNTS unites the overwhelming majority of the country's working people. Here one cannot but recall Lenin's criticism of the "left-wing" Communists who refused to work in "yellow" trade unions.

These two examples show how hard the road to Marxist unity is. But the process goes on, fuelled by positive developments in the world communist movement. At the same time I want to stress that the *success of this is exclusively in our own hands*. We are no longer in the 1960s, when a party could dictate to others. Long gone are the old Comintern practices whereby Moscow adjudicated on foreign Communists' intra-party differences. Nothing prevents Senegal's Marxists from holding talks at home to find optimal ways of achieving unity. If they are not in a position to meet and enter into dialogue, then how can we talk of any ability on the part of Marxists to spearhead revolutionary change in Senegal?

In conclusion, I want to repeat that, in our party's conviction, the achievement of communist and Marxist unity in each country is the *prime objective*, to which end no efforts can be spared. The journey may be long and difficult, but it will bring us success.

¹ See *WMR*, Nos 2, 3, 4, 1989.



POLITICS ON THE SCREEN

How TV and Video Serve the Brazilian Communists

Regis FRATI

member, Executive Committee and Secretariat,
CC, Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)

The development of television and audiovisual technology has opened new horizons for propaganda, mass political and cultural work, and for influencing public consciousness. In order for communists in the capitalist world to be able to take advantage of this they have to overcome numerous obstacles resulting from the sway held over the mass media by the monopolies. A *WMR* staff member interviewed Regis FRATI in Belo Horizonte about the PCB's experience in this field.

It's well known that Brazil is as vast as a continent and has a population of 140 million. But did you know that the combined daily circulation of the major papers is a mere 1.5 million? Compare these figures and it becomes clear how important television is here, with a nightly audience of more than 50 million. Politically, TV is also the most effective way of reaching the masses. Hence the PCB CC's decision two years ago to create a mass communication section with a brief to make TV and video programmes. This has enabled us both to publicise our aims and ideals, and to educate young Communists.

The party began a campaign to attract new members and in less than a year membership grew from 20,000 to about 120,000. We consider this as having been largely due to our use of video. At the moment, we have five videos for use in work with young party members and new recruits. We produced short films about the history, ideals and present policies of the PCB, about major political issues, and about perestroika and renewal in socialist countries like Bulgaria, the USSR and Czechoslovakia. (Incidentally, our video on the international communist movement was prepared in cooperation with *WMR*.)

Thanks to this the party has very quickly been able to make contact with thousands of people.

■ ***Are these films shot by Communists themselves?***

Yes. This is done for free by comrades who work for Brazilian TV. When a film is finished we prepare a master and then make 100 to 200 copies for nationwide distribution. These can in turn be reproduced very easily.

■ ***Do many people have video cassette recorders (VCR's)?***

Yes, and the number is increasing. They are too expensive for the poorer folks, of course, but there are a lot in middle income families. The main thing is that most organised social groups have one, which means that the party can show its videos almost anywhere in the country. At the moment we are trying to equip all our centres with VCR's. This is difficult in the poorest and most remote states, but the party is managing to solve this problem either by hiring videos at clubs, with the assistance of the unions, or by accepting offers of help from well-off individuals.

We're also trying to have our films shown on TV—by which I mean mainly small to medium-size local stations.

■ ***Do the Communists have access to national TV channels?***

Yes—a result of the struggle to democratise society. Each political party has the right once a year to one peak-time slot free of charge on each of the national networks. According to official figures, one of our programmes last year attracted 70 million viewers; another was lauded as the best political programme on Brazilian TV. Opportunities for television appearances increase when election campaigns are running. Additional air time is provided, a portion of which is shared equally between all the parties; the rest is divided in proportion to the number of MP's each of the parties has. During presidential elections each party has one 3-4 minute spot daily on the national network; during municipal elections they are given 5 minutes each. We use these slots to popularise our election platforms and our candidates, and to explain the general political line of the Communists.

Thus there are various openings for us on state television. This also applies to news coverage. For example, a festival organised in Belo Horizonte by the communist weekly *Voz da Unidade* was broadcast on the national network as well as on regional TV in the major state of Minas Gerais. TV reported on the event daily.

■ ***And all this is free of charge?***

Yes, we don't charge the networks for these programmes. Of course the Communists feel there is a certain amount of discrimination in comparison with other parties. But there are progressively-minded people in television who are sympathetic to us and do what they can to have our programmes shown.

■ ***Are there any famous people in Brazil working with the Communists?***

There are a great many, but let me give you just two examples. The popular young actor Estepan Mercecian, an Armenian by birth, often appears in our programmes, as does the celebrated entertainer Francisco Milan, who belongs to a Rio de Janeiro party organisation.

There are a lot of talented and highly-regarded figures in the arts and on TV who have lent their names to the communist cause.

■ ***Following on from this, are there any artistic works you would consider as playing a special role in your ideological work?***

Of course, because politics, as an integral part of social life, also manifests itself in art. I could mention, for instance, a play about Communists by Diudubaldo Bienafil, who sadly died recently. It was brilliantly adapted for television by a marvellous group of professionals which included Communists. I think it gives a convincing portrayal of the PCB and its policies.

■ ***What problems are you encountering in this sphere and how do you view the future?***

Obviously, our difficulties are mainly financial. A lot of TV and video technology comes from abroad and is very expensive, so we pool our funds and try to keep down our costs by obtaining the equipment wholesale. And we're in the process of setting up our own video studio. Generally speaking, the prospects are good. We're looking to produce some professional new videos on such topics as the PCB's cultural policy, the role of Communists in the trade union movement, the party's organisational principles, and grassroots organisations.

Our fight for greater democracy in the mass media continues, and we are still demanding broader participation for all parties in programme-making, and popular control over it. We have even suggested amendments to the Constitution in this respect, but the authorities will not make any such concessions without strong pressure from below.

■ ***Does the party intend to set up its own TV studio?***

Our dream is to have our own TV channel, but this is not yet possible since the law disallows a political party from establishing its own channel. The fact is, however, that all our stations are in some way connected with influential economic interest groups and help to propagate the policies of particular parties.

■ ***Are you familiar with the use of audiovisual technology by communist parties in other countries?***

I know that in Latin America the Colombian CP has experience in this sphere, and I've seen for myself how much the Japanese Communist Party relies on modern techniques, having themselves produced a whole series of videofilms. And we hear that the Italian Communist Party and the British Communists are venturing along similar lines. There seems to be progress also in other parties.

But on the whole, our information is that instances of Communists in the non-socialist world properly exploiting the possibilities inherent in modern communication technology are still few and far between.

The important thing, I think, is to recognise that TV and

video are becoming increasingly effective tools in social life. There is a danger here of falling behind other political forces. We have to get a move on and master the means of electronic communications in order to increase our influence.



FROM THE LEFT FORCES' EXPERIENCE

THE FOUNDATIONS FOR ACCORD

Abdel Gaffar SHUKR

secretary, CC National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP), Egypt

Our party was created in 1976 in the course of pitched battles for the future of Egypt, when imperialism and local reaction began a large-scale attack on the gains of the July revolution of 1952. Advanced democratic circles supporting social justice and independent development then came out against the ruling group's policy of satisfying the interests of the big bourgeoisie. Within the progressive front there arose a number of political organisations, including the Egyptian Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Nasserite Party, fighting for the right to legal activity.

The NPUP was formed on a legal basis by the well-known political figure, Haled Mohy el-Din, and a group of leaders from the organisationally and ideologically distinct Marxist, Nasserite, social democratic, pan-Arabic, and progressive religious currents which emerged in the process of the national democratic revolution.

The creation of the NPUP met the objective requirements of the joint effort to uphold the interests of the popular masses. In the party's Programme it was proclaimed that the *entry of representatives of the various ideological and political schools and currents into the National Progressive Unionist Party of Egypt would be conducted individually on the basis of their acceptance of the common political programme. Persons joining the NPUP have the right to preserve their ideological convictions.*

Such a principle for forming a broad-based left-wing party naturally raises many difficulties, the resolution of

which requires a creative approach. I think that our 13 years of experience may prove useful for any similar parties in Third World countries.

In examining organisational questions, we proceed from the premise that the problems connected with this issue are not something fixed or set and that they undergo change. The structure and principles of the inner life of a party are determined by its character, political aims and methods of struggle. Any difficulties that arose have been overcome on the basis of this understanding, and the following circumstances have been taken into account: the party consists of representatives of various ideological and political currents; it is waging a struggle for democracy, relying upon an organised movement of the masses; it emerged when there was restricted political pluralism in the country: the law strictly limited the activity of the opposition parties, denying them access to the masses through political work in the factories and educational establishments and through publications.

These basic principles, on which the general framework of the movement, the effectiveness of party activity and the relations among its constituent elements depend, have been the object of our research during the past years.

On February 23, 1989 an extraordinary congress of the NPUP took place. It reviewed the party's constitution and made changes to it that seek to remove organisational deficiencies. We shall touch on those questions which our experience tells us need to be given special attention.

The broadening of the ideological base is the foundation for strengthening the organisational structure of the NPUP. The party could not have existed if it were not based on even minimal ideological accord. As our Programme notes, this involves not a mechanical unification of forces of different historical origin and ideological thrust, but a rallying around common positions.

From the outset, the ideas of socialism have been the basis for accord among the left-wing forces. In the course of practical work a conclusion was drawn about the need to more actively use the methodology of scientific socialism in analysing social phenomena and in the development of party studies on its basis. Special attention has been paid to such questions as the objective laws governing social development, the content of socialism, democracy, international relations and the role of religion.

Extending inner-party democracy is an indispensable condition for the existence of the NPUP, and a guarantee

WMR intends to provide readers with broader coverage of the experience of various left-wing parties and organisations in the belief that their activity contains much of interest to Communists and other activists in the working-class and democratic movements.

of the cohesion and militant unity of its ranks in the conditions of a diversity of ideological and political convictions among the groups which form the party. Our experience has confirmed that along with the observance of the rules of democratic centralism, which express the essence of inner-party democracy, it is important to take care to create an atmosphere of unanimity within the leadership, use the practice of voting more often, and work for the fullest possible mutual understanding while simultaneously showing respect for the opinion of the minority. Democratic centralism by itself is not sufficient for the unfolding of democracy in such a left-wing party as the NPUP, which unites many political forces. It is necessary that the leading bodies at all levels should include supporters of the viewpoints *most acceptable to all* and expressed at party congresses and conferences.

In a country with widespread illiteracy and no democratic traditions, effective struggle requires that the party turn to a *mass support base* of factory workers, peasants, intellectuals and students. Our primary organisations are building their activity on a territorial-administrative basis, and strengthening their ties with democratic organisations—workers' trade unions, associations of non-manual workers, and peasant, youth, student and cultural unions.

Greater mass involvement, democracy and effectiveness is our slogan today. The extraordinary congress has formulated the norms of party life that help to work out a new organisational line, taking into account the character of the NPUP as a party representing a broad spectrum of progressive and patriotic forces. We are aware that these propositions cannot solve every difficulty that may arise. But they are an important step in the right direction because they facilitate a more coherent understanding of the situation, the securing of mass involvement, the promotion of inner-party democracy, the strengthening of unity and the enhancement of leadership efficiency.

We shall point as an example to some of the new principles introduced in our Constitution.

On inner-party democracy:

- * leading bodies to be directly elected by secret ballot;
- * in the committees of the primary organisations, the district and provincial committees, and the Central Committee, exponents of all the main views expressed at meetings (conferences, congresses) at all levels are to be represented; each elective body, including the Central Committee, can co-opt new members for a fuller reflection of the minority's views;

- * with due regard for the main viewpoints of the members of an appropriate organisation, a collective presidium

of the meeting (conference, congress) is to be formed which is included in the voting list for elections to the governing committee;

- * the organisation at any level is to create a governing committee and a secretariat; its supreme body is the meeting (conference, congress); the latter can express no confidence in the committee or some of its members and hold a re-election;

- * meetings (conferences, congresses) are to be held: in the primary organisations—every three months; in the district—every six months, in the provincial—every year; and a partywide congress is to be called every two years.

On the mass character of the party:

- * particular attention is to be paid to the creation of party cells in industry and in public organisations;

- * membership of two kinds is to be introduced: *ordinary* (for which it is enough to accept the Programme and the decisions of the party's leading bodies, and also to participate in mass work during parliamentary, trade union and local elections) and *active*, which envisages, in addition to these requirements, regular attendance of meetings and the payment of membership dues;

- * to conduct mass work in the trade unions at district or provincial level, it is possible to create specialised party groups directly subordinate to the district or provincial committee; to the same end party members elected to the leadership of workers' trade unions or peasants' cooperative associations at the corresponding level are to be co-opted onto party committees;

- * groups uniting party members who are deputies or candidates for deputies to the parliament or local councils are to be created in party organisations.

On the efficiency of the leading bodies:

- * one cannot be a member of more than one party committee or secretariat;

- * not a single leader is allowed to hold an elective post for more than two terms in a row.

In this way we can enlist more people in leadership work, guaranteeing them the chance to fully develop their talents, which will in turn help the efficiency of the party bodies.

The unique character of the NPUP has prompted the elaboration of a specific organisational approach, ensuring its unity on a democratic basis. Observance of the principles of democracy is the key to mobilising the broadest forces, to the openness of the party towards the mass movement, and to its ability to interact with it, exert its influence and at the same time learn and adopt its positive experience in order to improve inner-party life.





A CRISIS OF CIVILIZATION?

An International Mail-In Round Table

WMR has received a joint letter from two Soviet readers—Professor Alexander VOLKOV and senior lecturer Boris KAPUSTIN. "The participants in the symposium on 'Revolution and Peace in the Nuclear Age' (WMR No.2, 1989)," they write, "offered what we believe is a very apt and precise definition of several major issues the Marxist social sciences are facing—specifically, the need to analyse the social essence of the contemporary world, which is not simply a sum total of individual systems but an integral 'multisystem whole'; the importance of defining a concept of 'civilization' to reflect the world's interdependent and integral nature; and the advisability of examining the correlation of 'civilization-related' and 'system-related' aspects in the development of the human race. Work on these subjects would not only be a step forward in the advancement of the general theory of historical materialism, but would also be of great importance for the theoretical and practical dimensions of today's social struggle. In this connection we believe that it is no longer enough to speak about the 'general crisis of capitalism' as the prime cause of all social problems. An analysis of a broader issue—the 'crisis of civilization'—is also in order."

The term "crisis of civilization" is appearing more and more often in Marxist literature, but it is interpreted in different ways. The WMR Commission on General Theoretical and Global Problems has therefore decided to respond to our readers' suggestion and discuss what the term actually means. We proposed an exchange of views on the subject between the authors of the letter and prominent scholars from different parts of the world—Samir AMIN, Director of the UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning; Johan GALTUNG, a professor of sociology from Norway; and Zocorro RAMIREZ, a political activist and educator from Colombia.

NATURE IN REBELLION

Alexander VOLKOV

Science has proved that the world is growing increasingly interconnected and interdependent. Moreover, for all the gravity of the contradictions inherent in it, it is a world that is becoming more and more aware of the integral nature of the human community. Some people object to the concept of universal human values, or indeed of universal human interests—perhaps because these notions are taking shape unevenly in different areas. Their emergence is manifested in economic ties and integration, in the need

to tackle many problems on an international scale, and in the advent of what may be described as a "unified information field". Despite the distinctive nature of different national cultures, we all obviously share an integral universal culture. However, common elements in all these spheres are less discernible than, say, national, class-based or group interests and values. A universal interest has been particularly evident in relation to what is best defined as a "crisis of civilization".

In the most general of terms, the essence of this crisis lies in the fact that human activity with its innate contradictions stemming from the established forms of social being has entered into a *contradiction with nature and its laws*; this has posed a threat to life on Earth. Unadjusted progress along the traditional path will plunge us into an abyss. The danger of humanity perishing in a nuclear war has merely underscored the possibility of a manmade, rather than a mythical Apocalypse. While nuclear bombs

still remain unactivated, the environmental bomb has already exploded. We have discovered a limit to industrialisation. It is estimated that if the developing countries follow in the footsteps of the developed nations and reach the latter's energy consumption level, this will lead to a "greenhouse effect" and the rapid extinction of the human race.

But it is also clear that it is still unrealistic to expect people to give up their struggle for a better life or their consumption level. Rational solutions are impossible at the national level. But reliable international mechanisms which would pool the efforts of different nations in the tackling of mankind's common problems have yet to be devised. The same is true of effective ways of preventing global catastrophes, whether military, environmental or other. Moreover, the threat of such catastrophes is reproduced constantly by the operation of historically shaped mechanisms and structures.

By origin, the crisis of civilization is connected with the *contradictions and essential features* of antagonistic society—man's alienation and self-alienation, a utilitarian attitude to nature, a reliance on force in international relations, etc. At the same time, this crisis cannot be equated to the crisis of capitalism, or even seen solely as a direct consequence of the latter. The reasons, I believe, are several.

Firstly, the crisis of civilization calls into question the survival of all humanity, not just of capitalism. Secondly, it has not been brought about by the fact that capitalism as such has exhausted all its potential: the crisis is connected with a particular historical phase and a particular type of capitalist development. Thirdly, socialism as it exists today, having emerged mostly in averagely or underdeveloped nations (Lenin called Russia an "average underdeveloped country"), has not yet fully become a negation of capitalism but largely followed the development path of the latter, accompanied by the same negative phenomena—industrialism, the destruction of the environment, man's alienation, social inequality and the like—although in specific forms. Deformed socialism has also given rise to distinctive problems connected with the cult of the state, the use of its mechanisms and means of management, and the pyramidal hierarchy of leaders little concerned about the effectiveness of their work. Finally, the Third World, too, has failed to create a development formula of its own, instead reproducing, often in an inferior version, already available forms of economic structures and social relations.

The crisis of civilization manifests itself on *many planes*. It is a crisis of international relations in all their dimensions—East-West, North-South, etc. It involves contradictions between the main centres of capitalism, sharp conflicts and an enormous foreign debt in the developing world, the impasse into which the belief in "conquering" nature has led us and, finally, the crisis of man's reproduction—something that, in a sense, sums up all the contradictions of our age. The direct threat of the extinction of

the human race in a nuclear war has recently been pushed back thanks to efforts undertaken on the international scene in a spirit of new political thinking, but there is still a long way to go before this threat is eliminated. On the other hand, there is man's insufficient adaptability and the contradictions between the demands made on human beings by the objective logic of the revolution in science and technology; the need to tackle global problems; and the qualities and forms of human activity nurtured and reproduced by social structures left over from earlier stages of history. The individual's dedication to moral improvement and a sense of personal responsibility for the future of humanity are clashing increasingly with the danger of the moral dimension in human thinking and behavior being eroded—up to and including the disintegration and "disappearance" of the personality, a risk inherent in many mass culture phenomena. The range of factors producing the "crowd of loners" phenomenon is expanding. The realisation is growing that such widespread social types and forms of being as the narrow specialist or the unthinking underling are historically transient and limited.

The crisis of civilization therefore rules out the world community's movement in the old direction because, I repeat, it will lead into an abyss. The only solution is to find *alternative ways of progress for the entire world*, proceeding from the priority of universal human interests which are now reflected in the problem of survival.

Naturally, no one can "abolish" the existing social contradictions or the clashes of different interests in the economic or political sphere. But we must also be perfectly clear on another point: no single group of people—be it a nation, a social class or an ideological or any other entity—can place its interests above this universal human interest because in this case its activities would, on the whole, become detrimental to humanity.

The question is whether the "other side", that is, capitalism, will accept this argument. Can capitalism really adapt to a world without any armaments, an equitable economic order and an honest comparison of the two systems' intellectual and spiritual values? There was a time when capitalism refused to accept the very fact that a country was going to build socialism. Has capitalism become more rational since then? Lenin never ignored the role of "reasonable capitalists". Today we can see that as far as peace is concerned, their numbers have grown. But a theoretical and political analysis of such matters should be based not so much on the actual behavior of individuals as on the logic that guides the actions of the system in question. Still, this logic manifests itself in different ways too.

In his time, Engels noted that the methods employed by the bourgeoisie had changed during the 19th century: employers increasingly abandoned the rough forms of labour relations typical of the "adolescent stage of capitalist exploitation". But he stressed that the change occurred not because the employers were now more en-

lightened or moral but due to the laws inherent in capitalist production: the old methods had become inexpedient and unprofitable, and they had to be changed to secure stable and high profits and expand production. Similarly, Engels said that the bourgeois state was "being forced" to transform part of private property into state property. Why not assume, then, that the same laws of its operation as a system, the commitment to its own survival and even considerations of profit can "force" it to change its attitude to issues of war and peace, environmental problems, human development, etc.?

The task of overcoming the crisis of civilization demands the social renewal of the world. In conclusion, let me list four main aspects of this renewal. *Firstly*, the objective of creating a nuclear-free and nonviolent world. *Secondly*, a global form of coexistence—a diversity of social systems and the interdependence of their development, including the opportunity for each of them to rise to a higher level. *Thirdly*, the comprehensive development of man and the growth of his universality as the criterion of social progress at the present stage. *Fourthly*, a change in the structure and content of the aggregate maker of social progress.

CRISES, NOT CRISIS

Samir AMIN

It may sound a bit old-fashioned but, frankly, I am somewhat suspicious of sweeping notions such as the "crisis of civilization". I think we are dealing with a series of interconnected but essentially different crises. Firstly, there is a crisis of capitalist development, of commercial viability, investment and profits. Secondly, there are crisis situations in postcapitalist systems, that is, in socialist systems which were developing successfully but which ran into problems emerging in the first phase of extensive accumulation and in the transition to the intensive mode of production and to the democratisation of society. The crises of the two systems are occurring *simultaneously* because the socialist countries do not exist in isolation: they import Western technology, have to make foreign debt payments and export their goods.

A different kind of crisis is plaguing Third World countries—both the newly established procapitalist industrial and semi-industrial nations and the so-called non-capitalism-oriented states. These crisis situations are also linked with the worldwide crisis phenomena; still, they have different causes in different countries, and their development follows a distinctive course in each particular nation.

There is also a fourth type of crisis, closely resembling what may be described as a crisis of civilization. I am

referring to the problems connected with the fact that humanity has reached a new and dangerous phase in the arms buildup. The gravity of the world situation is also compounded by the uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources.

Can these four types of crisis be lumped together and defined as a crisis of civilization? I would refrain from doing so because our debates concerning the crisis of civilization are often so broad that we lose sight of the dissimilarities between social regimes and their distinctive features. Strictly speaking, the problems with which political leaders are confronted, say, in France, the Soviet Union and Bangladesh, are essentially different and cannot be tackled similarly.

However, there is, of course, a certain degree of interconnection between the problems of different countries and regions. It is, I believe, useful to identify those crisis knots that are particularly dangerous to *all human civilization* and to highlight the connection between crisis phenomena in different social systems and the tense situation in the world as a whole.

Firstly, *capitalism*. This social system has proved unable to tackle the tasks of the world's development. Please note that capitalism as it actually exists means not only the more or less prosperous individual Western nations but also the millions of abandoned Asian and Latin American children and the hunger in most dependent countries. By its very nature, capitalism is incapable of stopping the growing polarisation of the world's wealth, when plunder by a minority makes progress impossible for the majority. The world's five billion inhabitants (a total which is expected to reach eight billion early next century) cannot reach the Western level of consumption because the planet does not have the resources for it.

After 1917, people began to think that *socialism* offered a different solution to the problems of the human race. I am convinced that the future belongs to socialism. But developments in different countries often made the situation worse. Generally, the socialist solution was at first seen as some kind of universal panacea. However, even the leaders of most, if not all, Eastern countries—at least in the Soviet Union, China and several other nations that have used Marxist theory—have noted that socialism is not a simple miracle cure.

A *polycentric world* in the full sense of the term is what we need today. In his well-known *Memorandum* of 1964,¹ written during major disputes, even conflicts, between the Soviet Union and China, Palmiro Togliatti was already saying that it was necessary to promote a certain degree of polycentrism. We need a polycentric world in order to be able to settle disputes peacefully and to develop close ties without the present constant reference to capitalist principles and values. Bourgeois means of settlement such as the World Bank or the IMF are imposed on the Third World by brute force. They are at odds with its vital interests and lead to recolonisation.

The reactionary quarters in the West still hope that the socialist countries will have to throw in the towel and accept reintegration into the world system, gradually shifting to capitalist principles of operation. It is important to counter this vision with a multivalent, polycentric world in which different societies or groups of societies direct their development in line with their common requirements shaped by the diversity of social systems and their experience. We must try and live in our world in conditions of equality, accommodating one another and settling disputes in concert. Of course, I cannot rule out the possibility that the developed capitalist countries which are the world's main economic force, will refuse to follow this path. Then we will have to do it without them—on the basis of new principles and without reproducing anything similar to capitalist forms.

In this connection I must say I am concerned to hear the word "market" used excessively both in the Soviet Union and in China. I personally have nothing against the market. I think it is necessary. But one should not treat the market as a new idol, expecting it to resolve the problems which, as we can see from the age-old history of capitalism, it has so far failed to remove. You can't replace an idol with another idol.

And now about the social forces I believe are responsible for the crisis situation in the world. I think most of the blame should be put on the more powerful ruling classes—first and foremost, in the United States, but also in Western Europe and Japan. Then come the lackeys of contemporary imperialism—the ruling classes in the Third World. Unfortunately, even after the victories of the national liberation movements in the 1940s-1960s, these comprador social strata still hold sway in most developing countries. The ruling groups in the socialist countries also bear their share of the responsibility. They should not blame their people for the wrong decisions they themselves made. You could say that peoples are responsible for their governments, but the responsibility of the people is different from the responsibility of those who actually govern.

Finally, about the principal ways of overcoming the crisis and the main social forces capable of doing it. I would link this with what I said earlier about polycentrism. I mean that there is no *single* recipe for eliminating crisis situations. As an example I can cite the work of the Brandt Commission which, about 10 years ago, suggested, as an antidote to crises, a kind of global social democratic movement, a sort of worldwide Keynesianism. The suggestion looks nice, but I think it is naive—nothing more than high-sounding words. Once again, a single approach is impossible in principle. I have no faith either in forecasts of a collapse of capitalism brought on by its own internal contradictions, or in the old dream of a worldwide revolution, or in dire predictions of a series of revolutions in Third World countries.

There is no universal way out of the crisis because we are dealing with crises, not a crisis. So various different

courses of treatment are required. This does not mean that we need no long-term strategic guidelines at all. In order to act successfully, our vision must be far-sighted. Why are we witnessing a worldwide revival of religious beliefs? One of the reasons is that, among other things, religion offers a future (eternal life), a sense of infinite possibility. The fact is that people need these visions. They want to know what to do. Capitalism is too committed to a short-term approach. Commercial viability and profits are calculated for a period of 15 years at best. But such plans are useless if you want to build something that will endure.

I may be old-fashioned, but when I refer to long-term prospects, I remain within the mainstream of a tradition that could be described as communist, or Marxist, or socialist. That is, I advocate a universal society in which people are masters of their future (at least their immediate future) and can avoid crises related to the socioeconomic system. At the same time, they should not be subject to the operation of external so-called economic laws: as masters of the situation, they should be interconnected organically with economic processes and social organisation.

This vision is, for the time being, far from theoretical perfection or practical implementation. Let me just note that some of its ideas were basic to the creation during the Middle Ages of the European world, the Islamic world and so on. It is an age-old human aspiration. Today, however, the important thing is not to deny people, in the name of long-term prospects, the satisfaction of their day-to-day needs, the pursuit of freedom and democracy and access to material values. A nation starving to death needs not only a well-charted path to remote goals but also a way of developing its productive forces in order to solve its pressing material problems. That is why we must act to combine a struggle for a wonderful but distant future with a struggle for the satisfaction of immediate needs.

What social forces are capable of accomplishing this task? I think it is the popular forces as a whole, not just the working class in the narrow sense of the word. Nineteenth- and even twentieth-century Marxists were overoptimistic about capitalism creating all the necessary conditions for the emergence of a future equitable system, believing that this, in turn, would make it possible to lay the basis for socialism and communism throughout the world after a brief period of transition. History has not confirmed their expectations. The development of capitalism has not produced the material might Marx envisaged. It follows that this system necessarily leaves to the postcapitalist societies the problems it has failed to resolve. It is therefore not only industrial workers but all of us who have a stake in society's improvement—although our interests may, of course, differ, and even clash.

Under these circumstances I think that intellectuals have a more substantive role to play. I am not partial to headstrong avant-garde phraseology because it was often abused in the past, but my reference to the growing role of intellectuals relates to their important function in linking

different social interests, settling conflicts and outlining the common prospects.

RED AND GREEN ARE MY FAVOURITE COLOURS

Johan GALTUNG

I see no crisis of world civilization, but I am aware of a crisis of European civilization, rooted in a proliferation of various forms of expansionism. All-out expansionism underlies man's relations with nature. Expansionism is also reflected in the pressure brought to bear on other nations in order to convince some and defeat others. This is typical of both capitalist and, to a certain extent, socialist countries. But all expansion has its limits because the world is not limitless.

The crisis I am referring to (the one brought on by expansionism) has reached its limit. I believe Japan more or less belongs to this type of civilization too since it shows an inclination towards expansionism, although it still has some 20 years or so before this tendency produces a crisis.

How does this crisis manifest itself? Firstly, in our *relationship with nature*. The pollution and reckless plunder of mineral resources has gone too far and the end is already in sight. Secondly, in the *sphere of social relations*. People react to exploitation in various ways, some taking the form of "civilization-related diseases"—heart conditions, cancer, mental disorders and drug addiction. We have reached a very serious crisis of social justice, although this is less typical of socialism. For example, in the Soviet Union the difference between the rich and the poor has not assumed menacing proportions. Under capitalism however, this rift is greater than ever before.

The crisis is compounded by *global problems*. Humanity is facing numerous threats, the most dangerous of which is that of a nuclear conflict. There is also a crisis of culture associated with the proliferation of expansionist concepts completely incapable of changing our thought patterns.

How do I see the principal ways of overcoming these crises?

Naturally, a certain role can be and is being played by the traditional working-class movement and by human rights movements. But I believe that today, the Green movement is the principal anticrisis force. It unites those who advocate the emancipation of women, champion peace and promote the solution of environmental and other problems. The Greens are guided by a simple doctrine—that all movements are equally important and

that no one can say, "Let's tackle my problem first (the women's question, peace or the environment) and the rest later." Attention should be focused on all problems simultaneously.

By 1989 there were Green parties in 24 countries; in 11 of them they were represented in parliament. All this was accomplished within a mere five years or so—an unprecedented growth rate in the history of political parties, although this does not mean that it will be sustained. I believe it is extremely important to take advantage of the opportunity for close cooperation between the Greens, the Social Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists. A Red-Green alliance, of which I am a keen advocate, would then emerge. Another thing I would like to see (and I am almost sure it will materialise) is a powerful Green movement taking shape in the Soviet Union and other East European countries—a movement capable of exerting a certain amount of influence on the communist parties and of entering into alliances with them.

THE BLIND ALLEYS OF INDUSTRIALISM

Boris KAPUSTIN

In my view, the crisis of contemporary civilization should be defined as an extremely acute contradiction between, on the one hand, the objective interests of humanity's further progress, and, on the other, the industrial forms of organisation applied to human activity, as well as the institutions, standards, values and the measure of human development determined by these forms. It is a crisis of industrial civilization and of the principles of industrialism in all their manifestations, from politics and culture to the economic sphere and environmental management.

The crisis of civilization is not identical with a crisis of the socioeconomic system (or of the systems existing in today's world), although the connection between the system-related and the civilization-related aspects of development is now obvious, just as it was at other stages of history. Let us note that this is a *genetic* connection. The emergence of the industrial forms of social organisation (above all, the industrial type of productive forces) is linked with a particular phase in the development of capitalism. At the same time, existing socialism as it developed historically was, in Lenin's words, a realised opportunity for a "different transition to the creation of the basic conditions of civilization", that is, of the same industrial organisation, but with different system characteristics. The Third World was affixed to industrial civilization through a network of colonial and neocolonial relations of dependence. Let us also note that there is a *functional* connection between the

civilization-related and the system-related aspects. The crisis of industrialism reflects the following: the crisis of a particular stage and *type* of capitalism; the "precrisis state" of the existing *model* of socialism (a state aggravated but not engendered by negative manifestations of the subjective factor), the crisis of the existing *forms* used to link the Third World to global processes; and the crisis of the "grow in order to catch up" model.

I hold that all this leads to the following basic conclusions as far as the theory of social progress is concerned.

Firstly, resolving the problems of human survival means overcoming the crisis of civilization. This is possible only if the three major components of the contemporary world all reach a fundamentally higher *development level*. This implies the replacement of an Industrial civilization with a postindustrial or scientific and technological one. Each of the systems should, acting within its distinctive structural framework, realise a version of historical progression which offers an alternative to the present (industrial) logic of development.

Secondly, such a breakthrough onto a higher level and such a transition to development alternatives ensure not simply humanity's survival but also the attainment of a new stage in its social progress because they remove the historically specific forms of alienation typical of society's Industrial organisation. It is a necessary phase (not a conclusion) of the process whereby man is being transformed from a means into an *end of social activity*.

Should this come to pass, all social systems are likely to become more dynamic, but the impact will be different with regard to the future historical prospects of socialism and capitalism. In the latter case, accelerated development according to this model will result in a growing self-negation of capitalism (as Lenin put it), the main features of capitalism being further transformed into their opposites. Conversely, as socialism outgrows its industrial forms, it will assert *much more fully* its potential and its objective of man's emancipation and free all-round development.

Thirdly, in order to overcome the crisis of civilization, different social systems should undergo transformations not in isolation but in tandem, as it were. Such transformations are rooted in the changing *formula of world development*, that is, in the changing principles of the global system's organisation and operation. "At others' expense" sums up the old formula. The degree to which socialism advanced was seen as the degree to which capitalism was set back, and vice versa. The accumulation of wealth by the capitalist North was proportional to the poverty of the South (the Third World), etc.

This formula was generated by the overall mechanics of industrial civilization: the latter could develop only at the expense of nature, which was treated in a utilitarian way; of man, who was reduced to a narrow specialist; and of whole classes and nations subjected to plunder and violence. Such is the actual manifestation of the formula of antagonistic progress which Marx recorded. It is a

salient feature of this formula that amid a crisis of industrial civilization, further progress along the old path is feasible only *at the expense of humanity as a whole*. In other words, it is essentially impossible. This confronts the world with a dilemma: either destruction, or development along a different path. The new formula for the world process is based on a different imperative—not "at the expense" of man, nature or other nations. It advances the principle of co-development and nonviolence.

Fourthly, the switch to the new formula is also the degree to which certain principal features of capitalism are transformed into their opposites and capitalism is negated as the focus and the organising factor of global processes. At the stage of industrial civilization, the international role of socialism was confined primarily to an "ennobling" and restraining impact on the global phenomena and processes generated by capitalism. Within the framework of the global system that the new formula of global development may produce, capitalism will be forced to act in many respects in a "noncapitalist" way, while renewed socialism will be able to influence global processes not from the outside and not only by restricting their more destructive manifestations, but from the inside and therefore by increasingly shaping their very nature.

Previously, the Marxist theory of social progress regarded the elimination of capitalism and the triumph of the socialist system as essential to such civilization-related transformations as the harmonisation of relations between society and nature, the humanisation of international relations, the realisation of the ideal of "peace forever", the development of a new type of man, and so on. In the present conditions, however, the onward march of history, and human survival itself, are directly connected with the assertion of a new, post-industrial civilization. This should form the necessary basis for future transformations of the social system.

The new civilization is taking shape and will function in the foreseeable future amid a diversity of social systems.

This principle therefore becomes the key formula of new political thinking, thus largely explaining the likelihood of its acceptance even by opposite social forces. It is in fact a *style of thinking* which, geared to the new civilization, is generated by objective processes and the principles underlying its emergence, not by a particular doctrine or concept which always expresses a vision of social reality determined by class interests.

New political thinking is replacing not just a particular theory, school or ideological current but the paradigm and style of thinking, in all their ideological manifestations, of industrial civilization. As the style of the post-industrial civilization, this thinking ought to produce an ideological pluralism of currents, schools and doctrines. In other words, it will be interpreted differently in class-based terms by the liberal bourgeois, Marxist, "Green alternative" and other types of new thinking. Marxist-Leninist theory will rise to the level of contemporary problems only on the basis of new thinking, but this does not mean that it is in fact

"latter-day Marxism". It follows that the acceptance of this thinking by different social groups and classes does not at all imply their metamorphosis into adepts of Marxism.

TOWARDS A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE

Socorro RAMIREZ

We now have every reason to speak of a crisis of civilization—one that takes different forms depending on the development level of a particular country. The course of history has acquired a tragic dimension, and it has put large-scale social change on the agenda.

I should begin by noting the crisis of Western civilization. I am referring to industrial models which, I might add, have to a greater or lesser extent become widespread in the East too. These development models have turned out to be too expensive with regard to the environment and the quality of life. Growth and modernisation of industrial production—everything that used to denote progress—can no longer meet people's diverse needs. Naturally, the basic minimum has been taken care of in the developed Western nations—but to the exclusion of a higher cultural level or the development of man's relations with nature and society (one dominated by a cult of profit and pragmatism). Western civilization is also stifling other national cultures and all Third World countries. This I see as the foremost manifestation of the crisis of civilization.

Signs of crisis are discernible not only in contradictory and runaway growth but also in politics. There, we are witnessing a crisis of party systems, of political organisations' orientation on electoral success instead of on the actual expression of the people's will, or on an effort to sum up and realise the interests of different sections of the population. The emergence of many new and alterna-

tive social movements which reject the values of Western civilization is therefore not accidental.

These new social agents want no part in state affairs but strive to tackle their own pressing problems. For example, the women's movement is upholding the rights of women not only in order to augment their political opportunities but also to restructure the entire sphere of family relations. Grassroots Christian communities reject vertical social organisation and, in their day-to-day activities, want to be independent of parties, the state and even the Church. Or take the environmentalist movement which is trying not simply to protect nature from destruction but also to create a new type of society and new forms of social organisation which would be in harmony with the environment. And pacifists have delivered a powerful challenge to the arms race.

In other words, *new forms of struggle for social renewal* are being born, although this process remains largely blocked by the crisis of civilization. Meanwhile, new attitudes are maturing, not in the course of a power struggle but as elements of a nascent civilization which will be more pluralistic and humanitarian and display a higher level of socialised human relations. In this context, the socialist perspective appears to go further than simple control over the activities of the state apparatus.

The objectives and the broadly representative nature of the new social movements also indicate that the character of the struggle is changing too. A process of enlightenment is pushing violence into the background—violence that used to play a major role in overcoming the resistance offered by what was old. Force can be used only to defend what is new. But the most important task is to create, on the basis of a broad consensus, an alliance of those who can find a way out of the crisis of civilization. Such an alliance, like a radically different level of social development, cannot be secured by force.

¹ See *World Marxist Review*, No.7, 1989.





WILL THE "IMPOSSIBLE" MATERIALISE?

A Dialogue of British Labourites

How are changes in the British working class affecting the work of their trade unions and political organisations, primarily the Labour Party? What are their prospects for the next few years? Ken LIVINGSTONE, MP and a member of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, and former leader of the Greater London Council, and Peter HAIN, Labour Parliamentary Candidate and Head Research Officer for the Union of Communication Workers, discussed these questions in London at WMR request.

Below is an abridged record of their discussion.

Ken LIVINGSTONE. We have a real divide in Britain, with people arguing about the nature of the working class, as though it is something fixed in time. That's never been the case: the working class has always been changing and evolving. As the pattern of employment changes, it takes new forms. And these changes are now very much a part of the whole of the developed world: a major shift into services away from manufacturing, a major shift towards women in paid employment, and very often part-time work. And certainly in Britain almost all of the new jobs that have been created have been in those two areas; the 25% decline in the British trade union movement, with a couple of exceptions, is almost wholly linked to the decline of jobs in particular sectors of the economy. There are deep divisions over the very definition of the working class. Bourgeois sociologists tend not to include most of wage labour, whereas Marxists consider 80-90% of the population to be working class. It is these people that we must win over to our side.

Peter HAIN. The concept of class, and of the working class in particular, may seem all too theoretical, but it is inextricably linked with politics. I don't think there should be any argument about class relations and a class analysis still being valid. However, the working class now is probably more differentiated because of the increasing division of labour and the breakup of the old centres of urban manufacturing. I have studied these processes, and a few years ago wrote a book about these changes and their impact on politics. The trade union movement in the mid-1970s in Britain was about ten million strong. It then went up, then it fell back to about ten million in the mid-1980s. So if we take a snapshot of the composition of the TUC in the mid-1970s compared with the mid-1980s—exactly the same total of about ten million—what you see is one million more white-collar workers, one million fewer

blue-collar workers, 700,000 more members working for local and national government, and half a million fewer people in heavy industries. You've also got half a million more women, half a million fewer men. All these structural changes occurred within the space of ten years.

K. L. I'd say that the working class, as a class, has actually grown in the sense that a larger proportion of the population has to earn a living. New groups of workers are coming into it. Unfortunately, the Labour Party and the unions still cling to their notion of the working class as it was at the turn of the century. We have been very slow to adapt to changes as they occur. But the most forward-thinking elements in the trade union movement have now realised that they must adapt in order to reflect the working class in its present form. So unions like the transport and general workers, the manufacturing, science and finance union, the general and municipal workers, have programmes in hand to recruit part-time workers, to recruit women, and this will gradually feed back and help to change the agenda of the labour movement.

P. H. The problem is that some people are now saying, "Class is no longer a factor—we are all middle class now." I don't think this is true.

K. L. Why do people view themselves as "middle class" even though they still sell their labour power? Clearly, if people move from conditions of quite appalling poverty which we had 50 years ago in the workforce to the situation now, where they are well housed, and they have foreign holidays, I think we have to admit that the labour movement was basically struggling to achieve those things. People's mentality changes as a result, and they view their social status differently from their parents. Some don't identify with the working class any longer, have stopped voting Labour, and dropped out of the trade union movement. But they are still socially conscious. For

example, many of them now are pushing environmental issues, and many are actually worried about the centralisation of power around Thatcher and the lack of a written constitution. Our problem is that the labour movement has not developed an agenda, it is just beginning to identify these new concerns.

P. H. There is no reason why in principle today's car- and home-owning, foreign holiday-taking chemical worker should be any the less inclined to the Labour Party than his parents 30 years ago, when they didn't enjoy the same material benefits. Home-ownership has grown by one million in the past ten years, and that was a very strong card for Thatcher to play. But home-owners are a very narrow section of the working class. The important thing is that the same problems of lack of power, of lack of equality and so on, still operate.

K. L. Another serious factor of change in social mentality and divisions is that many people actually live in isolation. I mean you can knock on people's doors in the city and you are the only person they would talk to between coming home and going to work the next day. They are not involved in tenants' associations or cultural groups, or anything like that. And so we are a society riddled with isolation. And people don't see themselves as part of something wider. They don't necessarily think they are part of anything at work. All the things that produce a collective society have to a degree been eroded, some quite deliberately by the government, others through other social changes. And the emphasis we had in British politics for 30 years or more on looking after ourselves, standing on your own two feet, is often echoed by labour movement figures.

P. H. Yes, there has been a fantastic privatisation of lifestyles, which is a problem for the labour movement because it is so motley. In general socialists operate on a collective basis which is the antithesis of a privatised marketplace type of approach. And the fact remains that the whole atmosphere and climate in which socialist politics can be conducted at the moment is very difficult for that reason. It concerns the trade unions because their strength and industrial solidarity, working-class solidarity, was an oasis of sorts in the context where there was a relatively homogeneous community. But the closed shop, the greater professionalisation and bureaucracy in the trade union movement, which has brought its own organisational assets, has also meant a distance, a cultural distance between the rank-and-file member and the trade union as an organisation. I would just question whether there has remained in the working people a spontaneous striving for socialism, or if there was ever one at all. I do think that there is a real crisis for socialism and for collectivism, witness the debates in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in China, and in the British labour movement itself. Until we actually solve that crisis, the prospects of winning mass working-class support are not going to be very good.

K. L. I disagree. I think there is an inherent collectivism,

or rather socialism, in people. In the Middle Ages when the pressure on them was too great, the peasants rose in revolt, chased away the lords, and held power in their hands, if only for a few days. Today this desire to be human beings has been realised consciously in the socialist ideal.

P. H. I still think that people don't know what socialism is today. In Britain, I would say that the majority of workers, the majority of the public do not know what socialism is in the sense that they did in 1945 (however limited we may think it was). People knew that a Labour government was going to deliver the welfare state, nationalisation, greater public control, greater equality. Now they don't know what the labour movement is going to deliver, which is not just a problem for the labour movement since socialism as a whole doesn't seem to have a clear identity, ideologically and at the popular level.

K. L. I don't think so. In the beginning there were obvious material objectives in terms of pay, health care, poverty, etc. In many ways these still exist in the Third World. But in a small number of societies, the worst conditions are gone and therefore the labour movement really needs to be thinking of their objectives for the next 50 or 100 years. There is a lot more to achieve in terms of redistributing wealth and founding decent services, settling conflicts between consumers and producers and caring for the elderly. But the big step forward towards socialism has to be the democratisation of society. This is very difficult and we haven't thought it through yet, but it is already clear that greater worker participation in running production and managing society is very important.

P. H. In my view, a great many socialist objectives in Labour's programme are capable of winning popular support, one of the most difficult of which is the area of public ownership. There has been a massive privatisation programme under Thatcher, which in its own way has been relatively popular. We have not, if we are honest, been able to mobilise the mass opposition that could have defeated this. Public ownership was very centralised, not at all concerned with the consumer, and there was no industrial democracy. It was not popular. What we are now actually coming to in the party is a much more popular view of public ownership, with decentralisation, strong consumer rights and industrial democracy built into it. That could be very popular as a future programme. My worry in all these policies—and that is just one example—is that it will be projected in a very defensive way, rather than as a radical programme of major change.

K. L. The impression that Labour is keeping a low profile while the Tory cabinet pursues a well-thought-out policy can do us a lot of harm. The Tories were behind the portrayal of the trade unions as a bad thing for society, and Labour tried to distance themselves from the miners' strike in 1984-1985, terrified that they would be tarnished by it. But you have to stand up and defend working people when they come under attack. Last summer we had a TV programme called "A Very British Coup", about

a left-wing Labour prime minister eventually being overthrown by a military venture. He was actually the kind of Labour leader we always wanted, confident about socialism, able to bounce things back at the press and brimful of enthusiasm and optimism. In reality the Right sets the agenda, and every time you make a concession it pushes forward for more. Take defence, for example. At a time when the whole world wants disarmament, when there are real opportunities for weapons cuts, the Tory stand is the biggest obstacle. We should be leading the attack on it, but there is just this deathly silence. A purely defensive system is a distinct possibility for the whole of Europe. We should respond to Gorbachov, negotiate cuts in nuclear and conventional weapons, because Soviet policy makes this more of a likely proposition than ever before. Sleepless nights spent wondering what the Russians are going to do are a thing of the past.

P. H. It is fantastic irony that for the last ten years, during which the Labour Party has had a clear commitment to unilateralism, there was no movement internationally. But now, when there is some movement towards nuclear weapons cuts, in the Labour Party unilateralism suddenly becomes inappropriate.¹ Meanwhile, our defeat in the 1983 and 1987 parliamentary elections was not over unilateralism but because the voters were not convinced of Labour's economic and political competence.

K. L. I'd say that people have got to believe in socialism. Our problem is that we've lost a chunk of the working class, but also some groups of the middle class. That's why we've got to have a policy that appeals to them if we want to win them back. They have not done very well under Thatcher, and if we are now moving into a recession, as I suspect we are, they are exactly the group that is going to be squeezed.

P. H. I think Labour has failed to address the interests of the growing stratum of skilled workers, who are slightly better off than the majority of the working class. When in government, we had incomes policies which depressed their living standards, and we did not provide that group with an alternative in terms of more power and influence on their lives, in terms of housing, and so on. The Tories moved to fill the vacuum, mobilising a sufficient proportion of that group by appealing to their self-interest. And it's worth making the point that the Tories are still winning on a very small proportion of the vote, 40.3%. Incidentally, it seems we may be following the Americans in this, Reagan and Bush having won on a very small proportion of the vote: only about 50% of Americans ever actually vote and we may be entering that kind of phase in Britain, with political apathy spreading as people fall to thinking that nothing changes whichever party is in power.

K. L. We have a particular problem, I think, in Britain, which is that generally the leadership of the Labour Party has been very poor. Basically competent politicians have been starkly absent in a large portion of the Labour leadership. One of the major reasons why we don't get elected is that people don't consider us fit to run the country. We

haven't done anything to create that impression. Moreover, the labour movement does not yet have an effective and realistic programme but is just setting its agenda.

P. H. I don't agree. We have a programme, and some of its goals reflect the influence of the party's left wing and the labour movement, but the trouble is that it tends to be backward-looking with little account taken of present circumstances, recent changes or the mood of the mass of workers.

K. L. What we need today is a new strategy directed at forging a broad coalition of interests in which social justice and democratisation go hand in hand with the normal desire to redistribute wealth, to introduce parliamentary reform and to decentralise government.

P. H. I am for a coalition of interests, but against pacts with the centre parties because I don't think they work. We don't agree with the Communist Party on alliances here in Britain.² But our programme could appeal to different groups of voters. A statutory minimum wage to tackle the problem of low pay would be very popular with significant sections of the people. There is a whole agenda that we could address to the working people, including safety, health, job security at a time of economic restructuring, and more power and rights at the workplace. An ecology agenda could appeal to progressive and radical groups. I do agree that our priority is the democratisation of society and politics. I think the agenda for Labour in the next ten years, in or out of government, is more a democratisation agenda than a socialisation agenda. Steady advance along the former will, I think, lead to the latter.

K. L. The problem for Labour lies in winning public support for their programme and convincing the voters that it is practicable.

P. H. It will not be easy: we should rely not just on parliamentary, but also on extra-parliamentary forces, including the trade union movement, the women's movement, the peace movement, and people in the community.

K. L. As for cooperation among working-class parties, we have always got on very well with the Communist Party. We should be prepared to cooperate on quite a lot of issues, but pacts are completely out.

P. H. I can say that, yes, we would work with members of the Communist Party and other socialist groupings, but really that is not the priority. The priority for Labour is the bigger constituencies, which don't see themselves as working class. Here we have to build alliances, but not at the expense of traditional working-class links.

K. L. Unfortunately, the Labour Party is geared mainly towards election campaigns. Important as they are, they do not meet all the challenges arising from people's various interests.

P. H. A new political level should be reached by the party as a whole. Its branches do not discuss basic issues of politics, ideology, the economy or ecology. Most grassroot meetings either hear dull reports on fund-raising

bazaars or are short debates, say, on unilateralism of the "Are you for or against?" type. We should progress from this primitive level to real socialist consciousness.

K. L. If the party were to come up with a good, forthright policy on relevant issues, it could achieve the "Impossible" and win the next election. The fact that in 1987 Labour polled 31% of the votes does not mean that they cannot get 40-45% in a couple of years.³ But the party will lose if it follows the old course, eroding its policies in its bid to seem "respectable" to certain voters. On the contrary, it should clearly and resolutely pursue the goals that the working people want.

P. H. The left wing of Labour consolidated its positions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but on the whole voter support has declined through the fault of the then leadership. A new agenda has to be devised today that incor-

porates the new realities and the mood of the workers, that looks to the future. The Left will have an important role to play in discussions on it.

¹ In May 1989, the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party called for the renunciation of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The new position provides for the inclusion of the British nuclear force in the strategic arms reduction talks. The NEC stated that Labour's goal was the abolition of all nuclear weapons by 2000.—*Ed.*

² The Communist Party of Britain has proposed an electoral agreement or pact between the major opposition parties in order to defeat the Conservatives at the next parliamentary elections.—*Ed.*

³ Labour won 40.2% and the Conservatives 34.1% of the votes in the June 15 elections to the European Parliament.—*Ed.*

WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

THE VIEW FROM THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

We continue with our series devoted to the views of different political forces on the prospective creation in 1992 of a single market among the EEC countries.¹ Two members of the European Parliament—Hedy d'ANCONA of the Netherlands Labour Party, and Lucana KASTELINA of the Italian Communist Party—comment on this issue.

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

Hedy d'ANCONA
member of the European Parliament (Netherlands Labour Party)

■ *The EEC countries have announced their intention to introduce the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour within the Community. How do you see this from the point of view of workers' interests?*

As a member of the European Parliament, a Socialist and a feminist, the well-being of the workers is a major concern to me. When people like the Italian economist Paolo Cecchini² talk about the internal market giving us economic growth at more than 5%, 2 million new jobs, and a greater diversity of products at lower prices, I want to know how this money is going to be redistributed for the people's benefit.

I won't go into the details of the Cecchini report and its

conclusions. Profits and pure economics don't interest me, but if this prognosis is right, and if the future market is so promising, then we have to talk about the social dimension of it. A full liberalisation of the West European market does not automatically mean that this problem will be dealt with. If we don't do anything this potential free market of 320 million consumers will bring no good to the workers, or to the weaker categories on the labour market—women, migrant workers and the less well educated. The plight of such groups will only deteriorate if we do nothing. The European parliament and the European Commission have an obligation to use the profits of the internal market to help the people.

So that's the reason we are going to develop the social dimension. Certain aspects like health and safety will not be a problem because, for instance, Article 118A of the Single Act will mean that regulations concerning these issues can be decided upon by a simple majority in the European Council of Ministers. After all, employers are not so noble or altruistic that they would not try to make more profits by producing goods cheaper in member countries which do not have expensive health and safety arrangements for workers. This would be a start, a foot in the door,

as it were. The fact that we can use this juridical base to create further regulations directed at the social field gives me hope for the future.

There is another question we have to ask ourselves and that is, at what cost is this economic growth, the potential for a wider range of cheaper goods, to be bought? We must take a critical look at the possible human and environmental consequences of our actions.

■ **How do you see further economic integration affecting the employment situation? Will it help to reduce unemployment?**

There are over 16 million people in the European Community without work and if we do nothing the selective unemployment we already have will become worse. The combination of economic internationalisation and new technology will be very dangerous for those people without sufficient education, and there may well be a polarisation between highly educated people with well-paid jobs and those who have no access to these things. And such a polarisation would not just be between Northern and Southern Europe but also within the rich countries of Northern Europe, like the UK, Holland and Germany. The problem exists and we must take measures to overcome this deep cleavage between the haves and the have-nots. Otherwise, specific groups will suffer protracted unemployment which will pass on to their children, and a new kind of class society will arise like that in the UK with its North-South divide. There, the government doesn't seem to care because it's "a mere" 10-12% of the population—poor, forgotten people with little chance of ever finding a job, a minority whose votes they can afford to lose.

Fortunately, there are enough people in the community at the moment who do not want to see this happen to the EEC.

■ **What do you think needs to be done to create a social dimension?**

When we speak of the social dimension, it's not only important for the poor people who need social security because they have no work; it's also important for women, who make up 52% of the population. For instance, we didn't want to duplicate the situation, like that in the Soviet Union, whereby women have a double burden: holding down a job because they have to be economically independent, but also having to be wholly responsible for organising the home. We of the women's movement want a redistribution not only of income, not only of power, but also of jobs. Why must some people work forty hours a week—and women have this double burden—while others have no work at all?! For people in employment the important thing is to get flexibility and a reduction in working time, adequate facilities for advanced training and paid educational leave. This last should not be ignored, because often in our rapidly technologically-evolving world the education you have received by the age of 21 is not enough. Constant re-training is essential, also because it offers opportunities

for solving the unemployment problem in that people away on courses open up free places on the labour market. Our aim, then, is a reduction in working time, more training and better working conditions.

I think in order to coordinate workers' actions in support of these objectives we need a strong Socialist party on the European level and a strong and determined labour movement comprising the unions in the community. Unfortunately, the employers were the first to understand the value of cooperation and lobbying, getting on with this while the unions wasted time arguing over minor details. The unions have finally realised what is going on, that they may get left behind, and that they have to unite now, not just to resist the machinations of their employers, but also to enter into discussions with them in order to solve problems. This is the only way workers themselves can take part in resolving issues of concern to them.

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

Lucana KASTELINA

member of the CC of the Italian Communist Party,
member of the European Parliament

I would not say that the way in which the single European market is being built is the best one. It is being formed in conditions of big capital domination. Democratic control exists within the national states which form the European Economic Community, but it does not exist at the EEC level.

Having closely studied social and economic trends, the ruling circles in the EEC countries have decided what to keep under national control and what to transfer to supranational institutions, proceeding with this while the labour movement was bogged down in ideological debate. As a result, the European Left and workers' organisations have fallen out of touch, now finding themselves confronted with a situation already determined by dominant forces.

What will the single market bring? I believe that the official projections for production and employment growth are largely false. They have no scientific basis, and ignore absolutely the causes of unemployment and general crisis phenomena. The Common Market's potential is *greatly overestimated*. Furthermore, the profound distinctions within the EEC between the strongest and weakest regions are not being taken into account. A Europe without political and economic convergence, without political unity based on common needs, will produce immense contradictions. The lack of a social dimension, of any European standards of labour protection, will create dangerous consequences.

This does not mean that we should resist the process of integration—that would go against the tide of history, like past attempts to prevent the creation of national states. But we must realise that unification is proceeding without any

control from workers' groups, leading to a *weakening of the existing mechanisms of social protection.*

Historically, at national level, the labour movement has won the right to a certain amount of control which is reflected in the power of the unions, in certain laws, and in the nationalisation of some industries. But now Western Europe is to be integrated on the basis of total deregulation and this confronts the labour movement with an enormous problem.

As I say, it's not a question of resisting this process, but of organising in order to *control it.* Our chief concern is not that there will be a unified Western Europe, but what kind of Europe it will be.

So far, this process has been in the interests of big business, whilst the Europe of the workers has met with difficulties and disunity. This, too, is an enormous problem of democracy, of the search for new forms. Within the EEC many decisions are now being made in uncontrolled bodies, whose activity remains unknown to the public. Relations between the electors and their representatives have become so unclear that nobody knows who answers for what or who controls what.

We ought therefore to speak of the *powers* of the European Parliament, for a number of important general decisions are being taken by the executive power or directly by capital itself while the European Parliament has no power at all. It's basically a question of representative democracy at this level, and also at the level of the national state.

Entirely new problems arise here. In principle the single market ought to bring a greater choice of goods and services at reasonable prices. But we do not live in conditions of pure market competition. There exist large concentrations of economic and financial power which are capable of removing weaker and less able competitors. This is occurring within a process of financial and economic concentration coupled with a decentralisation of production. A situation is being created of less rather than more choice. This is a process which has to be resisted in order to be redirected.

There also arises the question of the national sovereignty of the EEC countries. How will the establishment of supranational structures affect it? The creation of the EEC has led to a reduction of traditional nationalism. This is no bad thing since the history of Europe has been one of constant wars. However, we are now seeing the emergence of regionalism, as evidenced by contradictions between the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, and between the Welsh, Scots and English in Great Britain, as well as by the problems of the Bretons in France. There is a strong upsurge in regional movements and this will make the transition to the supranational dimension more difficult. These factors have to be taken into consideration because any solutions may have both positive and negative consequences.

The construction of a single Europe will have positive results if this is achieved by granting a great degree of

social and cultural autonomy to all the ethnic groups within each member state. Things may turn out differently if the process of market unification suppresses this autonomy, thereby provoking resistance.

Thus, the process of supranationalisation can be seen to arouse a strong fear of being overwhelmed by supranational institutions. The Left and the labour movement should pay profound attention to the whole range of problems thrown up by the process of integration.


¹ See *WMR*, 1989: No. 1 (Bernard Marx, "What 1992 Has in Store for Europe"), No. 2 (Rudolf Rohlicek, Willy de Clercq, "CMEA-EEC: New Prospects"), No. 3 (Henry Plumb, "Let Us Work Together"; Gerry Pocock, "Common Market: What Does 1992 Promise?"; Jan Debrouwere, "Transformation, Not Negation"; Serji Mari, "The Pros and Cons"), No. 5 (Julio Anguita, "What Sort of Europe?"; Alekos Ajavanos, "Who Holds the 'Trumps'"), No. 7 (Mike Morrissey, "Old Roles in a New Scenario") and No. 8 (Claude Renard, "The Democratic Dimension of a Europe of the Twelve").

² Head of an advisory group which prepared a report *1992—The Benefits of a Single Market* for the EC Commission.—Ed.

COMMUNISTS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Direct elections to the European Parliament, held every five years, took place in the 12 EEC states in June. In six countries Communists, who ran independently or in a bloc with other progressive allies, won 42 seats—six less than in 1984. (See the table for a comparison of figures for the last two elections; and the diagram for a breakdown of the 518 seats in the latest parliament.)

Country	Total seats	Won by Communists	
		in 1989	in 1984
Denmark	16	2	2
France	81	7	10
Greece	24	3	4
Italy	81	22	26
Portugal	24	4	3
Spain	60	4	3



From left to right: Communists, Socialists, ecologists, Christian Democrats, Gaullists, Liberals, Conservatives, the Far Right and others.

A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES

National Liberation and Universal Peace: Any Contradiction?

Antonio DIAZ-RUIZ
Cuba CP representative on WMR

Politicians and scientists have recently focused their attention on the problems of interdependence, the dialectical relation between the two world social systems, the class struggle, and the national-liberation movement. This is natural because it is immediately relevant to the activity of communist and workers' parties, and other left-wing, revolutionary and progressive forces.

Most Marxists have recognised that the global situation is a novel one, and that the nuclear threat is as real as the objective existence of the class struggle and the need to liberate the oppressed peoples. Almost all are agreed that it is the prime duty of the international communist and working-class movement to militate for peace and social progress, but different opinions are voiced when it comes to the concrete tasks, their interconnection and priorities.

Some say that mankind's survival is the supreme and absolute value, and tend to relegate the aims of the class struggle to the background, referring, in particular, to the improved relations and the ongoing dialogue between the USA and the USSR. This seems to me a rather one-sided approach. The global problems of the modern world—protection of the environment, disarmament, efforts to overcome the backwardness of the Third World, and national liberation—are indivisible, which is why *it is wrong to assume that any of these major problems has any kind of priority.*

The interdependence of countries has markedly increased. Isolation and autarky are a thing of the past. The Marxist idea that the improvement of the productive forces has the key role to play in human progress has been fully vindicated, but under capitalist exploitation it is having a negative effect both on the condition of the working people, and on the environment. This has jeopardised the very existence of the human race, in turn generating a mighty movement against the nuclear danger.

The central task now is to affirm peaceful coexistence as the only rational form of being. Recognition of this, should not, however, imply any neglect of the fact that the contradictions in society are objective. Marx and Engels proved that class struggle is an objective result of the antagonisms arising from the economic and social conditions of the various classes. It is inevitable that working people will fight for their rights, just as countries dependent

on Imperialism will fight for national liberation and social emancipation.

An awareness of the class struggle as the motor of history should not be carried to extremes by claiming that the only way to solve mankind's problems is to eradicate capitalism, or to reject any opportunities for cooperation and dialogue.

A view of the modern world as an interdependent and diverse entity—made up of rich and poor countries with their own internal social conflicts, dominant countries and dominated countries with opposing interests—inexorably leads one to the conclusion that there is no inevitable contradiction between universal and class interests.

In order to frustrate the schemes of the military-industrial complex and the other aggressive circles of imperialism, it is necessary to unite the broadest social strata, including more progressive elements of the monopoly bourgeoisie. But one should not forget the role of the proletariat, which is by its very nature the class with the greatest stake in peace, and the class that is the most fiendishly exploited. Despite the changes in its structure wrought by the advances in science and technology, it is the core of the forces opposing extreme reaction, fighting not only for its own emancipation but also for society as a whole. The interests of the working class correspond objectively to universal human interests.

Mechanically setting off universal human interests against class interests could well dampen the militancy of the workers and lessen their activity in the centres of capitalism, and harm national-liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

However, the class struggle in the developed capitalist countries is slowing down. There are various reasons for this, notably the capacity of the ruling circles to keep wages at a fairly high level, and to respect the peoples' other social gains. Anyway, room for manoeuvre is provided by their exploitation of the underdeveloped countries.

The evolution of the world towards greater integrity and interdependence has been accompanied by a sharpening of contradictions—something that tends to be forgotten. There has been a noticeable increase in tensions between imperialism and the less developed countries. *The focal points of the most acute class conflicts have shifted from the citadels of capital, where the ruling circles have managed to ease social conflicts, to the Third World, where imperialism has relied on local oligarchies when brutally imposing its domination, and where the exploitation is most lacerating.*

The international situation testifies to a sharpening of the contradictions between the centres of power and the periphery. The contradictions in North-South relations have become insoluble. The economic dependence of the Third World countries on the international economic and financial institutions has become a drag on the peoples' development, while the external debt, once regarded as a temporary difficulty, has grown into an intolerable burden on all the underdeveloped countries. Many people in the

world are unaware of the gravity of these problems because most of the mass media are in the hands of those who are least interested in spreading the truth.

In recent decades there has been an unprecedented concentration of production and capital, and this has led to the emergence of transnational corporations which control about 50% of world trade and between 70% and 95% of the marketing of basic export products from the underdeveloped countries. Influential economic and political groups in the leading capitalist countries have formed themselves into an alliance. They are managing to block all the proposals coming from the Third World countries for a reform of international economic relations. Private capital investments in the less developed countries (LDC) have been gradually shrinking, giving way to an influx of bank capital and state loans at usurious interest rates.

Changes in the geographical and sectoral structure of investments and world trade, and the movement of capital between the Western powers, have had grave consequences for the economy of the Third World. After World War II, 43% of investments from the United States went to Latin American countries, and about 19% to Western Europe; the figures are now 17% and 37%, respectively. But there has been no reduction in the dependence of the Latin Americans due to the external debt.

The bulk of world trade is carried on between the industrialised capitalist countries. Export from the LDCs (except for the oil producers) dropped from 25% in 1955 to 11% in the 1970-1980 period, and the trend is still downwards.

Latin America and the Caribbean are in the throes of the deepest crisis in their history. Their economic indicators are now those of a decade ago. The decline in production, which began in the 1980s, is continuing. A weak recovery can be seen only in some industries and in some countries. Inflation is still rife.

Also, external factors are having an effect on the situation in the region; notably the drop in prices for basic export products and the general worsening of the terms of trade. Protectionist measures are being intensified by the Western industrialised countries. In many countries a denationalisation process is under way and capital is fleeing abroad, the result being that Latin America is now an exporter of capital.

The Latin American countries' external debt has risen to over \$420 billion and become a powerful instrument of their subjugation. Western creditors have been receiving sizable profits, but the accumulation of political and social problems is creating a serious long-term threat to the capitalist system as a whole.

Africa is also in crisis. Its peoples, plundered first by the colonial masters and then by imperialism, find themselves in dire straits. Most of them depend on the export of raw materials whose prices have been steadily falling. They have to bear the burden of the external debt, which jeopardises not only their development but their very survival. Africans suffer disastrous droughts and other natural

calamities causing starvation and death. And all this is happening on a continent with immense natural wealth.

A similar situation exists in *Asia*, where the majority of countries are also faced with grave economic problems. Large masses of people are being brutally oppressed, suffering hunger, illiteracy and inhuman living conditions. In those countries which have had some development as a result of the location of TNC subsidiaries on their territory—South Korea is a prime example—US-supported dictatorships are still in place. An open-ended working day, poverty wages, intolerable working conditions and the almost total absence of safety procedures on the shopfloor are the main features of the "prosperity" in these countries, besides which, the masses there are deprived of elementary political freedoms.

The deepening contradictions between the Third World and imperialism bring to the fore the need for struggle *against the repayment of the external debt and for a new international economic order.*

Some say, however, that national-liberation processes must be subordinated to the task of mankind's survival, and "recommend" moderation to the revolutionary parties and movements, so as to prevent any local or regional problem from triggering a global conflagration.

If it means acting with prudence in the search for ways to settle potential conflicts through negotiation, then flexibility—like that displayed by the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua in its approach to Central American problems—or a readiness to compromise for the sake of peoples' right to sovereignty and self-determination—as at the tripartite conference on Southwest Africa with the participation of Angola, Cuba and South Africa—is perfectly acceptable. But *moderation is unacceptable if it means a renunciation of legitimate defence against imperialist aggression, including armed action, or the disbandment of patriotic forces engaged in armed struggle against repressive regimes.* In El Salvador, for instance, all the ways towards a negotiated settlement have been blocked.

Occasionally, reference is made to countries which have been developing for decades without cataclysms, upheavals or wars. If only the problems of our region could be solved in this way! *Communists are committed opponents of violence for the sake of violence.* But is it fair to urge moderation on exploited and oppressed peoples? Can one expect them to reconcile themselves to the status quo? Of course not, and it is unrealistic to think otherwise.

In order to advance to national independence without jeopardising world peace, revolutionaries must act prudently and intelligently by analysing in-depth the concrete situation. Errors and excesses can, of course, occur, but this is no reason for renouncing the struggle. This would be a serious mistake *since the conflicts are rooted in the interests of social classes, and if the Communists were to renounce the struggle, other forces would take up the vanguard positions.*

The national-liberation movements have to ask themselves just how the United States understand peace and

peaceful coexistence. We are well aware of the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, their open-minded attitude and their desire to see that there is peace and equality for all peoples without any obstacles to development. Has the United States a similar approach? We don't know. There is still much ambiguity in US political theory¹ and in the concrete acts of the US administration.

On the one hand the influence of bold and considered Soviet initiatives supported by progressive world opinion has caused the United States to enter into a dialogue and to take the initial steps towards disarmament by agreeing to dismantle medium-range missiles in Europe. But despite its apparent readiness for agreements with the Soviet Union, the United States has clearly reserved the right to use threats, pressure and intervention against Third World countries. This has been the case with Cuba, Nicaragua and other states.

Peace is impossible without security and independence for all nations. The attitude of imperialism towards peace and detente arouses doubts on the part of the peoples of the Third World.

Recent events have justified these doubts. The Geneva accords opened up the prospect of a fair settlement to the *Afghan* conflict and the Soviet Union has strictly fulfilled its obligations under these accords. The United States, however, has continued supplying arms and equipment to the counterrevolutionaries, encouraging the government of Pakistan in hostile actions against a neighbouring state.

There is constant interference from the US in the internal affairs of Central American countries: bases and troops deployed in *Honduras*; continued support for the *Nicaraguan contras* and relentless pressure on the *Sandinista* government; and efforts to undermine the determination of the people and the defence forces of *Panama* to defend their national sovereignty. This is a clear attempt to turn the *Torrijos-Carter Treaties* on the Canal into a worthless piece of paper and instal a docile government for its own purposes.

The United States has also assumed the role of international gendarme in *Southwest Africa*, where, despite the accords reached between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, it has continued to fund and arm the counterrevolutionary UNITA forces.

The policy of the US administration with respect to *Cuba* has largely been delineated. The Bush Administration has already launched another provocative campaign against the Cuban Revolution, disproving the prediction of some political scientists that it would take a more pragmatic and realistic attitude and indicting that Reagan's approach to the issue is not going to be revised. Anti-Cuban propaganda is being intensified: plans for the so-called *Marti V*

Station represent a further escalation of the 30-year-long aggression on the air waves, a move that patently violates agreements signed by the United States and Cuba as members of the International Telecommunications Union.

The Pentagon's annual military exercises *Global Shield* involved fewer forces in 1989 than in the past, but the number of aircraft threatening Cuba increased. The presence of a submarine off the south coast of Cuba, jets flying close to its air space, and the frequent US protest notes against alleged violations by our armed forces around the Guantanamo Naval Base (the part of our national territory illegally occupied by the United States) have heightened tensions and further complicated bilateral relations.

There is no evidence that the United States is about to abandon its *policy of neoglobalism*, which is an aggressive reaction in the economic, political and military spheres to popular attempts to throw off the yoke of oppression and win national independence. This policy is camouflaged by talk of the need to protect "US interests", and is manifested in the strategy of low-intensity conflicts, which are designed to put down the peoples' struggle for national liberation and independence by means of counter-insurgency operations without the direct participation of US armed forces.

For millions of people in the Third World, the struggle for peace and other universal human interests means resisting the imperialist policy of dividing the planet into spheres of influence, an old idea revived by the US administration and one which is opposed by everyone who supports the right to self-determination and favours a restructuring of international relations on the basis of justice, equality and mutual respect.

The peoples and the revolutionary, progressive movements in the less developed countries need peace, detente and peaceful coexistence. But that is not enough: the Third World also needs *independence and development*, as is evidenced by the demands for a suspension of the external debt, the establishment of a new international economic order, and the integration of Third World countries. The popular masses want the entire system of international relations changed so that they can face the future with confidence.

¹ *A New Inter-American Policy for the 1980s, A Strategy for Latin America in the 1990s*, known as the Santa Fe-I and Santa Fe-II documents, and the *Discriminate Deterrence* report prepared by the commission for formulating a comprehensive long-term strategy.

APARTHEID ON THE RUN

Aziz PAHAD

member of the National Executive Committee, African National Congress (ANC)

Today the apartheid regime is indisputably trapped in a deepening and irreversible crisis. This affects every aspect of that society—economic, political, military and international relations. The situation, which has been brought about largely through the militant mass struggles (political and military) of the peoples of South Africa and Namibia with the support of democratic and progressive forces throughout the world, ensures that the strategic initiative in South Africa rests with us in the ANC.

As we come to the end of the 1980s we can confidently predict that victory is in sight. Our objective is to consolidate the gains we have made, to draw the greatest number of our people into active opposition to the apartheid system and to further isolate the regime. However, we are not complacent and are conscious that we face an adversary that is still strong and continues to enjoy support from powerful forces internationally.

We therefore do not expect quick or easy victories and our strategy is one of a protracted struggle. But given the objective situation in South Africa, in the region and internationally, we must plan and be prepared to seize any opportunity for a sudden transformation.

We believe that we have the capacity and the will to make decisive advances on all these fronts. Why have we reached this conclusion? Are we not being unrealistically optimistic? It is important that we attempt to address these questions because recently there has been much debate about the South African situation and the way forward. The South African clampdown on the media and the almost total restrictions on what can be reported from South Africa, coupled with the compliance of the majority of the international media with these restrictions, have succeeded in imposing a blanket of ignorance on the international community about the real situation in our country.

The regime has created an illusion about its strength, its capacity to maintain "law and order", its successes in destroying democratic organisations, its ability to suppress our people's will to struggle, its success in co-opting sections of the oppressed, its capacity to solve its crises, its commitment to "reform" apartheid, and its commitment to regional peace.

All this has led to the search for "special and unique" solutions. Concepts such as "power sharing", "group rights", "federalism" (South African style), "cantonisation", on the "KwaZulu option" have become popular in many circles. Also, many groups are making demands on the ANC to make political "compromises", and they also wish to determine our methods of struggle.

WHAT IS THE REALITY?

The crisis of the regime is structural and affects every facet of society. This cannot be resolved without fundamental social transformations.

a) Economic

For several years the South African economy has been in a state of decline. The South Africa Reserve Bank's statistics and predictions for the second half of 1987 were so questionable that even the *Financial Mail* (mouthpiece of big business) was forced to conclude that the "picture is confusing and one is left with hopes and wishful thinking". From official statistics, output is rising at about 2% annually. There has been a real decline in investments in the 1980s. For example, the decline in GDFI (Gross Domestic Fixed Investment) in 1986 was 31.3% in the electricity, gas and water sectors; 27.2% in manufacturing; 24.6% in transport, storage and communication; 21.8% in construction; 20.9% in the wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation and 18.1% in agriculture, forestry and fishing.

Any major reorientation of the economy within the present system would require a massive injection of foreign capital. However, the volatile political situation and the imposition of the state of emergency in July 1985 resulted in a financial crash. Brokers described the wave of selling as a "bloodbath". It is estimated that the market value of shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange fell by 11 billion rand. By August 1985 the value of the rand had reached a record low of 34.8 US cents, and many companies increased repatriation of capital. The regime suspended all trading on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and all foreign exchange dealing. The crisis was compounded by the fact that South Africa's short-term debt, due for renewal, was estimated at \$14 billion, and commercial bankers were reluctant to renew the credit lines. Although the bankers reached a compromise with the regime, South Africa still faces a fundamental debt repayment problem.

Population growth and soaring inflation (19-20%) has meant that real income per head is falling. It is now estimated that black unemployment in some areas is over 50%. The ANC and the international solidarity movement have launched a campaign to ensure financial sanctions against the regime.

b) Political

The regime has no viable political strategy. Its attempts to impose racial and ethnic political dispensations such as

the tri-cameral parliamentary system (which gives some form of sham participation to the Indian and Coloured sectors of our community), the Local Authorities Act (an attempt to give Africans some local government participation) and the National Statutory Council, have not only been decisively rejected by our people but have also been catalysts for further organisation and resistance by the people themselves.

In October 1988 the regime called elections for these dummy institutions. They took place under conditions of a state of emergency. Thousands of leaders and activists had been detained or restricted, many organisations had been banned or restricted. For example, it was illegal to call for a boycott of the elections. The regime spent millions of pounds on the campaign, introduced subterfuges like "special" votes and double votes for property owners, instituted a campaign of intimidation by the State and the employers to get people to vote, etc. However, despite the regime's greatest efforts, the people of South Africa boycotted the elections in their millions.

The minority regime is finding it increasingly difficult to run the country. Its failure in the urban areas has been matched by failures in the rural areas. The Bantustan programme (a cornerstone of apartheid policy) is facing its most serious crisis. Not only have there been coups in the Transkei and Bophutatswana (both had to be put down by South African troops), but all the other Bantustans have been riddled with corruption, and the system is only maintained by the use of unprecedented violence. Many of these areas have become hotbeds of resistance and despite the repression, people's organisations are growing in number.

In the coming period our policy is to *work for the total destruction of all dummy institutions and their replacement by organs of people's power.*

The political crisis is further exacerbated by the sharp divisions within the white power bloc. Neofascist organisations like the AWB have been given massive and exaggerated publicity. While not ignoring this phenomenon, one must guard against it being used as a smokescreen to make the National Party look moderate and to argue for a more "reasonable" and "gradual" approach so as not to push the whites into their laager.

We believe that the greater the internal and external pressures, the more possibilities there are for larger sectors of our white compatriots to make a *decisive break with the apartheid system* and join the camp of those fighting for a nonracial democracy, as shown by the growing number of Afrikaner intellectuals, cultural workers, academics and politicians who are rejecting apartheid as a philosophy and are genuinely seeking new solutions.

The growing refusal of white youth to be conscripted into the South African army is another example. In 1988, in a sensational move, 143 white conscripts jointly and publicly refused to serve in the army. They preferred to face stiff jail sentences (we salute David Bruce and Charles Bester who are serving 6 year sentences and Dr Ivan Toms who

was sentenced to 18 months for refusing to serve in the SADF). The number of whites (especially the youth at universities) who are forming democratic organisations and joining them to eradicate apartheid is growing. The number of whites who are joining the ANC and its military wing is on the rise, while members of the white business community are realising that apartheid cannot survive.

The ANC is committed to a united nonracial democratic South Africa. We reject any notion of defining our political dispensation by race, colour or ethnicity. Our revolution will guarantee freedom of speech, assembly, religion, the press and political participation. We believe that this accords with the interests of all South African, black and white. It is therefore the task of the entire democratic movement to *ensure that the divisions within the white power structure are exacerbated and that more whites join the struggle to end apartheid.*

c) International Relations

On February the 25th, 1988, Church leaders representing all denominations in South Africa held an historic meeting to assess the implications of the regime's banning of 17 organisations and the restricting of activities of the nonracial trade union federation COSATU. The leaders stated that "We now hope the international community—and especially South Africa's major trading partners—will wake up to the fact that this illegitimate government is threatening their interests as well as the lives and security of black and white South Africans. It has shown quite clearly that it has nothing to offer but instability and bloodshed. *It must be isolated* to force it off the awful path it has chosen."

These sentiments are shared by hundreds of millions of people throughout the world. The international solidarity movement which supports our struggle continues to grow in strength.

Internationally the apartheid system, like Nazism, has been categorised a crime against humanity in terms of the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. In various other resolutions the UN has declared that apartheid is a threat to international peace and security. The churches have declared apartheid to be a sin and its theological justification a heresy.

Apartheid South Africa has become a pariah and has been expelled from many international political, cultural, sporting, academic and other bodies. But the campaign to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the regime has been thwarted because the major Western powers in the Security Council have consistently used their veto powers. However, many countries (especially the African, Non-Alligned, socialist and Scandinavian countries) have imposed far-reaching sanctions. Also, we have recently witnessed the growth of the antiapartheid movement in many countries. For example, the Dellums Bill in the USA will impose very severe restrictions on economic and other relations with South Africa. In the EEC,

there is growing pressure for stronger measures, and the British government is becoming increasingly isolated on this issue.

The regime's attempts to break out of its diplomatic isolation must be rebuffed. Last year Botha made a much publicised tour of Zaire, Cote d'Ivoire, Malawi, Morocco and Mozambique. There were strong rumours that this was a prelude to a major conference between the South African regime and African states. It was ironic that this initiative was launched at a time when its army and its surrogate forces, the MNR and UNITA, were causing untold death and destruction in the region, when hundreds of opposition leaders in South Africa were being arrested, and when new draconian measures were being introduced further curtailing political activities. The ANC condemned Botha's jamboree and warned that this was a subterfuge to gain credibility and legitimacy and that it posed a danger not only to the South Africa people but to Africa as a whole. The OAU rightly criticised such contacts and called for increased vigilance against South Africa's manoeuvres.

Some people are arguing that the apartheid regime's involvement in the regional settlement in Southern Africa reflects a changing and more peaceful and democratic attitude. This is not true. The regime's participation in the talks on Angola and Namibia stems from South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. Its troops and mercenary forces have been constantly invading Angola and occupying part of its territory since Angola's independence in 1975. Despite all of South Africa's efforts to sabotage the talks, an agreement was finally concluded in December 1988. It is clear that the regime was forced to negotiate only after it had suffered military setbacks in Angola and the military balance of forces had changed decisively in favour of Angola and the Cuban internationalist forces. The myth of an invincible white supremacist army has been laid to rest, and this can have an important bearing on developments in the region.

The ANC sees the agreement as an advance of great strategic significance for the region and for our struggle. We are therefore determined to do everything possible to facilitate its implementation. In this context, in consultation with the Government of Angola and other Frontline States, we have agreed to move our military camps and personnel from Angola.

The Frontline States, SWAPO and the ANC are genuinely committed to peace, stability and development in the region. But we are painfully conscious of the apartheid regime's past record of renegeing on international agreements. Therefore, we must ensure that the Namibian settlement is not used to confer legitimacy on the apartheid regime.

There are still many areas of concern. South Africa will retain control of Walvis Bay. The major military base, Rooikop, is located there and what will stop South Africa from relocating more troops there? Also, the Pretoria-appointed Administrator General Louis Pienaar will be jointly responsible with UN representative for the implementation

of resolution 435. But Pienaar will have sole responsibility for law and order. This is to be enforced by the existing, South Africa-controlled, South West Africa police. The South Africans are incorporating the notorious South African counter insurgency unit, Koevoet, into the police force. Under these circumstances it is regrettable that the UN Security Council has agreed to cut the size of the UNTAG forces. The ANC calls on the international community to provide all possible assistance to SWAPO, and to ensure that fair and free elections are held.

THE REGIME'S ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE

In a hopeless effort to save the moribund apartheid system, the regime has launched an unprecedented reign of terror. In 1986, a Progressive Federal Party (a white parliamentary opposition group) investigation found that "in South Africa there existed a jackboot mentality at its worst ... there is random beating and shooting without any plan or objective".² The state of emergency imposed on the 20th July 1985 is still in effect, and all indications are that this will continue for some time. In the last four years more people have been detained, tortured, restricted or killed than at any other time in the regime's 40 years of rule.³

Many new regulations restrict political activity. However, the regime has failed to cow our people into submission. The masses are refusing to live in the old way and, for them, love of life has become synonymous with love for freedom.

The capacity of the masses to respond to the new challenge was dramatically demonstrated by several events in 1988. For example, in June the entire country was brought to a standstill when millions of our people—workers, students, academics, and businessmen—went on strike. This was the most successful 3-day strike ever organised in South Africa. In November there was a massive boycott of the elections and a conference was organised to build a broad coalition of anti-apartheid forces. Over 70 organisations (black and white, from urban and rural areas) representing millions of people were expected to participate. The regime's banning of the conference was a clear indication that the spectre of the masses and their organisations haunted the ruling circles. Efforts to launch a broad coalition continue, and the ANC fully supports this.

The ANC has been banned since 1960, but today its programme, the Freedom Charter, has been adopted by almost all the major nonracial organisations and trade unions. It is generally accepted that the ANC is central to any solution of the South African problem. This position has been achieved through struggle and will only be maintained through struggle. Our slogan "ADVANCE IN STRUGGLE" has more relevance today than at any other time. We are advancing through mass political and armed struggle towards people's power.

Today, there is much talk about a negotiated solution in South Africa. Western governments and organisations are taking many initiatives to achieve this. Unfortunately, little

is said about how the regime is going to be brought to the negotiating table, and less is being done to achieve this objective. The ANC has never opposed a negotiated settlement. Our history is full of attempts to resolve the issue of apartheid through negotiations. We have always been ready and willing to enter into genuine negotiations to transform our country into a united nonradical democracy.

However, we are convinced that the apartheid regime, at this moment, has neither the desire nor the intention to engage in any meaningful negotiations. This view was confirmed by the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group: "It is our considered view that, despite all appearances and statements to the contrary, the South African government is not yet ready to negotiate ... except on its own terms. Those terms, both regarded as objectives and modalities, fall far short of reasonable black expectations and well accepted democratic norms and practices."

The ANC therefore believes that the regime is pursuing two major objectives—firstly, to defuse the struggle by holding out false hopes of a genuine political settlement and, secondly, to gain legitimacy for itself and defeat the mounting campaign for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. The regime remains intransigent on the realities of negotiations because it believes that major Western governments will not take effective and decisive action against it. The regime is refusing to negotiate, not because there is an armed struggle, but because it is not willing to give up *white minority domination*. If the key to negotiation were in our hands we would have used it. The demand on us to cease or suspend the armed struggle, or unilaterally proclaim a moratorium, will do nothing to bring about negotiations.

It is strange and ironic that in the face of South African intransigence, and even after the events of the last few months, there are

still strident voices accusing us of terrorism and condemning our use of the armed struggle.

For almost 50 years we carried out a non-violent struggle. Throughout this period our resistance was met with increased violence. As early as 1952, Nelson Mandela said that as the struggle intensified, "all constitutional rights are being thrown overboard and individual liberties are being suppressed. Lynchings and pogroms are the logical weapons to resort to. The spectre of Belsen and Buchenwald is haunting South Africa." Subsequent events have proved how prophetic these words were.

At a meeting in February 1988, South African Church leaders stated: "We believe the restrictions represent a desperate attempt by weak people to hold onto power in

the face of ever increasing determination by the oppressed of our country to bring about justice, democracy and peace. The government's drastic and brutal action removes all effective means ... of working for true change by peaceful means, and if there is a violent reaction to its action, this government must take the responsibility."

The regime had decreed that to resist oppression in any way is illegal. What choice did we have but to take up arms? There is no constitutional provision guaranteeing us our inalienable right to fight for our freedom peacefully. We are excluded from all political processes and presently there exist no constitutional possibilities to change this brutal reality. We are forced to choose whether to submit and surrender or face this challenge. We have chosen to fight back both politically and militarily. Today, despite the most intense repression in our history and the continuing problems of not having a secure and contiguous rear base, guerrilla attacks in South Africa have reached record levels.⁴

FROM A PRESS STATEMENT BY ANC PRESIDENT OLIVER TAMBO

The five-year plan placed before the National Party conference by President-elect FW de Klerk in June 1989 is a shocking insult to the people of South Africa. As we have repeatedly warned, FW de Klerk has nothing better on offer than a refurbished version of apartheid—"a reformed apartheid". Consistent with the central dogmas of that system, De Klerk insists on establishing and reaffirming race as the basic plank of the constitution. Political rights will continue to be defined on the basis of race.

In other words apartheid, in its essentials, will be retained. Legislative power based on separate racially defined bodies is to be entrenched through the device of group rights written into the constitution. This elevation of group rights, above the rights of the individual, is the essence of apartheid. Behind this are two basic principles that De Klerk and his party adamantly refuse to relinquish:

- There shall be no majority rule.
- There shall not be any fundamental change.

De Klerk will maintain the fundamental features of the apartheid system—separate schools, separate group areas and the division of the African population through bantustans and "independent homelands".

The ANC President has said in a press statement on this score: "Every aspect of the National Party's platform is deliberately designed to convey the impression of change, while regaining the hegemony of the racist minority. The oppressed are to be given the shadow of power while its substance remains exactly where it is today..."

Had the National Party any serious intention of moving our country forward it would at least have addressed the demands of the overwhelming majority of our people:

- Unconditionally free Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners.
- End the State of Emergency and remove all troops from the townships.
- Lift the bans on all political organisations and repeal all repressive legislation.
- Permit the return of exiles.
- End all political executions.

These demands have won the support of millions throughout the world who are genuinely interested in the transformation of South Africa...

Only an intensification of the struggle on all fronts, and an international campaign for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa, will hasten the dawn of freedom in that country."

Millions of our people have accepted the legitimacy of the armed struggle and, in a real sense, it is rooted amongst the masses. The possibilities of intensifying the all-round struggle is greater today than at any other time. There exist real possibilities for advances on all fronts. The people must be drawn into action through day-to-day issues, and we plan to organise and mobilise for militant mass defiance of many aspects of the system. For example, the state of emergency, the group areas act, rents, forced removals, conscription to the SADF, etc. "The alternative power is as real today as it is impossible to vanquish in the future. It is becoming impossible to avoid confronting the question of the legitimacy of the powers that are contending with each other. These two cannot coexist, as fascism and democracy could not. One must give way to the other. Our common action should proceed from the starting point that we seek to totally eradicate the apartheid system in the shortest time possible, and with minimum cost in terms of loss of lives and destruction of property", Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, said in 1987.

At this crucial and decisive stage there can be no appeasement of apartheid. We must mobilise for the total isolation and eradication of apartheid South Africa.

¹ All these are political manoeuvres based on the separation of the races and aimed at preserving white minority rule.—*Ed.*

² PFP Monitoring Group Report 1986.

³ In this period, it is estimated that over 50,000 people have been detained (many were subjected to severe torture); more than 4,000 have been killed by the paramilitary forces or by the regime-sponsored and -aided vigilante groups. A new and alarming feature is the systematic and institutionalised war that has been declared against children. Between 1984 and 1986, 312 children were killed by the police; over 1,000 wounded; and more than 11,000 detained under regulations which deny legal rights or access to parents and lawyers; more than 18,000 arrested and awaiting trial for "unrest". During 1988, 34 political, educational and youth organisations were banned.

⁴ In 1986 the regime acknowledged that there were 230 guerrilla attacks—this was double that of the previous year and 5 times higher than in 1984. In 1988 the regime was forced to admit that nearly 300 attacks had taken place.

CAN AFRICA FEED ITSELF?

Many countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, face a food problem. According to FAO figures, although overall food production on the continent has risen by 20% over the last decade, it has in fact dropped by 11% in per capita terms. In the mid-1980s, several African countries suffered famine as a result of severe drought, the consequences of which are still being felt.

There are some encouraging signs, however. Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, has said that decent weather conditions allowed for a real improvement in food supply in 1988. Food production increased by 3.8% on the previous year, while population growth was 3%. Yet the indications are that drastic change is still a long way off. The crisis is being perpetuated by many factors, including the African countries' huge external debt, which reached \$230 billion last year; regional and domestic conflicts and the policy of destabilisation pursued by the South African regime towards the Frontline States have also played their part.

FACTORS OF FOOD INSECURITY

Ibrahim F. SHAO
Senior Lecturer,
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From independence to the early 1970s, Tanzania was almost self-sufficient in major food staples (maize, rice and wheat). Since that time, however, serious difficulties have arisen.

It is a shame that a country like Tanzania, endowed with abundant human and natural resources, should suffer from what I would call food insecurity. The main reason for this, I think, is not the weather, but economic planning and management failures.

To begin with, the country has a total of 36 million hectares of arable and cultivable land, but only 6 million hectares, or 17%, is actually cultivated. The larger part of our chief resource, arable land, has not been put to use.

The causal factors of food insecurity are natural and sociopolitical. The former are easy to identify: the acute droughts of 1973-1974 and 1984-1985 forced Tanzania to import a lot of food. This entailed a serious balance of

payments crisis because the declining export crops (both in output and in world prices) could not offset that spending. Another external factor was the Ugandan war¹ of 1978-1980, which cost Tanzania \$500 million.

Natural factors are beyond human control, of course, but the situation could have been managed better with proper planning, an efficient irrigation system and the encouragement of the production of drought-resistant food crops.

Since independence the government has been paying more attention to the urban sector at the expense of agriculture, and within agriculture emphasis has been on cash crops rather than food crops. Until 1982, an average of 20% of the total budget was allocated to agriculture, and only in recent years has this share been raised to 30%. Meanwhile, the government has been subsidising food prices for the urban population. Imported food has always been confined to the urban sectors, particularly Dar es Salaam, with very little finding its way to the rural sector.

All this tended to keep the morale of food producers low, and the majority produced just enough for their own needs. Any surplus was either sold on the "parallel" (i.e., black) market, or smuggled across the border. That situation persisted from 1980 to 1985, until the country adopted an economic recovery programme with some emphasis on incentives to food producers. However, because of the position of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), most of the incentives are directed to foreign exchange earners (cash crops) rather than to food producers. With this trend, food insecurity is bound to grow worse.

The government's price policy has encouraged the consumption of rice, maize and wheat, the national production capacity of which is low, at the expense of traditional cereals like cassava, millet and sorghum, although these could have helped offset crop failures.

Apart from that, the National Milling Corporation, which is a government organisation, and the Cooperative Unions have been inefficient and ineffective in collecting food grains from surplus areas like Mbeya, Iringa, Rukwa and Ruvuma (the Big Four) to feed deficit areas. In 1980-1985, the government set up road blocks and check-points to enforce by-laws that prevented the movement of food grain from one region to another. There still are large maize grain stocks lying in the villages of the Big Four because the Cooperative Unions do not have lorries to haul the grain to the market, while private transporters would not venture into the business because of the bad roads.

Inefficient marketing, lack of organisational ability and inadequate transport and storage facilities have led to huge harvest losses, those for 1976-1977 amounting to 500,000-600,000 tons, or the equivalent of the total maize imports for three crop failure years (1979-1982).

In sum, food insecurity is a result of the interplay of a conglomerate of climatic, ecological, social, economic, cultural, political and administrative factors. But the problem seems to hinge on the *role of the state* in planning and pursuing food and nutrition policies.

The situation has improved over the past few years as the government's two agricultural and food supply programmes have begun to pay back. Under these, seed stocks have been improved, better cultivation, irrigation and mechanisation methods introduced, better use of fertiliser achieved, storage facilities improved, etc. Food imports have been declining since 1985, and in fiscal 1987-1988 no maize at all was imported because surplus maize production made it possible to lay in store 80,000 tons.

Two years ago the government liberalised trade between regions: all roadblocks and check-points were removed; private traders were allowed into food distribution; and the Cooperatives became more active. As a result, the food market expanded, and peasants were inspired to produce more. Characteristically, an increase in producer prices caused sales on the free market to drop because peasants preferred to sell their surplus to the state.

Problems persist, however. There still are erratic crop failures, and the government has to send food relief to the affected regions. The government and cooperatives do not have the vehicles to haul crops, and private transporters cannot be used because of bad roads and a lack of funds.

Of course, food is more than just grain. Without shifting the emphasis from maize, rice and wheat, the country can encourage the production of traditional food staples, as well as vegetables, fruit, beans and potatoes. There are good opportunities for expanding livestock-breeding: Tanzania has approximately 12 million cattle, 5.5 million goats, and 3.6 million sheep, and also fish and other water and sea animals which can provide a lot of protein domestically. I repeat, the problem hinges on efficient planning and administration and the wise use of national resources.

RESOURCES MUST BE USED TO MEET REAL NEEDS

Mathurin Coffi NAGO

Vice Dean, National University of Benin

African countries are being forced to increase their food imports, and are thus incurring new debts. In 1979, for instance, Benin's export earnings paid for 80% of imports, but now the figure has dropped to 50%.

The problem is difficult to resolve because of ecological factors, such as desertification and deforestation—tendencies which cannot be reversed overnight. Irrigation systems, although an effective means of controlling the drought, are very costly.

Governments and specialists in Africa should draw up and put into effect development programmes that would take into account the potential and circumstances of every country. Urgent measures, even on a small scale, are

needed now. For example, thousands of peasants lack even the most primitive farm tools and implements. An exhibition in Harare during the Africa Food and Nutrition Congress featured tools—scythes, sickles, plows, harrows, cultivators and basic grain storage facilities—which could be assembled in any village from locally-found materials... We must also encourage the cultivation of traditional cereals, grown on the continent for centuries. As for the new ones, maize and wheat, which could boost our exports, their efficient cultivation depends on instructing peasants in advanced techniques and supplying them with fertilisers and machinery.

However difficult the situation and however bleak the immediate prospects for a number of regions, a great deal can be achieved if there is the political will to draft and carry through real agricultural development programmes.

Benin has now introduced a policy of zoning agricultural development. This is important because when efforts are centralised on a national scale, important aspects of local development are often ignored.

Agriculture is not isolated from social and economic life in general. Rural progress requires good health care and hygiene services, because the farmers must be healthy. It is very important to have good marketing opportunities, that is, to develop roads and a transport infrastructure. Otherwise food production will never improve.

The situation in the country has been looking up in the past few years. Plans for improved crop-growing, livestock-breeding, road-building, storage facilities and crop processing have been included in agricultural projects worked out for each of the six administrative provinces.

Unfortunately, the early programmes were misdirected because they were funded mostly by international organisations, such as the World Bank, which usually push ahead with their own policy and, like a bad physician, prescribe the same remedy, the expansion of export-oriented production, to every patient. As a result, there were shortages of food for domestic consumption. But no country can make progress without first feeding its population, and to do this it has to know what to produce, where and how. That is why new projects are encompassing a range of factors and learning from past mistakes. At our university we have a department training agronomists and other specialists under a programme designed exclusively to resolve the food problem.

It is my belief that Africa has good opportunities adequately to supply the population with food. But certain conditions must be met in order to make use of these. Firstly, I repeat, it is the matter of *political will*, something which is increasingly being displayed in the countries of the continent and on the part of international organisations. It should be remembered, however, that an agrarian development strategy requires huge resources.

The Harare Food and Nutrition Congress listed the main reasons behind hunger and malnutrition in Africa, among them civil wars within individual countries and conflicts between them. They make food self-sufficiency absolutely

impossible. Instead of building up national economic potential, many governments are paying through the nose for costly weapons. *There must be no wars in Africa*. Internal peace and stability are vital if development plans are not simply to remain on paper.

THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Professor Tola ANTINMO
Director of the Department of Nutrition,
University of Ibadan (Nigeria)

The food and nutrition problem in Africa is caused by the inadequate food supply, the very low purchasing power of the people, the polluted environment and also, more importantly, by the lack of knowledge about how best to use the available resources. This combination of factors has led us to a disastrous situation. Infant mortality is growing, people are dying in their thousands in rural areas hit by floods or drought, and millions are starving, with no hope of ever feeding themselves and their families.

The low level of farm production is bad in itself. To make it worse, people do not have very good methods of preserving, storing and processing their produce, and roughly 30% per cent of the food that is produced never reaches the consumer. The market situation is important as well. Prices in Nigeria are so high that the ordinary consumer cannot afford to buy food. Although the country is 80% self-sufficient in food, the people's buying power is so low that barely 60% of the produce brought to the urban markets from the rural areas is sold. Even if the market were saturated, many people would still starve. So, in encouraging production in order to meet the demand in full, we should remember that the prices must be affordable to all, or malnutrition will persist in Nigeria and other countries with low living standards.

What is needed in the present situation is for governments and international agencies to come to the assistance of the peasant-farmer, because the peasant-farmer still produces more than half the food we eat in Africa. Governments and international agencies must provide inputs of fertilisers, very simple implements for work on the farm, and an infrastructure of roads and transport to enable the farmer to haul his produce to the market. It is important to develop storage facilities, not the huge grain elevators used in the developed countries, but small facilities capable of properly preserving harvested crops. Last but not least, farmers must be helped to earn reasonable incomes from their farm produces.

There are many special programmes going on in Nigeria. First, the government is tackling the food problem

through an Integrated Rural Development Programme designed to make rural areas more accessible. To this end the government is building roads and storage facilities so that farmers can come together in cooperatives and use them. The government is willing to buy any surplus grain at a reasonable price. It is also encouraging surplus food production for export to earn some foreign exchange—to buy fertilisers to boost agricultural production, for instance. Because most African countries have to rely on imports, high fertiliser prices hurt Africa badly.

Cooperation among African countries in agriculture leaves much to be desired. From what I hear, it is well organised in East, Central and Southern Africa. Zimbabwe is setting a good example by producing surplus maize and shipping it to neighbouring countries. What we have in

West Africa is unofficial cross-border transportation and exchange of farm produce—smuggling. Grain produced in Nigeria finds its way to Benin, for example. Why not do it on an official basis, so that each country can trade bread for butter?

Generally, my opinion is that *Africa can feed itself* on condition that governments meet farmers' needs and that regional and international cooperation in agriculture develops across the board.

¹ In April 1979, Tanzanian troops and the forces of the Uganda National Liberation Front established on Tanzanian territory toppled the Idi Amin regime.—Ed.

* * *

UNITY AND STRUGGLE IN THE POLICY OF ALLIANCES

Enrique RODRIGUEZ
CC member, Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU)

The government of President Julio Maria Sanguinetti, the first civilian administration in Uruguay since the fall of the military dictatorship, is nearing the end of its term, and all the political and public organisations in the country are energetically preparing for the general election scheduled for late November.

The democratic forces are mainly opposed to the government's socioeconomic policy, which they view as conservative, antinational and antipeople. The administration, the ruling Colorado Party, and the National Party which joined it in effect blocked even the modest programme of reforms formulated in the "Programme Accord", which underlined the political and organisational unity of the forces opposed to the dictatorship. And *cooperation between the left opposition and the government in domestic politics actually became impossible* after December 1986, when Parliament approved a law to pardon military personnel involved in human rights violations under the dictatorial regime.

In this situation Communists consider it a priority to unite all the social groups, parties and public movements aspiring to effective change and progressive policies in order to rid the country of its dependence on foreign powers, to strengthen national sovereignty, to democratise

the foundations of state institutions, to abolish the arbitrary sway of transnationals and to create the conditions for the free development of Uruguay.

At the 1985 national conference the PCU formulated its policy line as "strengthening democracy, going further along the road of democracy". It envisaged an amnesty for all political prisoners, the restitution of their rights to those persecuted under the dictatorship, compensation for any damage caused, and the restructuring of politics along democratic lines. "Going further along the road of democracy" meant seeking an alignment of forces which could make it possible to form a broad-based government, and advancing the policy of alliances with a view to forming a bloc capable of establishing and defending people's power. "To us the task of defending and broadening democracy is both a tactical and a strategic one in identifying historical goals," the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of Uruguay (December 1988) stressed in its resolution.¹

Our party has always been willing to use any opportunity for cooperation, on both particular and more general issues, with any force opposed to reaction. But such cooperation presupposes a common stand on at least the basic urgent problems of concern to the mass of people. That is why the PCU is advocating measures to improve the living standards of industrial and agricultural workers, the middle strata, pensioners, etc. We believe that the *struggle of the working class for their rights and urgent demands broadens democracy*: what is the worth of democracy if the working people are suffering from unemployment and poverty?

In pressing for real change in order to resolve the urgent problems confronting the people, the Communists support any democratic reform and any protest against reactionary policies. At the same time *we are not prejudiced against the conservatively-minded sections of the population*, that is, against all those who follow the "traditional" bourgeois

parties. Nor do we rule out the possibility of positive differentiation amongst them, which will enable joint actions in specific areas of the struggle for peace, democracy and national independence.

The PCU consistently stresses the need for class unity amongst the working people and objects to their artificial division into factions. We argue that under capitalism workers and employees, regardless of their politics or wages, are hired slaves of capital. They are not divided into "rightists", "centrists" and "leftists" but on roughly the same terms face the common enemy, that is, the capitalist monopolies, big landowners and their henchmen.

Of course, some viewpoints current amongst the working people differ from ours. We engage in constructive and democratic dialogue to defend our ideas, our political positions and our right to criticise other people's opinions, but do so in a way that helps people understand each other, forge unity and establish relations of trust and equality in the struggle for solutions to common problems.

The urgent need for change in Uruguayan society makes it incumbent upon the PCU to analyse and accurately define the *theoretical basis and practical foundations of the policy of alliances*. The idea is to attune it better to the Communists' current and long-term objectives so that the party should "know as exactly as possible with whom it can go into battle, which of its allies is unreliable and who is its real enemy".²

The party elaborates and pursues its policy of alliances on the basis of the principles formulated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. But life does not stand still, and we try to respond to every tiny shift in the sociopolitical situation, in social consciousness and in mass mentality, and to use flexible tactics in improving the old forms of relations with real and potential allies and in creating new ones.

The approach to alliances in Uruguay has varied from one period to another, but has always borne the imprint of national specifics. Yet those variations have remained secondary to Lenin's essential premise: a *party can accomplish its revolutionary mission only by efficiently winning a mass ally*. "Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism *in general*,"³ Lenin noted in his *"Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder*. The broader the party's base for alliances, the stronger its positions in society and the better the prospects for the changes it is advocating.

Practice shows that unity among mass democratic forces never occurs spontaneously but has to be fought for consistently from day to day. We try to sense the needs and judge the mood of the working people and take into account the general level of their political consciousness and militancy. Conducting a dialogue with other political forces, we consider it important to test our ideas and policies against public opinion and to make people understand that *far-reaching social change is impossible without the PCU*. Finally, we want people to realise that the Communist Party articulates their needs and hopes.

The Marxist-Leninist strategy of alliances is a science based on the objective analysis of specific historical circumstances, national features, and the experience of the international anti-imperialist movement. Just like its derivative, communist tactics, this strategy requires "a precise analysis of the position and interests of the various classes",⁴ and full regard for the totality of factors of social development and their interaction at any given moment.

The PCU attaches much importance to the changes in the structure of society resulting from the development of the country's productive forces and from scientific and technological progress. On the one hand the party's unitary policy is differentiated depending on the situation in hand and the specific interests of various groups of the working people, while on the other it takes account of those points of contact between such groups which make it possible to identify their common needs and goals and to build social and political alliances in concrete forms.

Our invariable priority is the strengthening of the *cohesion of the working class* as the core and vanguard of the drive for unity among the democratic and progressive forces. But the party of the working class should be able to find the ways and means of reaching agreement with other democratic movements, and of building a left majority in order to enable it to play the role of political leader.

The broader involvement of intellectuals is a precondition for success here. In today's Uruguay they constitute a major social stratum which exerts considerable influence on the moulding of social consciousness. In its work with intellectuals the PCU tries to avoid sectarianism, instead clarifying real processes in constructive discussions so as to strengthen the communist movement and the positions of all the left forces.

We are also attaching far more importance to *work amongst youth*. Students are a great potential force in such countries as ours. Communists have won strong positions in universities, other educational establishments, and among working-class youth, and more and more young people are joining the party: 82% of the several tens of thousands of those who have come to us over the past few years are between 18 and 40 years of age.

Many young people have become leaders of grassroots organisations. Some of them lack experience and political maturity, and our task today is to educate them so that they can work on their own and respond promptly to changing circumstances and new problems.

In tackling new tasks, we bear in mind the lesson of history: the *right combination of social and political factors is extremely important in the strategy and tactics of alliances*. Practice shows that political alliances without a social base are worth little: they are weak and do not last long. On the other hand, social alliances which are not formalised politically in a front, bloc or coalition do not work and constitute a promise of unity rather than its reality.

However extensive the objective communality of the circumstances and interests of classes and strata, the

policy of alliances is pursued in practice not through their concrete cooperation, but through social movements and sociopolitical coalitions which unite various forces on a certain platform. There are no recipes for creating such a platform, which always depends on the specific situation and the demands of the moment.

In this sense the most important factors in Uruguay today are the consequences of the economic crisis, which subject the working people to deprivation and make them join forces in defending their rights. The progressive forces also have a common interest in overcoming the country's dependence on the United States and international imperialism as a whole. Democratisation after years of reactionary rule is another important issue.

The vigorous mass movement, which relied on resistance to the dictatorship and the growing working-class and trade union movement, made it possible to abolish dictatorial rule by political methods, but the accession of a civilian government following the 1984 general election brought about only a partial democratisation of social life. Vestiges of the past must be fully eradicated to assure progress on that road. That is why the Broad Front⁵ (FA) opposed the government's decision to pardon *all* the military under the 1986 "Non-Liability Law", which relieved army personnel from responsibility for the offences and crimes they had perpetrated under the dictatorship. Almost two years of fierce debate on the problem culminated in a plebiscite on April 16. Although it is a rankling problem with thousands of Uruguayans, the law remained in force. In Montevideo, the home city of 1.3 of the 3 million Uruguayans, where the progressive and democratic forces are especially strong, the opponents of the pardon (known as the "greens" from the colour of the ballot papers they cast) pulled ahead of the "yellows" (54 versus 41.7%), but the referendum was decided by the conservative voters of the country's interior agrarian regions: the "yellows", with 62% of the votes, were far ahead of the "greens", with a little more than 28%.

The results of the referendum prompt two conclusions. Firstly, the nation with its reawakened civic consciousness has turned away from executioners, and is resolved never to allow another authoritarian regime. Secondly, the *majority support the legal "forgive and forget" (which nevertheless does not rule out moral censure) in order to maintain and carry on the process of democratisation in the country.*

The Communists' clear-cut stand is that the army should participate in the democratic process if it is to proceed normally. Naturally, not all the members of the armed forces are criminals, but those who tortured and killed patriots, suppressed public protests and robbed the country for the benefit of foreign monopolies ought to pay for their crimes. "The objectives of this legislation go beyond its legal and moral consequences; it is essential to the ruling circles' political objective of fully integrating the army into the model created by them, and of preserving the distance between the army and civilian society."⁶

The aggravation of the political situation in the country also affected the left movement, including the Broad Front: the Party for a Popular Government and the Christian Democratic Party first quietly distanced themselves from the Front, and in May 1989 openly left it. There were a number of reasons behind their move, including their fear of opposing the conservatives' programme, their meekness in the face of the seemingly omnipotent authorities, insidious anticommunism, vicious divisive propaganda carried on by the mass media in the service of the financial oligarchy and the pressure of the international social democratic and Christian democratic circles.

As we see it, the split was caused not by the sectarianism of the Communist Party or other progressive members of the Front, or their failure to take a constructive stand that would cement unity, but by the class-motivated objectives and political interests of some of the left bourgeois parties. Not all the members of the two breakaway parties backed their withdrawal from the Front, and they themselves were split: two influential groups of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, including senators, deputies and leading trade unionists, withdrew from their parties and formed their own groupings within the Broad Front.

Moreover, two more movements, the National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) and its spinoff March 26 Movement, pledged support for the Front's programme and applied for membership. Both emerged in the 1960s within the frame of the "urban guerrilla movement", and now their leaders have been released and they themselves legalised by the authorities. They consist mostly of young people, students, women and some worker groups.

In this situation the Communist Party is consistently popularising the *Broad Front as a democratic alternative to the former political, economic and social model of development.* The Front is capable of rallying a popular majority around itself, assuming government, and implementing a programme of far-reaching changes in the interests of the people, national independence and genuine democracy. Eventually, it can alter the balance of forces in a way that will make it possible to introduce a *fundamentally new stage of advanced democracy*, which in turn will lead to profound anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist transformations.

In June 1989, the First Special Congress of the Broad Front approved its electoral platform, which constitutes a detailed programme of socioeconomic transformations in the interests of the working people. It envisages more energetic efforts for the further consolidation and spread of democratic processes and for national sovereignty and economic independence; proposes effective measures to relieve Uruguay's economic troubles, primarily to contain inflation and prices and to settle the external debt problem fairly; and aims at a series of reforms, including the guaranteed right to work, to social security, to pay rises pegged to the growing cost of living, measures to control the housing crisis, and jobs for young people.

To the Communists the Broad Front policy is not an opportunistic manoeuvre but a long-term strategy. That is why the PCU has always advocated a calm and serious discussion of problems without polemics in public. We say that the strengthening of the Broad Front is the duty of all its member parties and call for settling differences in the spirit of mutual respect. *The Communists want the continued unity of the coalition to be the main goal of our discussions.*

Democracy in political alliances is the most important unifying factor because it helps identify centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. It is impossible to avoid internal contradictions in a coalition because they are rooted in the antagonisms of bourgeois society. Cooperation involves ideological and sometimes even political differences, which makes it necessary always to try to overcome them, to concert positions and to work out original approaches to new problems. That is why we believe that *unity and struggle do not exclude but complement each other in the activities of the Broad Front of the left and progressive forces.*

The party is thus confronted with the complex task of articulating the common interests of the majority of people and therefore developing contacts with other political forces on the one hand, and preserving its independence in the struggle for democracy and social progress on the other. In pursuing our policy of unity, we are always ready to discuss issues with our partners: we will stick to our principles, but will never undermine the basis of our joint actions.

Class and political alliances of necessity involve compromises, but they must not tie the Communists' hands or prevent them from pursuing an independent policy line and formulating their own political initiatives. Only total clarity in

the members' relationships and positions can guarantee a coalition success in achieving its common goal. That is why *we are working not for a coalition in general but for the Broad Front, with a clear perspective of progressive change.*

We think that the Communist Party should influence the overall orientation of the alliance and keep in touch with the other left trends. In our view, the contradiction between unity in the coalition and the independence of individual parties should be resolved not mechanically, through their mutual exclusion, but dialectically, through their dynamic interaction. The main thing here is to work out a common approach to the key issues of the situation and struggle of the working people.

Campaigning for the next elections has become an important step towards that goal. The PCU believes that it must help strengthen the Broad Front and forge it into a powerful and cohesive force capable of contesting the elections—elections that will largely decide the fate of democracy in Uruguay.

¹ *El Popular*, December 23, 1988.

² V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 473.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 71.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol 11, p. 366.

⁵ Founded in 1971 as an umbrella organisation, the Broad Front initially united the Communist Party of Uruguay, the Christian Democrats, the Party for a Popular Government, the Socialists and several left groupings.—*Ed.*

⁶ *El Popular*, December 23, 1988.



WMR INTRODUCES

GRIGORIS FARAKOS—GENERAL SECRETARY, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREECE (KKE)

At the plenary meeting of the KKE Central Committee in July 1989, Grigoris Farakos was elected General Secretary. He replaces Harilaos Florakis, who becomes Party Chairman.

Born in Nauplia in 1923, Farakos is a power engineer by training, having graduated from the National Technical University of Athens.

During World War II he

worked underground, participated in the Resistance and was wounded. He took part in the activities of the communist youth organisation and in 1941 joined the KKE. In 1961 he became a member of the party's Central Committee, joining the Political Bureau in 1968. After the establishment of the military-fascist dictatorship of the "black colonels" he returned illegally to Greece

from abroad to spearhead the work of the party within the country. In 1968 he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment. The downfall of the military junta in 1974 saw his release. Since then he has regularly been elected a deputy to the national parliament.

From the mid-1970s Grigoris Farakos headed the central organ of the CC KKE—the newspaper *Rizospastis*. He is well-known as an eminent publicist and the author of numerous books and articles, as well as a frequent contributor to *World Marxist Review*.



History of the Communist Movement

“HE KNOWS AND THINKS”

Otto Wilhelm KUUSINEN in the Comintern

As 1989 marks a major anniversary of the Communist International, there is a need to study and reappraise, in the light of new historical experience and new opportunities, all aspects of the work performed by this unique international organisation—its historic accomplishments, its serious mistakes and its variegated impact on past decades and on today's world.

Naturally, more attention is also being paid to the activities of the Third International leaders who shaped its strategy through their personal and collective efforts. Among them was Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen, the founder and leader of the Communist Party of Finland and a secretary of the Comintern who served on its Executive Committee for two decades.

Kuusinen was only 37 when, as a representative of the newly founded Communist Party of Finland, he attended the international meeting which became the Founding Congress of the Comintern. He was a revolutionary in his prime. His extensive experience in the class struggle and his remarkable personal qualities and talents were undoubtedly behind his rapid promotion to the leadership of this international organisation.

At the congress, Kuusinen backed the idea of creating a Communist International and fought vigorously against attempts to question the validity of this decision. He recalled the historic achievement of Karl Marx and his followers in founding the First International. Kuusinen's speech was full of historical optimism, and he was undaunted by the small size of the audience: the strength of the new International, he said, would be

as great as the strength of the revolutionary working class; it would not be confined to the circle of those present at the meeting.

The brief speech he delivered reflects a quality typical of Kuusinen and of his 20 years of work in the Comintern—an extremely serious and thoughtful approach to theory, history and the phenomena and processes present in the working-class movement. A superficial or shallow attitude was alien to him. The comrades who worked at his side, even his political opponents, respected him as a profoundly knowledgeable and hard-working man. Although among his numerous works one may come across different writings which include items “made to order”, most of them are nevertheless permeated with a burning sense of political commitment. Their language is very vivid, particularly when he is addressing Finnish readers. Lenin put his finger on the essence of Kuusinen's theoretical and political work when he wrote in a letter unpublished until the 1950s: “He knows and *thinks*.”¹

The work in the Comintern apparatus fascinated Kuusinen and was a source of priceless experience to him. Surviving documents indicate that he took part to varying degrees in discussions on virtually all important political issues. He was particularly involved in the drafting of the Comintern programme.

At the same time, it is noticeable that the leaders of this highly regarded international organisation sometimes took it upon themselves to tackle issues with which they were not wholly familiar; hence the extremely high probability of mistakes. Kuusinen's report to the 1928

congress of the Comintern on the revolutionary movement in colonies and semi-colonies is a case in point. Looking at aspects of social change in India and China and analysing the development of the class struggle in these countries, Kuusinen concluded that the liberation of colonies from imperialist oppression was impossible without a revolutionary uprising of the working masses there. For the first time in history, Kuusinen maintained, the proletariat would play an independent role in these nations.²

He obviously underestimated the role of the hundreds of millions of peasants and failed to see the national bourgeoisie as a revolutionary force in its own right. Later, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Kuusinen noted that there had been a sectarian streak in the attitude of the 6th Congress of the Comintern to the question of the national bourgeoisie in colonial and semicolonial countries. He welcomed the fact that, after the 20th party congress, the CPSU's practical policies were based on a new assessment of the role played by the leaders of the national bourgeoisie—specifically, by Mahatma Gandhi.

Major changes occurred in the Comintern between 1929 and 1935. By studying the available documents, we can trace the impact of these changes on Kuusinen's thought patterns, particularly with regard to the development of capitalist economic production and the Comintern's policy and strategy.

At the 10th plenary meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI) in July 1929, Kuusinen delivered a report on the international situation and the tasks facing the Communist International. With his usual thoroughness, he analysed the technological aspect of capitalist production and dealt with the problems of increased labour intensity and rationalisation in relation to the nascent crisis of capitalism. But he failed to grasp its in-depth causes and even mistakenly concluded that the crisis might provoke a mass popular swing to the left.

At that time Kuusinen fully shared the Comintern's attitude to social democracy.

He believed that the overall process of fascistisation was affecting the reformist trade union movement and the parties in the Second International. Reformism breeds social-fascism, Kuusinen claimed.³ On the basis of his report, the plenary meeting of the ECCI required all sections to step up their struggle against international social democracy, particularly against its left wing, which was seen as a mortal enemy of the Communists within the working-class movement and as the main impediment to the growth of militancy among the working masses.⁴

Bearing in mind the anticommunist attitudes of the social democratic parties at the time, this assessment was still downright sectarian, and yet this was the reason why a profoundly mistaken course was prescribed for the communist parties.

Four years later (in September 1932) Kuusinen delivered a report at the 12th plenary meeting of the ECCI. This time he spoke about the policy of a united workers' front and about the need for cooperation with grassroots social democratic organisations. It took Hitler's rise to power in Germany (with all this entailed) to make the Comintern revise its earlier course.

On August 22, 1934, Kuusinen addressed a meeting of the preparatory commission of the 7th Comintern Congress, urging a sober reappraisal of the situation in order to prevent "earlier assessments which overestimated the ripeness of the revolutionary crisis" from hindering the revision of communist parties' often ill-advised and misconceived tactics. He called for a rebuttal of misguided leftist and sectarian deviations and for a different attitude to the Social Democrats since they were undergoing important changes, with essentially left groups and currents emerging.

At the 7th Congress of the Comintern, Kuusinen, in a spirit of cooperation and new ideas, delivered an impassioned speech under the heading "Youth and the Struggle Against Fascism and the War Threat." This speech, and his work in 1934-1935 generally, show that he was sincerely dedicated to the defence of the Popular Front policy and to the struggle against fascism and war.

During this period, Kuusinen was in a good position to study the way popular fronts were organised in practical terms. Jacques Duclos recalled how meticulously Kuusinen had studied the Popular Front experience in France: "When I told him about the congress in Villeurbanne

which we were preparing at the time, he came up with a very apt and valid slogan we wanted to put into circulation: 'a free, strong and happy France—the Communists can build it!'"⁵

Another recollection highlights Kuusinen's position then. Walter Ulbricht wrote that "while talking with party representatives at a session of the Executive Committee Presidium in November 1935 about consistent implementation of the decisions of the 7th Comintern Congress on the policy of a united Popular Front, O. W. Kuusinen drew the attention of comrades, particularly German comrades, to the need to win bourgeois opponents of Hitlerism over to our side and to work together with them in the antifascist struggle."⁶

A serious attitude to the policy of creating an antiwar Popular Front also manifested itself at the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Finland, held in the wake of the 7th Congress of the Comintern. At the party congress, Kuusinen delivered a report on work among the masses, fervently advocating the Popular Front policy, rejecting sectarian views and giving practical advice on the creation of a united front. He was particularly insistent that the party should intensify this work in Finland.

After the 6th Congress of the SKP (1935), certain results were achieved in the practical implementation of the Popular Front policy—for example, in the trade union movement, during parliamentary elections and in the struggle to overturn the death sentence on Toivo Antikainen, a well-known leader of the SKP.

Towards the end of the 1930s came the most difficult and critical period in Kuusinen's activities. The Communist Party of Finland was deep in crisis. Its ties with the masses had been severed and its influence on Finnish society and politics was minimal. The reactionary bourgeoisie was dealing painful blows to the party, which had to work underground. Most party cadres were in prison.

But enemy action was not the only reason behind the party's paralysis. This was above all a concomitant of internal developments within the communist movement. How Kuusinen viewed these events we do not know. Nor is it clear how this period affected his role as a member of the Comintern leadership. There is reason to believe that he suffered a personal crisis at the time.

Kuusinen felt the oppressive impact of Stalin's purges. Finnish Communists suf-

fered greatly and several of his close friends and relatives perished. Of those who left Finland with him in 1918 to help found our party, many were murdered. The same fate was to befall SKP Central Committee members elected at the party's 6th Congress who went to work in the USSR.

How did Kuusinen react to this turn of events? Hertta Kuusinen told me that Otto Kuusinen enquired of Stalin about his comrades, but never received any clear reply. This was borne out by Ville Pessi, our Party's General Secretary, at a plenary meeting of the SKP Central Committee in 1956.

No precise assessments of that period by Kuusinen have come down to us. I repeat, that was a time of great losses for the SKP. We only know that this weighed heavily on him for the rest of his life, so much so that he was tempted to quit politics for good.

The abrupt deterioration in Finnish-Soviet relations and the war between the two countries in late 1939 changed the course of Kuusinen's life. When the hostilities began, a so-called popular government led by Kuusinen was set up on the Soviet side of the front line at Terijoki, in the Karelian Isthmus. The government declared its intention of achieving peace between Finland and the USSR and effecting large-scale social transformations in Finland. The establishment of this government received absolutely no support in Finland; moreover, it plunged the Finnish Left into confusion. In the closing stages of the war, which lasted for 14 weeks, the popular government announced that it was ceasing its activities.

It is claimed that the government was formed on the initiative of the SKP Central Committee. But for most of its members it was physically impossible to have shared in the taking of this decision. Party members have long held that the formation of that government was a political and tactical mistake, and this view is upheld by some of its former members. The process of its formation remains largely unclear, as do the motives of Kuusinen's actions during that period. At any rate, the establishment of the government furnished enough grounds for anticommunist attacks and claims that the Communists were not guided by the interests of the Finnish people.

In June 1940, with the "winter war" over, Kuusinen moved to the Karelo-Finland Soviet Socialist Republic and became Chairman of the Presidium of the

Supreme Soviet there. He took no part in the activities of the Comintern during the final stage of its existence. A new period opened in Kuusinen's life: he became one of the leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

After the war, Kuusinen was often critical of certain Comintern decisions. His criticism, however, was not directed against the main political line of the Comintern or the form of its organisation. He was not one of those who had long been aware of the impossibility of directing a major ideological and political movement from a single centre. Kuusinen paid little attention to this problem. During the 1950s and 1960s he welcomed the practice of convening large-scale international conferences of communist and workers' parties.

Throughout his term of office in the Comintern, Kuusinen was an uncompromising enemy of imperialism and of the bourgeois system of values. He championed the cause of working-class emancipation and the idea of workers' international solidarity. He was guided in his work by the ideas of Marx and Engels and by the record of the First International. From his first meeting with Lenin in 1917, Kuusinen always checked all his actions against Lenin's behests.

Nevertheless, in the years of trial for the Soviet Union, Kuusinen did help to promote Stalin's personality cult, backing the idea that the Comintern and its sections should take part in the internal party struggle within the CPSU against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and Bukharin's "right-wing deviation". He wrote articles contributing to the destruction of these groups.⁷ Although Kuusinen was generally a cautious and circumspect man, he could not escape the spirit of the times, his environment or the methods of action acceptable then.

In Finland, public attention has been drawn more than once to Kuusinen. During the 1960s and 1970s students showed an interest in his career and in some political quarters he was regarded as a Soviet political leader.

Bourgeois historians and the bourgeois mass media tend to refer to Kuusinen simply as the head of the government I mentioned earlier, primitive propaganda that would have us believe it was simply an attempt to destroy Finland's independence.

For several decades, Kuusinen's image has been the subject of intense ideological struggle both in Finland and abroad. In parrying reactionary campaigns, the working-class movement

ought to present his life and work as accurately and truthfully as possible, seeing in him an outstanding Marxist, an ardent champion of communist ideals, and a man who accomplished a great deal; but also a man who, like the movement he lived and worked in for sixty years, made mistakes.

Erkki KAUPPILA
Political Bureau member,
Central Committee,
Communist Party of Finland

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 185.

² O. Kuusinen, *Kansainvälistä kysymystä*, Lahti, 1951, p. 147.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁴ See *The Communist International in Documents. 1919-1932*. Edited by Bela Kun, Moscow, 1933, p. 882 (in Russian).

⁵ *Suomalainen internationalisti*, p. 31.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁷ See, for example: O.W. Kuusinen, "The Two Decades of the Communist International", *Pravda*, March 4, 1939; "International Issues. Victory Is Where Stalin Is", *Novoye vremya*, No. 52, 1949 (in Russian).

* * *

CLASS BATTLES IN THE BASTIONS OF CAPITAL

A Survey of the Strike Movement in 1987-1988

The tasks and problems facing the working-class movement in the capitalist countries over the past few years have found specific expression in strikes. Social and political development, which is riddled with contradictions, including different conditions of working-class struggle, has further differentiated the strike movement, with an even tighter intermingling of stimulating and inhibiting factors.

The general rule that strikes are fewer in times of recession and depression, increasing when the outlook is favourable, continues to hold good, but in very different conditions. Thus a thorough analysis of the specific features of the

strike movement in the individual countries is required, with emphasis not so much on the quantitative as on the qualitative characteristics, which are not always adequately reflected in the partial picture of actual developments presented by official statistics. In this way only some strikes are registered, in accordance with definite criteria which also differ from country to country: in the United States, for instance, only those strikes involving over 1,000 persons have been recorded in recent years, while strikes lasting beyond a certain time limit are the only ones recorded in other countries.

With such methods, only approximate

figures, if at all, are given for strikes deviating from these rigid criteria: in 1987, the FRG is said to have had 155,000 strikers, although 1.25 million workers and employees were involved in brief warning stoppages in the metal-working industry alone. There is also a failure to record other expressions of a readiness to struggle, such as notification of major strikes or even of a general strike in the event trade union demands are not met, as was the case, for instance, in Italy in January 1989, when the trade unions gave up the intention of staging a general strike after obtaining concessions from the government.

The purpose of this survey of the strike struggle in the major capitalist countries (with the exception of Japan) is to supplement the official statistics with information that would help form a deeper understanding both of the general trends and of the specific aspects in the development of the strike movement.¹

Let us also note that the processes in these countries are often closely linked to mass class battles in other capitalist countries in which the strike movement is gaining momentum.

In 1987 and 1988, labour unions in the United States continued their struggle for job security and against any further cutbacks in wages and social services.

In February 1987, 5,000 workers at three McDonnell Douglas plants launched a one-day strike to prevent the company reducing social services. In March, almost 10,000 car workers in Michigan downed tools for four days demanding additional measures for health protection and better working conditions. In June and September, tens of thousands of teachers in California, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington and Ohio went on strike for higher wages. On October 11, over 100,000 US citizens staged protests in Washington against the administration's unsatisfactory health care policy. Homeless people have repeatedly staged demonstrations in the major cities.

From March to August 1988, film and TV script writers were on strike in Hollywood for higher pay and better medical services. In August, 9,000 workers in the wood-working industry in the Northwest of the United States struck against earlier decisions to reduce wages. For three months, until October 1988, more than 10,000 workers making submarines at General Dynamics shipyards in Connecticut stayed away from work to secure better working conditions.

In September 1988, the traditional Labour Day was marked by demonstrations for job security and greater social security. Broad protest actions were repeatedly staged against racism, the policy of apartheid in South Africa, and against the US administration's interference in the internal affairs of Latin American countries.

One US Supreme Court ruling in early March 1989 shows just how hard it is for US labour unions to stand up for legitimate worker interests. The court ruled that those who hold jobs at aircraft and railway companies face dismissal for taking part in a strike, with strike-breakers being given priority when applying for jobs. This did much to complicate the strike by the 8,500 mechanics of US Eastern Air Lines in March 1989 against further pay cuts. The unions fear that the court ruling could provide a model for

similar action against strikers in other industries.

The past two years have been marked by diverse social actions on the part of the working class in the **Federal Republic of Germany**. The trade unions believe that long-term mass unemployment is the gravest social problem, and so they have concentrated on job security, calling for a gradual reduction in the length of the working week without any wage cuts. They have set the concrete objective of switching to a 35-hour working week. The trade unions estimate that the struggle for shorter working hours helped both to preserve and to create hundreds of thousands of jobs between 1984 and 1988.

There were long and widespread protest actions and brief stoppages against the planned closure of the steel mills at Hattingen and Rheinhausen. These culminated in a trade union action day on December 10, 1987, when almost 200,000 steel workers, miners and others protested against the planned closure of Krupp's Duisburg-Rheinhausen steel plant. The downing of tools, the blocking of roads and protest rallies and demonstrations were forms of struggle actively supported both by the population and by parties, youth organisations, churches, local authorities and the peace movement. They insisted that the government should take political decisions to improve the state of the steel industry, and while the long struggle did not prevent the closure of the mills at Hattingen and Rheinhausen, the steel workers won a compromise which prevented mass redundancies.

A new basic-rate contract containing provisions for a further reduction in working hours and higher wages was won by the Metal Workers' Union in 1987, thanks to the solidarity of all the unions within the Association of German Trade Unions (DGB), after impressive warning strikes in which almost 1.2 million people took part.

That same year, in the public sector in the FRG numerous protest actions were staged by railwaymen and postal workers against the government's plans to privatise sections of the railways and postal branches. The German Postal Unions (DP) also protested for several days in 1988 against privatisation and job cuts. Some 50,000 people took part in the protest demonstrations organised by the trade union in Bonn on November 16.

Almost 300,000 workers and

employees at state enterprises staged warning strikes in more than 200 cities in the FRG during three days in February 1988 and in March won a new basic-rate contract providing for a phased reduction in working hours and higher wages for more than 4 million workers. Over 100,000 employees took part in a demonstration under the slogan "Work for All—Justice for Each—Act Together!" in Stuttgart on February 27, 1988, in response to a call from DGB. Tens of thousands of people also took part in regional demonstrations. In October of that year more than 2,000 forums, actions and demonstrations were held within the framework of a DGB Action Week to substantiate union demands.

In March 1989, the print and paper workers' union staged powerful week-long warning strikes which led to a new basic-rate contract under which calendar holidays are not to be included in the total length of the working week.

The strike movement in **Britain** in 1987 was markedly stronger compared with the previous year, and remained on roughly the same level in 1988. Most of the strikes were in the services and also in high-tech industries. The strikers' demands were mainly for higher wages, job security and the right of the workforce or trade union members to discuss modernisation problems. The antiunion laws enacted by the Conservative government and used against strikers over the past two years continued to be a formidable obstacle for the British labour movement. Under pressure from these laws and in view of the threat of sequestration hanging over the assets of the print and allied workers' union and of the National Graphical Association, they were forced to call off their unsuccessful year-long strike for jobs by 5,500 workers of News International.

By contrast, nearly 110,000 workers and employees at British Telecom held a successful three-week strike for higher wages in January of that year. In the course of the year, strikes were staged by civil servants, air traffic controllers and customs officers, by bus drivers and mechanics in London, and by postal workers. In mid-year, 14,000 miners held a protest strike against changes by the National Coal Board in their social security agreement.

There was a new wave of strikes among public health workers, dockers and car workers in Britain in early 1988.

In January and February nurses held many local stoppages and one national strike in protest against low wages and understaffing. The government was forced to make considerable concessions.

Seamen manning P & O ferries were on strike from February to May demanding higher wages, better working conditions and no layoffs. The strike was supported by the National Union of Seamen and affected most ports. The High Court in London penalised the seamen's union for holding banned solidarity strikes by impounding its assets and also imposed a large fine for contempt of court.

The two-week strike by 32,500 car workers at 22 plants of the Ford Motor Company was of especial significance for the labour movement in Britain. In defiance of the government's anti-strike laws, all 12 unions represented at the Ford plants acted in concert: the strike not only brought car production to a standstill, but also affected car manufacture at Ford plants in Belgium and the FRG. The British unions took advantage of the highly modernised production to force the Ford management to raise wages and improve social security, and also to promise that any future modernisation measures would be agreed with employees.

Some 140,000 postal workers went on strike in early September against the new wages scheme. On November 7, over 200,000 government employees, supported by dockers and miners, came out in protest against the dismissal of the remaining trade union members from the government communications centre at Cheltenham.

Social confrontations in France in 1987 centred on the public sector. Numerous local and regional strikes were

staged by employees at banks, airlines, post offices and in education. More than 100,000 senior school pupils and students protested in Paris in November against the poor conditions at schools.

In the southwest, miners staged a successful eight-week strike for job security.

There were massive demonstrations for the preservation and extension of the existing social insurance system: over 1 million took part in protest actions in March and May 1987, and also in a na-

struck for several weeks in the spring. Miners of the Gardanne commune, near Marseilles, stayed away from the pits for almost four months to back up their demands for higher wages. Similar demands were made by strikers at the public sector's SNECMA and Michelin. Nurses and hospital attendants were out on strike throughout the country in September and October and forced the government to make concessions. At the end of the year, powerful strikes hit all the

local transport services, primarily in Paris (metro, busses, and suburban trains). Under pressure from the striking workers the government was forced to relax its restrictions on wages and to provide for a gradual increase in pay for almost 5 million employees when the new basic-rate contract was negotiated.

There was a very important strike at the Renault car factory, although it involved only a few hundred men. It began in October, when about 250 workers of a Le Mans plant went on strike for higher pay. This numerically small strike had serious consequences for other Renault plants which depend on the supply of components from Le Mans: the output of cars

dropped from 5,200 to roughly 1,000 a day. The technological effects of this limited strike in the integrated producer systems—as in the case of the Ford plants in Britain earlier that year—jeopardised Renault's profits and forced it to make concessions. Wages (as they stood at the end of 1987) were raised for 189,000 workers.

Hundreds of thousands were involved in the massive actions staged in May and September called by the General Confederation of Labour (CGT). A national action week was held by public sector employees in the autumn.

Strikes in the Leading Capitalist Countries

A—Number of strikers (1,000);

B—Number of working days (1,000) lost through strikes

		1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
United States ¹	A	376	324	529	174	91*
	B	8,499	7,428	12,215	28,959	3,923**
FRG	A	537	78	113	155	33**
	B	5,618	35	27	34	40**
France	A	496	271	258	222	242*
	B	1,317	731	569	501	836*
Britain	A	1,436	643	538	885	569*
	B	27,135	6,402	1,920	3,546	3,533*
Italy ²	A	7,356	4,843	3,607	4,272	1,046***
	B	60,923	26,815	39,506	32,240	14,193****

¹ Since 1982 only strikes involving over 1,000 persons.

² Italian statistics record working time lost through strikes in terms of hours.

* October incl.

** September incl.

*** June incl.

**** July incl.

tional day of action for jobs, higher wages and trade union rights in October.

In 1988, there was a further increase in the number of strikes and protest actions, mainly for higher wages, and against any further dismantling of jobs and social service cuts. Most of the protest actions were addressed to the government, which was proposing an austerity programme at the expense of the working people. Numerous local strikes throughout the year affected various spheres of the public sector in Paris and other cities.

Employees of Sealink, which operates ferry services across the English Channel,

In Italy a large number of local, regional and short-term strikes, mainly in various spheres of the public sector and transport, were to be seen over the past two years. As a rule the strikers were demanding higher wages, better working conditions, and more government expenditure on social requirements.

Nearly 600,000 employees at state hospitals struck on February 18, 1987. The week-long strike by haulage workers, also held in February, affected the entire urban transport system. In the summer there was a series of public sector strikes by railwaymen, pilots, teachers, traindrivers and seamen. Another wave of strikes hit the public sector from October to December, affecting the Alitalia airline, the state suburban transport system, education, medical care, etc.

There was no change in the picture in 1988: strikes once again engulfed rail, air and water transport and the education system.

In May and August, there were mass protest actions against the persistently low economic and cultural development in the south of the country. Working people's social activity reached a peak in

the autumn of 1988. Four hundred thousand joined demonstrations to voice their anxiety over the growth of taxes and the cuts in expenditures for social needs in Rome on November 12, following a call from three major trade union associations.

The three major trade union associations—the General Union of Italian Workers (CGIL), the Italian Confederation of Syndicated Workers (CISL) and the Italian Union of Labour (UIL)—announced a general strike for January 31 of this year to protest against the government's tax decree issued in December 1988. The strike was abandoned after the government agreed to negotiate with the unions, admitted that their demands were reasonable, and undertook to make due amendments to the tax laws. However, within three months the issue was once again on the agenda because the government measures, notably the decision to increase charges for health care, and the continued growth of taxes, had all but invalidated the January agreements. Almost 15 million took part in a general protest strike on May 10 in response to a call issued by the major union centres.

* * *

Editorial Council Members Reply to Our Readers

LEBANON: THE TOXIC WASTE SCANDAL

I have read that some Western companies are dumping toxic waste in Africa—in Nigeria, Ghana and other countries. It seems there was an attempt to turn Lebanon into a dump too. How did Lebanese public opinion react to this?

S. SAKHNO, Voronezh, USSR

Lebanon, my long-suffering country, has indeed become a dump for the toxic waste of Western chemical companies—namely, Jelly Wax of Italy. Here is how it happened.

Jelly Wax, a Milan-based company,

spent a long time trying to get rid of its toxic waste, but its agents' offers had been utterly rejected everywhere. Just over a year ago the company sent its envoys to Lebanon to buy land in which to bury some 4,400 tons of poisonous waste

This survey does not, of course, call into question the overall trend of the 1980s towards a decline in the number of strikes. Still, the facts testify that within the working-class movement processes are coming to a head which promote its consolidation and enhance the role of the unions in formulating alternative programmes to the social policy of state-monopoly capital. And, most importantly, there is evidence of working people's more vigorous participation in the struggle for broad and truly democratic changes in society.

Dr Kurt SCHUMACHER
senior researcher,
Institute for International
Politics and Economics (GDR)

¹ The statistics come from "Kampfaktionen der Arbeiterklasse und anderer demokratischer Kräfte in den Kapitalistischen Hauptländern" (Militant Action by the Working Class and Other Democratic Forces in the Leading Capitalist Countries), *IPW-Berichte*, No. 4, 1988; No. 4, 1989.—Ed.

products. After the proposal was turned down by the Chamber of Deputies of Lebanon's parliament, the Italians contacted the leaders of the so-called Lebanese forces (fascist units which, over the past 15 years, have committed many crimes against the Lebanese people) who agreed without batting an eyelid. The deal was mediated by the Nassar Shipping Company which was paid a handsome fee—about \$5 million.

The "Lebanese forces" sent three naval launches to escort the *Radhost*, the ship carrying the toxic waste, through Lebanese territorial waters. In violation of all laws, she was brought into the port of Beirut and the deadly cargo was unloaded. The public eventually heard that part of the toxic substances (2,000 barrels) had been burned near Al-Karantina, another part buried in different areas in Lebanon, the rest dumped down sewers and into the sea.

The Lebanese judiciary issued warrants for the arrest of the main culprits. Since some of them had fled abroad, Lebanon asked INTERPOL for assis-

tance. The World Health Organisation sent environmental protection experts to inspect Jelly Wax's industrial waste. A special commission of Lebanese and Italian experts was also established. It was stated that the waste products dumped on our coast were highly toxic substances which could not be processed, the destruction of which required the strictest precautions. They contained defoliants, pesticides, chrome, lead and nitrocellulose which explodes at high temperatures or on impact. Even in small concentrations they pose a threat to human health and to the environment.

The consequences of this criminal move were not long in coming. Dozens of swimmers suffered serious skin complaints, and a lot of fish died. At Kissriwan, decomposing chemicals affected children, some of whom needed hospital treatment.

Later, reports appeared in the press that the wastes dumped by Jelly Wax were byproducts of the manufacture of NATO-commissioned chemical weapons. These substances kill the soil where they are buried, contaminate sub-

soil waters, cause genetic problems and increase the incidence of cancer. No European country would agree to bury this poisonous "refuse" on its territory.

Naturally, the Lebanese public is sounding the alarm. All people of influence in the Kissriwan area—mayors, village heads and clergymen—demanded that the waste be removed immediately and the guilty punished. Prominent figures called on the world community and international organisations to protect Lebanon from the dangerous and criminal actions of transnational corporations. Eventually, Jelly Wax was forced to remove part of the waste and return it to Italy.

That is a brief account of the environmental tragedy that affected my country. But is it really over? The probability of such catastrophes recurring is high since many West European and North American companies, who cannot dump their wastes at home because they fear the wrath of environmentalists, are prepared to pay vast sums to anyone who agrees to accept the deadly substances. The world is facing a very grave problem, and it is high time we thought about tackling it.

In many countries, there are increasingly louder calls for a revision of the relevant legislation. It is becoming obvious that there should be stiff penalties for crimes against the environment. Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director of UNEP, has said that the developing countries are expressing legitimate concern over the use of their territories by Western nations for toxic waste dumping. New facts continue to emerge about shipments of toxic substances bound for Venezuela, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Gambia and other countries. But these facts, Tolba stressed, are only the tip of the iceberg. There are reports of new contracts being drawn up for the transportation of millions of tons of highly toxic wastes from Western Europe and the United States to African and Latin American countries.

We hold that the international community must do everything in its power to stop these dirty deals which threaten inevitable environmental disaster.

Rafic SAMHOUN
representative of the Lebanese
Communist Party on WMR



WMR INTRODUCES

JIANG ZEMIN—GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

The 4th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (13th convocation), held in Peking on June 23-24, has elected Jiang Zemin as General Secretary of the CC CPC.

Jiang Zemin was born in 1926 in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province. In April 1946 he joined the CPC and began his revolutionary career. The following year he graduated from the electrical engineering

department of the Jiaotong Polytechnical Institute in Shanghai, and from 1949 he held economic posts in the same city.

In 1955 he was sent as a trainee to the ZIS Motor Works in Moscow. After his return to China in 1956 he became deputy chief power engineer for the first Motor Works in Changchong, and later assistant director of the Shanghai Electrical Equipment Research In-

stitute. He also held other executive positions in industry. In 1980 he was made Vice-Chairman of the State Imports and Exports Committee, also combining the posts of Vice-Chairman and Chief of the Secretariat of the State Foreign Investment Control Committee. In 1982 he became Minister, and secretary of the leadership party group, at the Ministry of Electronics Industry.

In 1985 he was appointed Assistant Secretary and then Secretary of the Shanghai City Party Committee, later assuming the Mayorship of Shanghai.

Jiang Zemin has been a member of the CPC Central Committee since 1982, and a member of its Political Bureau since 1987.

PARTY NEWS

■ CUBA

Four hundred thousand people were interviewed in the course of a grass-roots-level campaign to "confirm" membership cards and the first results have been made public by the Communist Party of Cuba. The basic aim was to give every Communist an opportunity for self-criticism, to enhance political activism and production performance, and to see whether members' behaviour was in line with party policy. Over 6,000 were disciplined and nearly 2,000 expelled from the party, with most reprimands arising from non-compliance with the party Rules (almost 40%) and irresponsibility and indiscipline at work (31%).

■ CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Local Communists are preparing for the 18th Congress of their party, to be held in May 1990. It will approve a Party Programme and define a strategy of further socialist development in Czechoslovak conditions. New CPCz Rules will also be adopted. In particular, they envisage the confirmation of a limited term of elective office, including the post of CC General Secretary, the principle of secret ballot in the formation of leading bodies, and a contested election. The congress will also discuss a draft of Czechoslovakia's new Constitution.

■ FINLAND

The Communist Party's May CC plenum has resolved to hold the 22nd Congress of the SKP in February 1990. It has deemed it possible to include the question of changing the SKP Rules in the forthcoming forum's agenda. This may be necessitated by a projected unification of the SKP with the Finnish People's Democratic League and the creation of a new left party on this basis.

■ GDR

The SED Central Committee has announced an exchange of member-

ship cards to take place from September 1 to December 31, 1989. This is the fourth such campaign since the unifying congress set up the party in 1946. It marks an important stage in the preparations for the 12th SED Congress scheduled for May 1990 and is necessitated by the fact that most membership cards will expire in 1990. The measure will involve interviews with all full and probationary SED members.

■ HUNGARY

The Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, held in June, 1989, resolved to call the 14th HSWP Congress in October, elected the party Chairman and a 4-man HSWP Presidium, and extended to 21 the number of members of the Political Bureau, which is to serve as the party's Political Executive Bureau.

■ PDRY

The Yemen Socialist Party's May CC plenum has discussed major goals of political and economic reform in the country, stressing the need to further strengthen the YSP's leadership role in democratising society, in solving urgent economic problems and in removing the deformations and errors in government structure and in relations between the state apparatus and mass organisations. It especially noted the importance of identifying the common interests of North and South Yemen and objective prerequisites for unifying two parts of the country and creating effective forms of consolidating Yemeni society in a unitary and democratic state with equal rights for all its citizens.

■ SFRY

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia will hold its first extraordinary congress in December 1989. Under its

Rules, the party organisation of any republic or province that comes up with an initiative for convening an extraordinary congress (as did the conference of the League of Communists of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina) shall both organise the forum and elaborate its main documents. However, the LCY's April 1989 CC Plenum took a compromise decision to form a preparatory committee made up of representatives of all the republics and provinces of Yugoslavia.

■ TUNISIA


A statement by the Tunisian Communist Party (TCP) summing up the results of the second session of the National Council, which considered political and organisational matters, calls for the creation of a progressive bloc of democratic forces. The National Council indicated that the chief tasks for the coming period would be improving the party structure, expanding its work among various sectors of the population, particularly young people, and providing better political and ideological training to activists.

■ USSR

The CPSU CC Commission on Party Construction and Personnel Policy reviewed its recruitment record and measures to attract new members in the light of demands being made on Communists in the present stage of perestroika. It stated that most of the 438,900 people who joined the CPSU in 1988 were motivated by ideological considerations and had become actively involved in the work to renovate society. The drive to rid the party of unsuitable elements has been stepped up. The Commission deemed it necessary to heighten the responsibility of those who recommend recruits, and of the grassroots organisations as a whole, for the selection of candidate



THE BOOK SCENE



TOWARDS
A STATE
OF
INDEPENDENCE

THE HILLETHERN UPONING
OF INDEPENDENT INDIAN



THE LESSONS OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DOGMATISM

Ajoy Ghosh, **MARXISM AND INDIAN REALITY**. Selected Speeches and Writings, Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, 423 pp.

This anthology consists of selections from writings and speeches of Ajoy Ghosh, an outstanding leader of the Communist Party of India. They embrace mainly the period from 1951, when Ghosh was elected the General Secretary of the Central Committee,¹ till his tragic death in early 1962.

Perhaps a few words are due about the author himself. He was only a boy when he joined the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, the most popular, active and prominent national revolutionary organisation of the 1920s in India. He was an accused in the Lahore Conspiracy Case of 1929-1930 but was acquitted as the imperialist prosecution could not produce even a shred of evidence against him.

By this time Ghosh was already experiencing a certain disillusionment in the methods and forms of struggle of the national revolutionaries. The fact that a party of middle class revolutionaries relying on armed action by individuals as the highest form of struggle and operating in isolation from the people cannot rouse and mobilise the masses into the revolutionary movement was dawning on him. Ajoy Ghosh began to search for more effective ways of anti-imperialist struggle. This was a complex, difficult and painful process. It finally led him to scientific socialism and to the Communist Party of India. He joined the party in 1931. He himself vividly portrays this trans-

formation of his to a Communist in his pamphlet *Bhagat Singh² and His Comrades*, included in the present volume.

A few of the writings in the collection belong to the late 1930s. The Communists then worked in the Indian National Congress which they strove to develop, and with considerable success, into the united front of all anti-imperialist forces in the country. The selections from this period contain mainly critical comments on the agrarian and labour policies of some of the Congress provincial governments then functioning under limited provincial autonomy under British India government. An article deals with the concrete approach of the Communists in their work in the Congress combating the disruption of the Right, consolidating the Left and building up national unity.

Ajoy Ghosh was elected General Secretary of our party at a very critical phase of its history. Since its Second Congress in 1948, two dogmatic and sectarian political lines—one calling itself “the Russian path” and the other “the Chinese path”—afflicted the party one after another. There was one factor common to both these lines. They could not tackle the Indian specifics and work out a realistic political course on that basis. These lines and the adventurist actions corollary to them shattered the party ideologically, politically and organisationally. An intervention from abroad in the form of the editorial article in the Cominform paper *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* helped the party to see that its leadership had led it along the wrong track. But it could not set things right. For the editorial itself was steeped in dogmatism and its analysis did not take into account many a national specifics.

The party was sharply divided. A deep inner-party crisis ensued. A certain level of unity could be forged only towards the end of 1951, when the programme of the party and a tactical line were worked out through which the worst features of sectarianism and adventurism of the previous years were overcome. It is at the climax of this process that Ajoy Ghosh was

elected to be at the helm of the party. The party again went to the people. The ruptured links with the masses were considerably restored within even a few months as was evidenced in the successes we scored in the first general elections of 1951-1952. The CPI emerged as a significant political force in the country.

Despite this undoubted advance, deep dogmatism persisted in our understanding on a number of basic questions. Our leadership considered the independence achieved in 1947 was a sham and that the Indian government essentially carried out the foreign policy of British imperialism. It assessed that the Indian state was upholding the imperialist-feudal order. And so on. This dogmatic understanding, however, was not the exclusive bane of the CPI leadership. It came down essentially from the then Stalin leadership of the CPSU. Those were still the years when the axiom that the development of Marxism-Leninism, and even comprehension of reality in one's own country in the last analysis had to come from a single party and a single personality was ingrained in the world communist movement. We were at any rate the slaves of this concept.

As the 1950s unfolded, significant shifts could be witnessed in the policies of India's capitalist ruling class. Contradictions with international imperialism began to be sharpened. The Nehru government was taking steps to consolidate the country's independence—foreign policy turned decisively in an anti-imperialist direction with Pancha Shila, Bandung and Asian solidarity, opposition to imperialist war pacts, and the initiatives to develop closer relations with the Soviet Union, People's China and other socialist countries. And the government took a number of steps in the direction of independent capitalist economic development. Simultaneously the 1950s saw a certain erosion of the mass influence of the Congress. The CPI consolidated its position as the major opposition political force in the country. It is in this period that the first elected communist government came into being in the state of Kerala.

These momentous developments contradicted with the deeply held dogmatic views in the party. Ajoy Ghosh's merit consisted in that he grappled with these developments and discerned to a considerable extent their meaning and significance. And although he too was very much under the Stalin spell, still, when confronted with new reality, his Marxism enabled him to understand that the party had to comprehend this new situation if it had to move forward. True, he was not alone in this struggle. The majority in the Central Committee (and later in the National Council) supported him and several of them made their own contributions to renovating the party line. Most of the articles and speeches of Ajoy Ghosh in this volume deal with various facets of this difficult and painful transition from dogmatism and sectarianism to a more profound, genuine Marxist-Leninist understanding of the processes of social and political development in India.

As developments unfolded, it became clear within a matter of months after the adoption of the 1951 CPI programme that some of its basic postulates were or had become obsolete. Most glaring was the significant shift in the government's foreign policy course. Towards the mid-1950s it had become in the main a policy that upholds peace and independence. The Central Committee recognised this change despite stiff resistance from a section of the party. Asserting this fact of change, Ajoy Ghosh sharply underlined that "there is a tendency inside the party to underestimate the change in the foreign policy and undervalue its impact on the international situation... The dogmatic and sectarian understanding on the issue of foreign policy and

India's status is a serious obstacle in the task of forging broad popular unity for strengthening peace and national freedom" (see pp. 143, 144). Today, when India's foreign policy of anti-imperialism is upheld by the Communists in the country, we recall with satisfaction that it is Ajoy Ghosh who began the struggle to make this a common consciousness of the entire party.

In his works he demolished the dogmatic assertion that India is not a sovereign country. The country has achieved political freedom. The patriotic masses feel rightly proud of this fact, noted Ghosh and already then underlined that we Communists should identify fully with this legitimate feeling of the people. In this context, he rejected the then prevailing notion in the party on the Indian monopoly bourgeoisie: "The Indian monopolists cannot be called *pro-imperialist*. They do not want to join imperialist war bloc nor do they want to subordinate Indian economy to foreign monopoly interests. They have their own ambitions—that of developing India as an independent capitalist country" (p. 233).

The monopoly bourgeoisie display proneness to compromise with imperialism as well. They also constitute a reactionary force in our economic, social and political life. This dual position of the bourgeoisie is the source of conflicts arising in the Nehru government and in the Congress. Ajoy Ghosh points out that Left-sectarianism tends to dismiss these conflicts as being of no significance. This is wrong. And this indifference indicates a failure to win allies. He underlined that it is essential to adopt a correct attitude towards these differences for the growth of the mass movement and for the broadest popular unity for national advance.

There was a trend in the party which thought that a differentiation had taken place in the bourgeoisie and advocated a united front with the INC. Ajoy Ghosh rejected this as a reformist position. At the same time he constantly placed emphasis on forging links with the democratic forces within it and the masses under Congress influence. For, he underlined, the Congress hold extended to all classes—peasants, the artisans, intelligentsia and the working class, besides the national bourgeoisie. The main division among the democratic forces is between the masses following the Congress and the opposition parties. No broad national unity could be forged ignoring this reality of the Indian situation. And efforts to create a united front cannot succeed on the basis of the Communists' platform alone. Ajoy Ghosh emphatically raised this central political question of India's democratic and social advance. This remains essentially unresolved to this day.

While Ghosh was thus constantly conscious of the problem of uniting all the democratic forces, he never glossed over questions which could cause ideological confusion. He cogently exposed the Congress Party's claim of building socialism. At the same time he had no hesitation in supporting the basic elements of the Second Five-Year Plan strategy of the Nehru government prompted by the interests of independent national development. Again when Nehru came out denouncing international communism, Ajoy Ghosh spoke openly against the Prime Minister's unfair criticism. Two articles, "Pandit Nehru's Socialism—A Hoax" and "Pandit Nehru Raises Again Old Bogey of International Communism", deal mainly with such ideological questions. Evaluating his arguments from today's consciousness, one would think the tone and approach in them could have been more persuasive and taken more careful ac-

count of the consciousness of Congressmen, but his basic positions need no change.

Towards the end of the 1950s, religious-communal reaction began to rear its head. A number of Ghosh's articles in this volume deal with the anticommunal struggle, the consolidation of Indian unity, the struggle for the reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis and the problems of language and culture.

It was after the 20th Congress of the CPSU that an intensive attack on Communists began in our country. The party had to enter into a dialogue with the Socialists and other political circles, and at the same time combat anticommunist forays. How this was being tackled is illustrated by Ajoy Ghosh's reply to socialist leader Jaiprakash Narain. Ghosh underlined there that one of Communists' gravest failings in the past had been not to recognise the specific features and traditions of each country in the struggle for socialist transformation. We, he wrote, believe in the possibility of socialism being achieved in our country without resort to violence and civil war. This understanding was carried forward at the 5th Party Congress at Amritsar (1958), which emphasised that in socialist India the right of political organisation would be enjoyed even by those who were opposed to the government so long as they abided by the Constitution. This was an important step forward in the process of imbibing the fresh breeze of the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

Ghosh exerted great efforts in the struggle against sectarianism and its intolerance of others' viewpoint. He wrote: "It would be a great mistake on the part of anyone to claim that his position is correct and his job is merely to defend it. Let us give up that position. The thing is that while defending the point of view which you think is correct you should also try to see whether there is anything correct in the other point of view or not" (p. 169). Accepting the correct elements from the others' view, enriching and even modifying one's view in their light is "how a unified understanding is evolved and unified line worked out" (*Ibidem*).

In sum, the volume under review reflects an experience that is useful for the present and the future.

Unni KRISHNAN
member of the National Council of the CPI

¹ National Council of the CPI since 1958.—*Ed.*

² National hero of the Indian people, convicted in the Lahore Conspiracy Case and executed along with two of his colleagues.

* * *

PARADOXES OF PERESTROIKA

**Jean-Marie Chauvier, URSS: UNE SOCIÉTÉ
EN MOUVEMENT (USSR: A Society in Move-
ment), Editions de l'Aube, Paris, 1988,
412 pp.**

In the extensive Western literature devoted to the restructuring processes in the USSR, Jean-Marie Chauvier's book *USSR: A Society in Movement* is an outstanding event, a work based on a profound knowledge of concrete facts. The author—a leading French journalist of Belgian extraction—lived in the Soviet Union, and has visited the country several times in recent years. This has enabled him to create a broad panorama of the life of society and to show it as if from within, in all its contradictoriness.

Chauvier describes the central paradox of Soviet reform as follows: the advocates of perestroika "can change nothing without changing everything, and the changes can only be gradual" (p. 390).

Surveying the path travelled by the country since 1917, the author can see both its achievements and its shortcomings (an approach which distinguishes him from many Western Sovietologists). In light of this, as an answer to the question of why everything has to be changed, he speaks of a second paradox relating not so much to perestroika as to Soviet development as a whole. On the one hand, the USSR leads the world in a number of important quantitative indicators, producing more steel, footwear, tractors, combine harvesters and grain than anybody else. But on the other, notes the book, "the Soviet

Union is experiencing shortages of everything" (p. 303). The "secret" of the paradox is explained by low product quality and inefficient use, shortages of spare parts and huge farm-output losses during transportation, including a fifth of the grain harvest. Thus the world's major wheat producer becomes the world's major wheat importer.

The publication also dwells on the contradictions in other spheres. In the seventy years of its existence, the USSR has created one of the world's largest health services, employing every third doctor in the world. But at the same time medical equipment and drugs are in short supply, the share of the budget spent on health is relatively small and infant mortality is high.

A mosaic of the union of nearly 120 Soviet nations and nationalities, which constitute a federation of 15 republics and 38 other national autonomies, is given in the book. Yet it also notes the strain in the relations between nationalities, the reasons for which vary from the consequences of Stalinism (in particular, an excessive centralisation, violations of national sovereignty, and deportations of individual peoples) and increased bureaucratisation in the stagnation period to the objective problems relating to the economic, political and cultural development of the country's peoples. Elucidating the situation in Nagorny Karabakh and the Baltic and Central Asian republics, the author concludes that a solution to the national question has become one of the most important and difficult tasks of perestroika.

Chauvier writes that the 1980s have seen a crisis arise in Soviet society (see p. 321). The only way out is through a drastic renewal of its economic and political systems, social initiatives, the abandonment of the repression of the personality and an end to the alienation of the people from power. It is for this reason that "everything needs to be changed".

But why do the changes have to be "gradual"? Again, there is a paradox. Most people appear to support perestroika and this should ensure its quickest possible advance. But the reforms are skidding in places, remaining on paper only: there are inhibiting factors, divergent interests and struggles between different groups and trends.

The author attempts to show a differentiated attitude to perestroika. Since this question is little studied, his observations are not without interest. First of all, Chauvier considers the division of society simply into "reformers" and "conservatives" as inadequate because the composition of these groups is extremely diverse and because there are many intermediate ones outside them.

In its social characterisation of the supporters and opponents of perestroika, the book refers to the conclusions drawn by Soviet sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya. She groups sympathetic intellectuals, front-rank managers, workers and peasants, and the "new small entrepreneurs" among the former, and members of the economic and political cadres who fear for their incomes, backward workers with a stake in the status quo, and criminal elements among the latter. Zaslavskaya includes a significant portion of the urban and rural workers in intermediate groups because of their vacillation, prompted by fears of increased prices as the reforms progress and of unemployment as plants close.

Chauvier tries independently to pin down the differences in ideological and political stands. He points to the "traditionalist" views which crop up in discussions (an idealisation of the past, criticism of immoral tendencies, etc.), to which he counterposes "liberal" and technocratic approaches. He then categorises as a special group the so-called "socialist etatists", i.e., supporters of a continuing strong role for the state who want perestroika to advance at a moderate pace. Of course, such a classification is very provisional. Moreover, one gets the impression that the author is linking it with the history of social thought in Russia. The "traditionalists", as he presents them, resemble very much the Slavophiles of the 19th century, and the "liberals" the Westernizers. The "socialist etatists" bear the stamp of the "revolutionary romanticists" of the early 20th century. These analogies may be useful—at any rate, the diversity of views revealed by perestroika lends researchers plenty of material for broad comparisons.

In the turbulent sea of perestroika outdated traditions are clashing with new approaches and there is a contest between

those who are looking for answers and those who merely pretend to while trying to defend the old and resuscitate an already discarded past. Chauvier is therefore absolutely right when he criticises the works of Western Sovietologists who still talk of the Soviet Union as a "barracks society" of monolithic uniformity.

There is, he says, an inherent optimism in perestroika which the West underestimates. Most bourgeois commentators treat the processes in the USSR only in the light of a false dilemma: success—the country becomes part of the Western world—or failure—the establishment of a tyrannical regime. "...Russia", says the book, "will never become either a new America, or another Japan, or even a simple extension of Western Europe" (p. 391). By implementing perestroika, the Soviet people are not just looking for a way out of the "Stalin tunnel"; their aim is to build a new society which far exceeds the performance of the Western model.

Although the book says little about the foreign policy aspect of perestroika, by acquainting readers with internal Soviet problems, the author does lead them towards an understanding of its roots. As Claude Julien, director of the newspaper *Le Monde diplomatique*, stresses in the foreword, the insights given into the restructuring processes help us better to understand the essence and significance of recent Soviet world initiatives. A drastic renovation of society requires peace and disarmament, a point convincingly reiterated during Mikhail Gorbachov's visit to France in July 1989.

I can only commend Chauvier's historical approach to the questions being examined. Looking at the current reforms, he recalls the intentions of the 1960s. Much attention is paid to an analysis of the consequences of Stalinism, and factual information is cited on the scale of the repressions, the intellectual genocide, and the victims of collectivisation in the 1930s. The author rejects the line of a number of Western propagandists who see socialism as solely made up of these deformations and who call perestroika a Russian "trick", "a scheme to hoodwink the West".

Perestroika—and here is another paradox—was born of the sufferings and torment of the people but bears with it a "melody of hope". Russia, concludes Chauvier, after all the trials and tribulations of the stormy 20th century, "is again becoming a place where people can believe in the future".

Jiří VRBA

* * *

THE LONGEST UPRISING

TOWARDS A STATE OF INDEPENDENCE.

The Palestinian Uprising. December 1987-August 1988, FACTS Information Committee, Jerusalem, 1988, 265 pp.

The intifada—the Palestinians' popular uprising against the Israeli occupiers which began in December 1987—has been variously assessed in many articles and several books, some

looking at the reasons behind it, others at certain aspects and political results.

That the events on the Palestinian lands are the focus of so much attention is understandable given the uniqueness of this almost two-year campaign of civil disobedience. The aim of the intifada is not only to resist Israeli occupation, but also to fight for the basic rights of all Palestinian Arabs (above all, to self-determination), for an international conference of all interested parties, including the PLO, on a just settlement in the Middle East, and now also for an independent Palestinian state.

Towards a State of Independence is not just the impartial notes of a detached observer, nor a dry scholarly investigation, but a vivid glimpse from within of the new phenomena and

situations connected with the uprising. This collection of articles, which appeared after the Israeli authorities had blocked all reporting on events in the occupied territories and prohibited journalists from visiting the trouble spots there, seeks to inform the international public about the sufferings inflicted on the Palestinian people by the Israeli army and settlers.

The book convincingly reveals that it was the actions of the Israeli authorities in the political, economic and social fields after the 1967 aggression that provoked the feelings of protest which accumulated and inevitably erupted into open rebellion. The occupiers confiscated 52% of Palestinian lands in the West Bank and 42% in Gaza, and severely limited the availability of water to the local population, while allowing Israeli settlers double the amount.

The occupiers put up constant obstacles to the growth of local industry while brutally exploiting the workers. The population responded with various forms of resistance, amassing the experience of struggle which made the intifada possible. The book reveals the major preliminary actions which played a significant role in the campaign against such anti-Arab political manoeuvres as the Camp David agreement and the plan for granting "autonomy" to Palestine.

The analysis of the changes in the social composition of the population in the occupied territories is of particular interest. A significant increase in the working class is noted, as is the growth of social groups living in camps and bearing the brunt of the tragedy of their people. The emergence of people's committees, which organise the protection of local inhabitants, offer help towards farm development, health care and food supplies, and examine and decide on conflicts between Palestinians, is seen as a decisive factor behind the intifada and a guarantee of its continuation. This attests both to the growing involvement of the masses in the national liberation movement and to their increased militancy and maturity, something that is reflected in the expansion of the arsenal of organisational forms. "This has led to a weakening of the role of bureaucratic elements within the national movement, to the extent that the uprising has increased confidence in popular action," stresses the book (p. 11). The Israeli authorities have outlawed the people's committees and those taking part risk 10 years in jail. Nevertheless, the activity of the committees continues.

The breakdown of the civil administrative apparatus created by the occupiers is also described. As a result of the population's refusal to pay taxes and the resignations of Arab policemen and personnel in several municipalities, the occupiers' ties with their agents and collaborators have been paralysed, and there are increasing calls for a selective boycott of Israeli goods.

The book contains a detailed chronicle of the resistance

movement in towns and camps where the population's anger finds expression in clashes with the occupation forces and in acts of protest and disobedience. Students and pupils, workers and peasants, employers and intellectuals are participating in the intifada.

Bitterness and anger fill the pages which describe the barbaric methods being used to put down the uprising: mass arrests, a ban on movement between towns, the curfew, economic sanctions, the murder and maiming of thousands of Palestinians, the destruction of homes... Figures are given which show that, of the dead, 77% died from bullet wounds, 14% from the effects of gas, and 5% from beatings (see p. 157).

The intifada is often called a "revolution of stones", these having become the chief weapon of the participants, particularly the young. Young people between 15 and 29 have suffered the highest number of casualties—67% of the dead. The Israeli army is thus destroying the future of our nation.

In Gaza alone, 4,148 people were wounded between December 1987 and April 1988, that is, about 1% of the total population (see p. 178). In May-June of last year, Israeli settlers destroyed 4,175 fruit trees, 450 citrus trees and the grain crop on a total area of 4,000 donums¹ (see p. 206).

The book also contains letters from prisoners in the Beitunia and Ansar 3 jails which reveal their plight and the atrocities of the Israeli authorities. But their spirit remains unbroken.

Other materials in the book reflect the approaches of different countries to the solution of the Palestinian problem, including the position of Amman with regard to the West Bank, the proposals from the US State Department, and the principled Soviet policy, which coincides with the peace plan of the PLO.

Readers cannot fail to be moved by the insights given into the life of the Palestinian people, who are writing the heroic story of their struggle for independence in their own blood. The intifada has changed the political climate in the Middle East. New opportunities for peace are establishing themselves there.

Mahmoud SHUKEIR
member, CC, Palestinian Communist Party;
representative on WMR

¹ A land measure equal to 910 sq m.—E

DIGGING TOO DEEP

John Stalker, *STALKER*, Harrap, London, 1988, 288 pp.

This book is remarkable in many ways. John Stalker revealed in it intimate details of the current operations of the British counterintelligence service in Northern Ireland and disclosed highly damaging facts about the activity there of the paramilitary Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Within two months of publication the book *Stalker* was into its fifth reprint and became an outright indictment of the British state's policy in Northern Ireland. No wonder when the author attended a dinner of Irish people in his home city Manchester he was given a standing ovation—undoubtedly the first British senior policeman to receive such treatment—and when he went to Dublin to launch his book the people came in thousands to buy and to pat his back.

...Stalker, who held the post of deputy head of the police in Manchester, was charged to investigate the deaths of six young men in Northern Ireland in 1982. All were unarmed at the time they died. All were killed within the space of five weeks by members of the same previously unknown commando style "fast reaction" unit within the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

The shootings were part of what Stalker calls at one point the act of "a Central American assassination squad, truly of a police force out of control", adding on page 253 that "the circumstances of these shootings pointed to a police inclination, if not a policy, to shoot suspects dead without warning rather than to arrest them". Stalker gives evidence of the way in which the killings were linked, stemming from evidence provided by the same informer within the IRA,¹ of how the British army and MI5 were involved through elaborate surveillance measures and how, in order to cover up this involvement and obscure the deliberate nature of the killings, senior officers in the RUC had invented a completely untrue set of cover stories.

The reason for Stalker's investigation was that some of this had been exposed in two trials of some of the RUC commandos involved. Public outcry over the killings had led to murder charges being brought against the RUC members who in turn, in order to protect themselves from lengthy jail sentences, revealed something of what had happened which, in turn, forced the authorities to set up the Stalker inquiry.

However Stalker soon discovered much was involved, in particular that one of the killings had been recorded on a secret surveillance tape recorder put in place by MI5. This, of course, would quickly reveal the truth or otherwise of the RUC claims about the killing. When Stalker began to demand that he be allowed to hear this tape, he was removed from the inquiry. "A decision of this importance," he writes, "I feel sure would be unlikely to have been made at anything less than the highest levels" (p. 264).

The authorities were undoubtedly taken aback by Stalker's ruthless persistence in driving for the truth. The traditional role of the inquiry, public or private, in British governmental practice is to stall public protest and find a fudge to smother the truth, not to ferret it out in the way Stalker was doing.

He had been subjected to the closest security vetting on several occasions by MI5 and was one of the most highly

thought-of British police officers. He was one of the top hundred, with prospects of promotion to the most senior ranks, if not eventually the supreme position of Commissioner of Scotland Yard. The year before he was appointed to the Northern Ireland inquiry he spent on a special government course on security policy "affecting the Western democracies and other countries with similar interests", as the Ministry of Defence documentation on the course puts it. As part of this course he was "hosted at presidential level" in Chile. He was no closet radical. He was trusted by the highest authorities in Britain to carry out the investigation in a way which might offer some reforms in RUC practices, slap a few wrists but leave most stones carefully unturned. Instead he blew the situation apart.

The exposures caused concern in Britain, voiced in the media, in parliament and wider. This has been emphasised by the shooting of three similarly unarmed IRA members in Gibraltar two months after the publication of the Stalker book. In the wake of those killings the government has sought to put as tight a clamp as it can on public discussion of what lay behind those killings. It has tried to intimidate the media, particularly the two television authorities in Britain, from allowing their journalists to investigate what took place.

The Gibraltar shootings meant that the Irish issue and the problems Stalker pinpointed have remained in the media headlines. But while they have remained news, they have not been the focus of concerted political action. The British public is still alienated from the Irish question. One opinion poll, for instance, revealed that on the killing of the Gibraltar three nearly two-thirds of those questioned supported what had happened. This contrasts with the continuing very high showing for a "Yes" answer to the question: Should the British troops be brought home from Northern Ireland?

The generality of the British public tends to view the crisis there as one of Irish against Irish in which "our boys" are the innocent victims. Bring them home and let the Irish kill each other, the argument goes. Accompanied by a growing strain of anti-Irish racism in British culture, this is not an attitude upon which the British Left has been able to build a positive mass movement in Britain to work for change in relation to Ireland. Quite the contrary. Assisted by the impact of the IRA's campaign which has been wholly negative both in Ireland and Britain, this has helped successive British governments avoid any strong opposition to their policy for Ireland.

Stalker's work and the media investigation into the Gibraltar killings have not only shaken the well-being of the Thatcher government, but also offer the possibility for some openings towards a common process of campaigning against such changes which could help make democratic action around the Irish question the property of groups beyond the extreme, and often Trotskyist, Left in British politics.

For decades the Unionists, determined to hold to the union with Britain, appeared to be totally secure in their political control of a semi-autonomous government in Belfast, Northern Ireland's main city, right up to the mid 1960s. Then for the first time mass political struggles around issues which could unite Catholics and Protestants presented a challenge the regime could not cope with. The mass movement which appeared was met with violence which in turn brought in the British army. The soldiers came not to counter the IRA which at that time effectively did not exist, but to counter the violence from the Unionist side.

It was the calculation of Communists at that time that this

mass movement could win sufficient support in Britain and sufficient numbers away from the Unionist all-class alliance to be able to impose democratic reforms. This in turn was seen as offering a basis upon which some steps towards Irish national unity could eventually be secured. Things did not work out like that. Unionism in fact consolidated its hold and is now a stronger political force even than it was at the time of partition when southern Ireland won its independence in the early 1920s. One reason for this was the failure of the movement in Britain to grow to a point at which it could press home any fundamental changes in the structure of society and political control established by Unionism over the previous 50 years. Another has been the impact of the terror style tactics used by the IRA. This has devastated towns in Northern Ireland, alienated public opinion in Britain and blocked political activity on the streets in Northern Ireland.

Communists, therefore, face a difficult conundrum in both Ireland and Britain. They are opposed to the shoot-to-kill system of "law and order" which Stalker investigated. They support the cause of Irish independence—the British Communists have never organised in Northern Ireland. But they oppose the military campaign of the IRA—characterised in repeated statements from the two parties as a strange liberation campaign in

that it has done more to strengthen the hold of imperialism on Ireland than anything else.

Neither in Ireland nor in Britain have attempts succeeded in constructing movements which have any prospect of winning widespread popular support around demands which challenge British policy in regard to Northern Ireland. This has given the British government a largely clear field...

Communists do not regard the so-called Anglo-Irish agreement² as the way to a solution. But it has made issues like the Stalker affair international ones.

Chris MYANT
member, Executive Committee, Communist Party
of Great Britain

¹ The Irish Republican Army, an armed organisation which has been fighting a campaign since late 1970.

² This agreement puts the stress on Britain's links with the Republic rather than Unionism in the North. It gives the Dublin government the right to take part in official discussions about the internal affairs of Northern Ireland as part of the British state.







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World Marxist Review is published by **Progress Books**,
71 Bathurst Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5V 2P6.

Second class mail registration number 2352.

Printed in Canada.

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